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ABSTRACT
Since the end of World War II, a rather consistent narrative has appeared regarding the
origins of this terrible conflict: Hitler started it. The victorious western powers emerged as
innocent victims in the titanic struggle while the USSR, once allied to both Hitler and the west,
took on the role of principal villain during the Cold War.
With the collapse of communism and the partial opening of Soviet archives, a reassessment appeared, principally under the heading of the “Collective Security School.” As
politically incorrect as it may seem, sober reflection indicates that the Soviet Union was actually
the peacemaker in the inter-war period, while Britain and France engaged in a dangerous game
of deception and underhandedness regarding the USSR. With all options exhausted, the Soviets
turned to Hitler, making the attack on Poland easier.
In this dissertation, I present documentary evidence of Soviet intensions and western
duplicity. The Soviets did not seek to divert a conflict; they did not want war in any manner. The
USSR was undergoing massive internal upheaval in economic, social, political, and military
spheres. Soviet leaders could not risk an open contest for fear of losing the bigger prize: the
Soviet Revolution. Soviet diplomacy pursued a consistent path of collective security until
western intransigence became too great. The Nazi-Soviet Non –Aggression Pact of August 23,
1939, far from being a goal of Soviet policy, was simply a last resort.
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INTRODUCTION
Historians, like contemporary observers, have never fully understood why, in August,
1939, the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with its avowed enemy, Nazi Germany.
Some have asserted that the pact represented the outlines of a Moscow-Berlin axis bent on world
domination between Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler; others concluded that the Soviet dictator
finally gave up on the policy of collective security and turned to the only nation willing to align
with the Soviet Union. This work will argue that the Nazi-Soviet pact, with its secret protocols,
was Stalin’s last resort to slow down the advance of German aggression in Eastern Europe and
buy time for the Soviet Union substantively to oppose the coming conflict with Hitler. By late
August 1939 Western policy became clear regarding alignment with the USSR. With the horrors
of collectivization, man-made famine, and widespread purges revolutionizing the USSR, Stalin
could ill-afford the outbreak of a general war involving the Soviet Union. Stalin and the foreign
policy leadership of the Soviet Union favored collective security, that is, pacts of non-aggression
and mutual assistance with any and all nations opposed to Nazi Germany. When this policy
failed to produce results, the pact of 1939 became a reality.
In this work, I concentrate on the substance and shifts in diplomatic relations between
Germany and Russia between 1917 and most of 1939 until the conclusion of the Non-Aggression
Pact in August, 1939. The purpose of this presentation is to analyze the tension between Marxist
world revolutionary theory and Realpolitik in the USSR as well as to contribute to the “collective
security” debate begun by A.J.P. Taylor and refined by Geoffrey Roberts and Robert Tucker.
This work will argue that collective security was a substantive component of Soviet foreign
policy until late August 1939. “The case for collective security rests on the claim that regulated,
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institutionalized balancing predicated on the notion of all against one provides more stability
than unregulated, self-help balancing predicated on the notion of each for his own. Under
collective security, states agree to abide by certain norms and rules to maintain stability and,
when necessary, band together to stop aggression. Stability—the absence of major war—is the
product of cooperation.” 1 This controversy centers on the motives of Stalin and the Soviet
Foreign Office as to whether Stalin genuinely sought peace and stability in Europe or whether
his entire foreign policy program was a ruse to attract Nazi Germany into a substantive alliance
for the division of Europe. Central to this argument is an analysis of how this shift in political
authority in central and Eastern Europe toward a powerful Soviet Union altered the diplomatic
history of what could have become a formidable Nazi-Soviet alliance. Stalin, Maxim Litvinov
and Viacheslav Molotov supported the idea of collective security separate from the limitations of
Marxist theory. Stalin particularly understood that the USSR could not be involved in a general
war in the 1930s because it could not prevail in such a conflict. He sought to avoid war while
carrying out his terror inside the Soviet Union. His “peaceful” intentions were to avoid foreign
military conflict. The role of the dictators in the formation of foreign policy will be analyzed
against the backdrop of increasing domestic tensions in order to illustrate their ultimate goals; for
Hitler the goal was war, for Stalin international stability and internal terror.
A more general aim of this dissertation is to illustrate the importance of intention,
perception, and patience in foreign policy. By intention, I mean the interests of the states
involved and how they sought to fulfill those interests, that is, what did they want to
accomplish?: by perception, the political and intellectual overlay of foreign policy often leading
to distorted policies, how things appeared. I define patience as the painstaking give and take of
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modern diplomatic interchange and the willingness to wait for results. By examining the
diplomatic relations between Germany and Russia between 1917 and 1939, I hope to illustrate
that it was indeed the USSR which sought collective security in order to prevent a conflict
anywhere, while the domestic terror proceeded.
Central to this discussion is a detailed analysis of the diplomacy of Britain and France; a
policy which drove the USSR into the arms of Germany in 1939. Western policy regarding the
USSR alternated between reality and consternation in the 1930s. While the specter of war cast a
giant shadow over Britain and France, it cast the same shadow over the USSR. Russia too
suffered horribly in the Great War and sought to avoid a repeat of the carnage. British and
French diplomats and politicians feared the possible spread of communism more than the direct
threat of Nazism. They felt that any war could be localized, while the USSR wanted to avoid
armed conflict altogether. Domestic considerations and public opinion obscured the need for a
collective front against Germany. Paris and London did have some legitimate grounds for
limiting contact with the USSR. Perhaps such a discussion will deepen the debate concerning
contemporary problems in international relations, such as the recently revealed initiative for talks
between the United States, Pakistan, and the Taliban.
Britain and France faced a confusing, often contradictory Russia. While the foreign
commissariat advocated collective security, the Comintern continued to preach worldwide
revolution. The role of this controversial body shifted with the international fortunes of the
Soviet state. Founded in March, 1919, it spoke for the Marxist ideal of worldwide proletarian
upheaval, its venom especially directed against Russia’s direct enemy, Great Britain. The United
Kingdom was the model of western excesses: brutal capitalism and empire. Britain was also one
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of the nations leading the allied intervention against the Bolshevik revolution. One of the
declarations from the first Congress of the Comintern attacked Great Britain directly: “Matured
by the entire course of events over decades, the war was unleashed through the direst and
deliberate provocation of Great Britain.” 2 Later, as the USSR gained more international
stability, its voice was somewhat curtailed. 3 Even after Rapallo the Fourth Congress of the
Comintern in 1923 reminded the oppressed classes that, “The proletarian revolution can never
triumph within the limits of a single state, that it can triumph only on an international scale by
merging itself in a world revolution…in all countries the impoverished and enslaved workers
must proclaim their moral, economic, and political solidarity with Soviet Russia.” 4 The Soviet
Union aided Germany in avoiding the military provisions of the treaty of Versailles by opening
three joint German-Soviet bases on Soviet territory. Additionally, the USSR violated the arms
provisions of the League of Nations and the non- intervention agreement with its actions in the
Spanish Civil War. The terror and purges were beginning to make headlines in the west,
contributing to the anti-communist atmosphere. The west simply hated communism and wanted
the new state in the east to collapse. Stalin took the opportunity of the conflict in Spain to
brutally subjugate the Spanish Communist Party under the iron fist of Moscow. To western
diplomats, these actions did not comport with “collective security.” For Paris and London, the
real threat of war was in the east and this was not their problem. It was not “politically correct”
to support the USSR. Politicians were re-elected on an anti-Soviet platform. If Hitler attacked
the Soviet Union and was exhausted in the process, the twin devils may fall together.
Since the end of World War II, diplomatic historians, such as those mentioned below,
have examined the crucial decade of the 1930s in Soviet-German relations. The early work of
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diplomatic scholars suffered because of the lack of access to Soviet archives, leading to an overreliance on the captured German documents. According to the Nazi sources, the Soviet Union
courted Germany into the pact of 1939 in an effort to occupy central Europe and the Russians
created the bellicose climate resulting in the outbreak of war. In addition, the limitations of the
Cold War furthered this view that the Soviet Union sought only world domination in conjunction
with Hitler. Historians paid scant attention to the collective security policy of the USSR, at least
until recently, with the partial opening of Soviet archives. This initial analysis has produced
diverse and important schools of interpretation which seek to explain the intentions and
motivations of Russia and Germany leading to the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939.
Two contrasting points of view define the parameters of the debate: the “German school”
and the “collective security school.” Those scholars who espouse the “German school,” such as
Robert Tucker, Gerhard Weinberg (actually straddling both schools), Jiri Hochman and
Aleksandr M. Nekrich, argue that Stalin and the Soviet leadership concocted collective security
as a cover for their real intentions: a pact with Hitler and an extension of the Rapallo and Berlin
policies. (The treaties of Rapallo and Berlin appear in chapter 2). By supporting Hitler and the
Nazi repression of the working class, Stalin lured his avowed enemy into the trap of enhancing
the complete victory of communism. 5 Those of the “collective security” school picture Stalin
and the Soviets as realistic politicians in a hostile world seeking to protect the gains of the
revolution. 6 I now turn to a detailed examination of the particulars of this important debate.
THE GERMAN SCHOOL (AND WEINBERG)
While Geoffrey Roberts, Teddy Uldricks and others classify Gerhard Weinberg a
member of the German School, a close analysis of Professor Weinberg’s works illustrates a
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scholar with a foot in both camps. In 1954, Weinberg asserted in Germany and the Soviet Union,
1939-1941 that, “For Soviet Russia, Munich marked the final collapse of the policy pursued by
Foreign Commissar Litvinov of securing a common front of Russia with the western powers
against Germany. Whatever the motives and sincerity of that policy, after Munich it could hardly
continue to play any substantial role in Soviet eyes.” 7 He continued,
Whatever the real intentions of the Soviet Union might have been in the period before
Munich, the explicit classification of the new war, which the Soviets believed would soon
break out, as the Second Imperialist War—and as such one in which Russia might take no
active part—signified a change from the earlier policy of stressing the willingness of the
Soviet Union to aid those prepared to unite against Germany. 8
He did not mention the April 17, 1939 (post-Munich) Soviet proposal of a tri-partite pact against
Germany. He did not mention the furious Soviet anti-German diplomacy until August 23, 1939.
As such, Munich did not represent the final collapse of collective security.
Writing in 1970, Weinberg moderated his earlier position a bit when he concluded that
Soviet Russia did not fear the new Nazi regime and sought to continue the connections of the
Weimar period. Weinberg is here referring to the first year of the Nazi regime and Soviet hopes
for the proletarian revolution in Germany. Since the 17th century Poland remained an important
component of Russian policy toward the German states, especially Prussia. Weinberg argued
that:
It was also believed (by the Soviets) that the National Socialist regime would not last
long and would hasten the collapse of capitalism in Germany.
The practical reasons for Soviet reluctance to turn to new policies were of a different sort.
In the first place, the Soviet, like many German soldiers and diplomats, hoped for a
continuation of that cooperation between the two countries which had proved so
advantageous for both and to which individuals on both sides would hark back
nostalgically for years to come. Neither the German nor the Soviet ‘Rapallo generation”
of soldiers and diplomats had any illusions about the domestic policies of the other
country, but separated as they were by what they considered to be the common enemy of
Poland, each felt able to deal with any domestic advocates of the other’s social and
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political system. In this regard, the National Socialist regime looked to the Soviets as
simply more vehement and ruthless than its predecessors. 9
Even after Germany left the League of Nations and the Geneva Disarmament Conference
in October, 1933, Weinberg claimed that:

…many Soviet leaders were reluctant to leave the traditional policy of cooperation with
Germany and to align themselves instead with France and the League. Certainly the
military leaders of the Soviet Union were dubious of such a shift; and some of the
political leaders were not yet convinced that the turn toward collective security that came
to be advocated by Maxim Litvinov, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, was
either wise or safe. Perhaps the hope of securing a better bargain from the prospective
ally played a part in the proceedings; the similarity to the situation in 1939 is most
striking. In each instance, the Soviet government appeared to look back to past associates
while preparing to sign with new friends—unless confronted with a really attractive
offer. 10
This analysis puts Professor Weinberg into the “collective security” school concerning the Soviet
intention of “preparing to sign with new friends—unless confronted with a really attractive
offer.” In the same work, however, he interpreted the Nazi-Soviet economic talks of 1935 “as a
last attempt [by the USSR] to come to agreement with Germany.” 11 Soviet documents indicate
that Germany was seeking an understanding with the USSR. 12
In volume two of his seminal work, Weinberg argues that the replacement of Litvinov
with Molotov on May 3, 1939 was Stalin’s signal to Hitler that collective security was dead and
that the door was open for negotiations leading to the pact of August 23, 1939. He concluded
that, “Stalin could well believe that Hitler would find it easier to explore the possibilities of
agreement with the Soviet Union if he did not have to conduct negotiations through a minister of
Jewish background that had long been the object of ridiculing cartoons in the National Socialist
press.” 13 Further, “In the German capital, the change in the Soviet government was taken
precisely the way Stalin appears to have meant it, namely, as a sign of Soviet willingness to
7

works out some sort of rapprochement.” 14 He does not adequately explain the numerous
attempts Molotov undertook to establish an anti-German front in 1939.
Starting in 1977, Robert Tucker took up the mantle and became the main voice of the
“German School.” He asserted that Stalin indeed had great respect for the Nazi state and Hitler.
Hitler supported German nationalism and an anti-western policy. Like the Soviet Union before
1934, the Nazis opposed the Versailles Treaty and sought its revision. To Tucker, Soviet foreign
policy under Stalin was nothing more than a charade to mask a pro-German orientation. Tucker
started from the premise that:
On no subject was foreign opinion more inclined to err in the 1930s than on Stalin’s
foreign policy. The apostle of socialism in one country was widely viewed as a
nationalist leader who, in fact if not in theory, had jettisoned international Communist
revolution as an aim of Soviet policy. This simplistic thinking, based on the antithesis of
‘Russian nationalism’ versus ‘international revolution,’ blocked an understanding of
Stalin’s foreign policy as a subtle amalgam of both.
In charity to those who erred, it must be said that for reasons of Realpolitik Stalin
encouraged the misconception. 15
Although Tucker admitted that Stalin needed to avoid the inevitable capitalist war:
At the end of the 1920s and in the early 1930s, Stalin and his associates were preoccupied
with the internal revolution from above, knew that Soviet society was in no condition to
fight a war, and feared external complications that could lead to war. But preparation of
the country for a future war was the primary purpose of the policies being pursued; and
the war prospect was a revolutionary one as well. 16
In Tucker’s view, Stalin wanted both to prepare for international conflict, that is create a
war-like climate and to prevent war in order to promote the “internal revolution.” Hence he
sought out the one power bent on conquest: Nazi Germany. Tucker noted that:
Stalin’s German orientation was not rooted in anything personal. His German experience
was confined to the two or three months that he had spent in Berlin in 1907 while
returning from a Bolshevik party congress in London, and he knew only a few words of
German. The orientation derived from the legacy of Lenin.
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For Lenin, asserted Tucker, Germany was the key to a divisive diplomacy to separate and
conquer the West. 17 So powerful was this pro-Nazi orientation, that Stalin repressed the antiNazi German Communist Party and the German Social Democratic Party, both of which
correctly assessed the danger of the National Socialist movement. With these measures, argued
Tucker, Stalin illustrated his good faith toward Germany and even “abetted” the Nazi takeover. 18
Finally, Tucker addressed this question of collective security:
By his collective- security diplomacy, in combination with his popular- front tactics in
the Comintern, Stalin was assisting events to take their course toward a European war.
An accord remained a basic aim because it would offer an opportunity to effect a
westward advance of Soviet rule while turning Germany against the democracies in what
Stalin envisaged as a replay of World War I, a protracted inconclusive struggle that
would weaken both sides while neutral Russia increased her power and awaited an
advantageous time for decisive intervention. But to make sure that the European war
would be protracted, he wanted Britain and France to be militarily strong enough to
withstand the onslaught that Germany under Hitler was becoming strong enough to
launch against them. That explains his moves to encourage ruling elements in both these
major states to rearm with dispatch, and his orders to the French Communists to support
the French military buildup. 19
In essence, Tucker believed that Stalin sought to manage and control the bellicose intentions of
Hitler and jeopardize the Soviet Revolution with his belief that this avowed Communist hater
would not be true to his spoken and written words. The actions of the Soviet diplomats simply
camouflaged the real intentions of the master.
Jiri Hochman furthered the Tucker thesis in 1984. Hochman also explained the proGerman policy of the Soviet Union leading to the Non-Aggression Pact of 1939. He saw a
continuum of relations both pre and post 1933:
During the years preceding the Nazi accession to power, however, it can safely be
concluded that the Soviet Union followed neither a course of gradual withdrawal from
the policy of preferential friendship with Germany nor a course of gradual or even
purposeful rapprochement with the West. No intention to change clubs can legitimately
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be detected in the documented actions of the Soviet government…until the last moment,
commitment to the German connection appears to have been complete. 20
Hochman did not define what “moment” he had identified. He seemed to forget the trade and
commercial relations between Russia and England from the 1920s, not to mention the diplomatic
ties. Later in the same work he detailed the substantive commercial relations between Britain and
the USSR and pointed out that, “International trade statistics show that in the 1934-1938 period,
Germany was not in fact Soviet Russia’s leading foreign trade partner. England’s consistent
participation in Russian trade and relatively extensive imports from the USSR made her the most
important Soviet business partner in this period…” 21 Did these contacts constitute a pro-Nazi
orientation?
Hochman concluded that the purges of the “Old Bolsheviks” between 1936 and 1939
occurred because they “could not stomach” an alliance with Nazi Germany, something Stalin
presumably sought. 22 He went so far as to discount the quite public denunciations of both
Russia and Germany in the presses of each country:
Even the loud public campaigns waged in Germany against the Soviet Union, however,
and in the Soviet Union against Germany, failed to provide sufficient assurance that a
German-Soviet rapprochement or entente was not in the making. Not even assistance to
the Spanish Republic, the most impressive single act of the USSR as an advocate of
collective security, diffused the suspicions of a potential collusion with Germany. This
may, of course have followed from the parallel fact of the purges in Russia, the least
assuring background for an exercise of the defense of democracy. And yet the fact that
these purges, in addition to providing Stalin with unrestricted personal power, performed
a specific role in asserting the pro-Nazi orientation in the Soviet foreign policy was not
understood at the time, and even nowadays does not seem to be sufficiently
acknowledged. 23

Quoting Tucker, Hochman agreed that Stalin ‘‘visualized the coming pact with Hitler as more
than merely a way of securing temporary safety from invasion…what he contemplated…was a
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kind of Moscow-Berlin axis, an active collaboration of the two dictatorships of influence in
Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and even the Middle East.’’ 24 According to this thesis, Stalin was
looking for a long-lasting partnership with the sworn enemy of Bolshevism and everything that
he represented.
Prior to his untimely death in 1993, Professor Aleksandr M. Nekrich completed his
magnum opus, Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 1922-1941. 25 Nekrich
represents a moderate line of the “German School” of historians who asserted that Stalin and the
Soviets actively courted the Nazis in an attempt at European and world domination. Stalin and
the Communist leadership overlooked the doctrinal differences between Nazi Germany and
Soviet Russia and concentrated instead on the similarities of the two authoritarian nations. These
historians pointed to Russian support for closer ties with Germany despite the anti-communist
rhetoric and actions of the Nazi government. For these scholars, the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression
pact of 1939 and the subsequent dismemberment of Poland is proof of the culmination of Nazisoviet ties.
Nekrich actually adopted a middle position. He described a dual foreign policy in Russia
in the 1930s. Stalin sought accommodation with England and France while simultaneously
keeping a close relationship with Germany. 26 He would move Russia into the most
advantageous position. As Nekrich argued, “Soviet policy underwent significant change in the
spring and summer of 1939. Moscow developed a broad program; its primary purpose was to
expand borders along the western frontier, beginning with Finland.” 27 By 1939, Stalin came to
believe, based on the intransigence of the western powers, that England and France wanted a war
between Stalin and Hitler. Therefore, Stalin moved quickly to conclude the pact of August 1939.
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Soviet leaders identified the “genetic bonds” between the two nations. 28 Nekrich described what
he called the “Stalin Doctrine.” He described a speech of the Soviet dictator, delivered at a
plenary session of the central committee on January 19, 1925, wherein Stalin declared that “Our
banner remains, as before, the banner of peace. But if war begins, than we will not sit with our
hands folded—we shall have to act, but act last. And we shall act in order to throw the decisive
weight on the scales, a weight which could tip the balance.” Stalin sought to exploit any
contradictions in the imperialist camp should the west thrust Europe into war. 29
Robert Tucker saw this same speech as a call for a European conflict resulting in
Communist domination. 30 A close examination of the language indicates no such call, but a
reiteration of a demand for peace. 31 Of course, as Nekrich noted, if the West collapsed into
warfare, a war without the Soviet Union, Stalin would have been content to pick up the pieces.
But he was in no position to instigate or manage someone else’s conflict.
Nekrich presents an interesting perspective on Soviet motivation. He describes Stalin and
Litvinov neither as peace-loving doves in a hostile world, nor as power-hungry madmen, but as
rational practioners of Realpolitik. In his book, the culmination of his life’s work, he proposes a
needed balance in the historical analysis of this important period.
THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY SCHOOL
With the publication of his now classic work in 1961, The Origins of the Second World
War (1961), British historian A.J.P. Taylor ignited the debate on Soviet intentions in the 1930s.
Taylor asserted that the invasion of Poland:
Was not the intention of Soviet policy; the events of 1 September and 3 September could
not be foreseen on 23 August. Both Hitler and Stalin imagined that they had prevented
war, not brought it on. Hitler thought that he would score another Munich over Poland;
Stalin that he had at any rate escaped an unequal war in the present, and perhaps even
12

avoided it altogether. However one spins the crystal and tries to look into the future from
the point of view of 23 August 1939, it is difficult to see what other course Soviet Russia
could have followed. 32
With this provocative conclusion, Taylor founded the “collective security” school, although he
did not employ this particular phrase to describe his thesis. Taylor asserted that the Soviet Union
was simply reacting to the changing diplomatic conditions in Europe and it sought peace through
multilateral agreements among all European nations, including Germany, in order to prevent the
outbreak of conflict enveloping Russia as it sought to consolidate the gains of the revolution.
When the western powers, particularly Britain, rejected Soviet overtures for an agreement, the
Soviet Union had to align with the only willing partner. Even then, he continues, the USSR
sought a peaceful solution to the diplomatic crisis over Poland, a crisis that Hitler, not Stalin,
created. 33 After the conclusion of the agreement, the USSR took no action against Poland until
September 17.
In more recent works, Jonathan Haslam and Geoffrey Roberts have refined Taylor’s
thesis. They conclude that Stalin and Maxim Litvinov wanted to maintain the status quo in
Europe in the hope that the western powers and Nazi Germany would align with the Soviet
Union and maintain a balance of power status. Stalin was pre-occupied with domestic matters
and wanted to avoid a conflict that could only delay, or worse, destroy the proletarian revolution.
Alexandr M. Nekrich promoted a modified version of the other pole, the “German school,”
whereby Stalin and his foreign office courted Hitler and the Nazis in order to partition Europe
and later the world. In this view, the Nazi-Soviet Pact represented an instrument of authoritarian
domination.
In 1984, Jonathan Haslam continued and expanded Taylor’s work on collective security.
Haslam concentrated on the personality of Maxim Litvinov, the pro-western Commissar for
13

Foreign Affairs. Litvinov wanted a substantive alliance with Britain and France in order to
intimidate Hitler in east central Europe. When the western powers proved unwilling, the Soviet
Union had no other choice but to align with Germany. Haslam argued that:
Certainly the ever-suspicious Stalin found an isolationist policy more congenial than
either the revolutionary internationalism of Lenin or Trotsky, or the more conservative
and statist cosmopolitanism of Litvinov. Stalin’s whole philosophy was one of fortress
Russia, an outlook nurtured by the very isolation of the October revolution in an alien
world. 34
Haslam concluded that, “Nevertheless, the Nazi-Soviet pact was unquestionably a second-best
solution.” 35 Stalin was simply playing the hand that he was dealt.
Writing in 1995, Geoffrey Roberts emerged as the leading voice of the “collective
security” school. Roberts asserted that:
Having tried and failed to negotiate a suitable treaty of alliance with the British and
French, and fearing an Anglo-French design of involving them in a war with Germany
which they would have to fight alone, the Soviets turned to a deal with Hitler. The NaziSoviet non-aggression pact of 23 August 1939—notwithstanding its secret clauses
establishing Soviet—German spheres of influence in Eastern Europe—was for Moscow a
matter of security not expansion. 36
Roberts argues that Stalin and the Soviet leadership feared war and the possibility of a western
alliance with Hitler aimed at the Soviet Union. Therefore, Roberts supports Taylor in asserting
that, in concluding the pact in 1939, Stalin sought only to protect the gains of the revolution,
promote peace in Europe, and appease a dangerous Nazi dictator. Soviet foreign policy was
haphazard, not intentional. “There was no grand plan, or even inclination, for Soviet expansion
into Eastern Europe in 1939.” 37 In Roberts’ assessment, Stalin hoped to defend the territorial
balance in Eastern Europe while protecting the Soviet Union from a destructive conflict with the
West or Nazi Germany.
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Roberts bases his conclusions on the recently opened Soviet archives, German foreign
policy documents, and leading secondary works. With the Russian documents, we are able to
clarify the uncertainty of the diplomatic exchanges. From the German documents on foreign
policy, we learn that the German diplomats were frustrated with the Nazi government’s position
toward the Soviet Union. Compared with Nazi Germany, the USSR seemed the more flexible
and accommodating party until limiting diplomatic relations in the mid 1930s. War was not an
instrument of Soviet foreign policy during this period. Before the pact with Hitler, Stalin was
simply reacting to changing conditions in east central Europe in order to secure the territory of
the Soviet Union.
Proponents of the “collective security” school portray Stalin and the Soviet leadership as
defenders of peace in Europe in order to protect and extend the advances of the Soviet revolution
while awaiting the anticipated destruction of the western powers. This line of reasoning is
difficult to reconcile with the fact that the Soviet Union partitioned Poland in mid-September
1939 and started a war with Finland in November. Could the tyrant Stalin really be so focused
and patient when land and power awaited? Critics of the “collective security” school attack from
the perspective of the pact of 1939 and the division of Poland. They point, furthermore, to the
close relationship of Weimar Germany and Russia in the 1920s and early 1930s as well as the
commercial contacts with the Nazi regime. They paint Stalin as a cunning dictator always ready
to leap and devour weaker foes. They argue that Stalin indeed had a plan: world domination.
Who better to share this plan with than Adolf Hitler? Although Hitler disdained the Soviet state,
he knew that he needed Russian complicity with his plans to attack Poland. What better way to
accomplish his goal than a non-aggression pact with an isolated Russia? Hitler had ulterior
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motives from the start. Stalin did take advantage, however, of the geo-political situation with his
annexation of the Baltic States as a defensive buffer.
Soviet involvement in the outbreak of war in 1939 continues to generate fierce
debate. Roberts, Haslam, and Taylor, along with Tucker, Weinberg, Nekrich and others have
outlined the core arguments of the issue. They each present their interpretation of the evidence
and provide convincing arguments. With the anticipated permanent opening of Soviet archives,
especially the Central Party and Foreign Ministry archives, historians hope that the
contradictions and conflicts concerning Soviet foreign policy can be finally reconciled. These
scholars have certainly given us a great deal to consider. Teddy Uldricks succinctly summed up
the essence of the debate when he asserted that the position of the German School “makes 98 per
cent of all Soviet diplomatic activity a brittle cover for the remaining 2 per cent.” 38 I argue that
the ninety-eight percent was indeed the face of a realistic Soviet diplomacy of collective security.
As diplomatic historians, we often employ a textual analysis of the relevant documents.
We trace their path from office to office and attempt to analyze the impact of the information.
Recent research has revealed that not all information traveled the route that the time/date stamps
indicated. Further, the timing of the delivery of information became crucial. It is important to
study just who knew what and when they knew it.
INNERWORKINGS OF THE WEIMAR/NAZI FOREIGN OFFICE
In What Hitler Knew: The Battle for Information in Nazi Foreign Policy (2005), Zachary
Shore argues that indeed knowledge was power in Hitler’s Reich. Diplomatic information
determined the course of careers and Nazi foreign relations. 39 Information became a commodity
which diplomats and advisors brokered for their own self-interest and protection. Further, he
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illustrates the fact that Hitler’s system was so chaotic that the dictator himself often had no idea
about the state of affairs within his own inner circle, much less the workings of the entire Foreign
Office. Because various persons had separate agendas in the Nazi bureaucracy, the regime
suffered from Ämterstreit.
Shore pulls the reader into the Nazi foreign office with a provocative introduction which
he entitles “The Darker World.” Shore asks us to
Imagine yourself as one of Hitler’s diplomats. From the very beginning of Hitler’s rule in
1933, you find yourself serving a violent regime. Each day you read or hear about mass
arrests, beatings, and murders…You can no longer speak freely on the telephone without
fear that your line is tapped and your voice recorded…If this were not enough, your
position and purview are threatened by Party interlopers. 40
Shore’s approach creates a sense of personal connection with the events of the book. This
summary contains the central argument of the work concerning the changing nature of the
regime, the increase in violence as a matter of policy, and the value of information for personal
well-being.
Shore initially describes the role of the diplomats in the creation of a Nazi-Polish pact.
Poland was Germany’s sworn enemy, the creation of Versailles diplomacy, and a French ally.
However, because of the Soviet-Polish alliance, the Foreign Office in early 1934 convinced
Hitler to change his position. Germany feared that it would be surrounded by enemies if the
Soviet-Polish pact became more substantive.
Firmly in power by the summer of 1934, Hitler set out to consolidate his authority by
appealing to the regular army for support. Hitler then had to eliminate the more radical elements
in his party. Shore describes the events of “The Night of the Long Knives” and its effects on the
diplomatic corps. After the bloodbath in which one former Chancellor was murdered, one
arrested, and one sent into exile, Shore points out that, “One lesson these men, and surely other
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decision makers as well, drew from this episode of state-led terror was that their ability to control
information represented one of the few ways in which they could enhance their often tenuous
positions, and that lack of information could prove disastrous.” 41
Constantin Freiherr von Neurath was the Foreign Minister at the time of Hitler’s
accession to the chancellorship in January, 1933. He soon found himself in a power struggle with
the Nazi, Joachim von Ribbentrop. Neurath had to distinguish himself in Hitler’s eyes in order to
maintain his position. Shore describes how in 1936 Neurath, who was in possession of
information indicating French military weakness, urged Hitler to occupy the Rhineland in
violation of the Versailles Treaty. Other advisors urged caution. When German troops marched
into the Rhineland in early 1936 without incident, Neurath appeared to be a prophet. 42 In the
chaos of the Nazi foreign office, knowledge could protect careers.
Shore then examines in detail the diplomatic situation on the eve of war in 1939. He
asserts that the outcome of the conflict could have indeed been different had Hitler been aware of
all the information in the hands of his advisors. For example, Shore concludes that Ernst von
Weizsäcker, the chief political official in the Foreign Ministry, had details of a speech by the
Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, wherein Stalin indicated that he would like closer relations with
Germany. Weizsäcker, in order to prevent a substantive alliance, did not inform Hitler or the
Foreign Office until much later in 1939. 43 Later that same year, Ribbentrop, now Foreign
Minister, withheld information of a possible alliance with England: a policy favored by Herbert
von Dirksen. Ribbentrop was in favor of a Soviet alliance, and talks with England could have
jeopardized his goal. 44 Had these alliances materialized as intended (notwithstanding the weak
Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939), the result of the war may have been different. Shore clearly
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shows that information became very much a personal possession. In Hitler’s Reich, the irrational
reigned supreme. 45
Shore utilizes the archived papers of the diplomats and the published records to support
his argument. His conclusions, however, remain speculative. Shore admits that “We can never
know whether Hitler, if he had been in possession of all the information he desired and had not
been surrounded by advisors who advocated dangerous policies, would have acted differently.
What we do know, however, is that information-control affected the timing and nature of his
decisions, and it may even at times have altered outcomes.” 46 Shore gives the example of the
delay in circulating Stalin’s March 1939 foreign policy speech.
Finally it is important to analyze the structure of the Weimar foreign policy before
Hitler’s seizure of power in 1933. The Weimar foreign office maintained a distinct existence in
the realm of foreign affairs separate from the military establishment. In The Civil-Military Fabric
of Weimar Foreign Policy (1973), Gaines Post, Jr., argues that during the Weimar period the
Foreign Office and the Defense Ministry were actually quite close in their goals and aspirations
for Germany. The Weimar constitution was clear and explicit concerning lines of responsibility
of the two offices, “The Weimar Constitution supported the diplomats by designating the Foreign
Office as ‘the sole agency for the administration of German foreign interests.’” 47
Gaines Post asserts that the dismissal of General Hans von Seeckt, Chief of the Army
Command, illustrated the primacy of the Foreign Ministry over the military interests. Later, by
1933, “the center of gravity in German foreign policy and military planning had shifted from
interdepartmental to executive-departmental relations.” 48 Hitler was then able to exploit these
shifts to his advantage and he quickly dominated the foreign office from his executive position.
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Because German expansion dominated his ideology, Hitler took a personal interest in
the day-to day operations of the increasingly Nazi dominated foreign office. Lebensraum
demanded the extension of Germany and the colonization of the East. The Greater German Reich
would encompass both central, eastern, and Russian Europe. Although the debate continues to
rage between the “intentionalists” and “functionalists” regarding Hitler’s role in the German
state, it is clear that the Führer dominated the planning and implementation of his aggressive
foreign policy. He left domestic issues largely to his subordinates. 49 We continue to assess the
role of Hitler in the daily functioning of the Third Reich.
CONSTRUCTING A SOVIET FOREIGN OFFICE
While Hitler inherited a professional foreign office staffed with diplomats trained in the
fine art of international interchange, Lenin was not so lucky. As we have seen, initially Lenin did
not see the need for foreign relations at all. He quickly reversed course and established the
People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID) the day after the seizure of power.
Unfortunately, the staff of this hastily constructed bureaucracy, although energetic,
lacked any substantive foreign policy experience. 50 In fact, in the chaotic early months of the new
regime, diplomats from the overthrown Provisional Government remained at their posts and
coordinated anti-Bolshevik activities. 51 Additionally, Lenin had not yet set the parameters of
Soviet diplomacy beyond the Decree on Peace. As mentioned above, Trotsky took his position as
Foreign Commissar rather lightly. Finally, in keeping with the new, revolutionary atmosphere, the
Bolshevik government proclaimed on June 4, 1918 that the old ranks of “envoys, ministers and
other diplomatic representatives [are] to be abolished and all representatives of the Russian
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government, accredited to foreign governments are to be called plenipotentiary representatives of
the RSFSR.” 52
As Bolshevik policy became more complex, the role of the NKID increased in
importance. The first pressing problem was peace with Germany, finally settled at Brest-Litovsk.
With the advent of the New Economic Policy, Soviet diplomacy became intricately intertwined
with the search for peace. 53 Various statutes and constitutional provisions enlarged the scope of
the NKID. As the new Soviet state concluded formal agreements with foreign nations, the NKID
staff exploded. From around 250 workers in 1918, the NKID’s central office expanded to 1300
by 1921. 54 Georgii Chicherin was one of the few trained diplomats in the NKID when he
replaced Trotsky. Chicherin was a committed revolutionary, but he quickly realized that the
worldwide upheaval was not on the horizon. He transformed the NKID into a rigid center for
substantive foreign relations. In the Soviet system, however, the Politburo formulated foreign
policy; the NKID carried out its decisions. 55
Stalin altered the make-up of the foreign office as he touched every facet of Soviet life.
As the office increased in professional status, Koba became more suspicious. The NKID did not
escape the great purges. 56 Stalin wanted to dominate all areas of the state and to forge his own
foreign policy, or at least control his own diplomats. Interestingly, he did not replace Litvinov
with Molotov until May 3, 1939, illustrating his commitment to collective security even after the
change.
COLD WAR SHADOWS
Unfortunately, the legacy of the Cold War continues to obscure the scholarship. Hardline cold warriors asserted (often for political advantage) that “Uncle Joe” Stalin of the wartime
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alliance suddenly after 1945 became the source of all evil. As a brutal dictator, he could not have
orchestrated a substantive, peaceful foreign policy in the 1930s. While the USSR undertook
aggressive actions after 1945 in the name of self-protection, many anti-Soviet extremists in the
west argued that after 1945, the Soviet Union was the cause of all conflicts and controversies in
the world. It proved a convenient enemy for the west. They reasoned that Soviet Russia, the
communist monolith, seemed destined to devour the free world, while Germany simply sought
recognition and stability after the devastation of the First World War. This misinterpretation of
Soviet intensions contributed to the inaction of the western powers and the expansion of Nazi
authority in Europe. Such rational motives, such as the prevention of war and collective security,
were simply beyond Stalin’s capabilities, claimed some western historians after World War II.
He only sought to dominate and occupy any nation at odds with his communist ideology. Indeed,
he was a major cause of the horrors of World War II with his cohort and ally, Adolf Hitler.
However, as E.H. Carr reminds us, we should not be too quick to pass moral judgments on the
private lives of historical figures, which judgments cloud objectivity. 57 We must pass moral
judgments on the public acts of public figures in order to place them in a proper historical
context.
While Stalin remains one of the monsters of modern history, we must examine Soviet
diplomacy in the interwar period as seeking international peace while Stalin carried out domestic
terror. Stalin understood that the still fragile USSR could not defeat both foreign and domestic
opponents. For Stalin, foreign policy served the domestic agenda.
For some historians, Russian foreign policy in the inter-war period was simply a
reflection of the western Cold War mentality. To be sure, Soviet policy sought to exploit
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“contradictions” in the west, such as the pressure applied to Poland and the work of the
Communist International (Comintern), but historians tend to ignore Soviet attempts to make
peace. The clash of ideologies in the post World War II period affected basic historical research.
For example, in discussing Soviet foreign policy motives in the 1930s, Robert M. Slusser asserts,
“to put it briefly, was the policy of collective security an expression of Soviet hypocrisy or
indecision, or did it point to the existence of functional schizophrenia in the Soviet state?” 58
Many historians never considered the possibility that Soviet policy could indeed have
been peaceful. This dissertation argues that for a time Stalin did pursue peace, though the
purposes of that peace were in the end revolutionary ones, that is, to remake the USSR in his
own image. Internal terror, collectivization, and industrialization did not mix with international
warfare. Britain and France feared Bolshevism more than Nazism under the rubric “the enemy of
my enemy is my friend.” In the 1930s, the Soviet Union needed peace in Europe in order to
solve massive internal problems and then turn to the coming revolution and the inevitable
collapse of the west. The Soviets were in no hurry to force the proletarian upheaval, especially
when the Revolution was still quite young. In Russian eyes, Britain and France forced their
alliance with Hitler, and that alliance was made only as a last resort. 59
Did the Soviet Union have a viable choice of foreign policy options prior to August
1939? Did Litvinov attempt to cement a western alliance with the Soviet Union? Did Britain and
France ignore or refuse Soviet overtures? Did Stalin use the possibility of a western alliance to
move closer to Hitler and seize territory in Eastern Europe to fulfill a long standing Russian
plan? Why did Hitler ignore the advice of professional, career diplomats in the field? How did
the structure of the German foreign office change after 1933? What were the goals of the Soviet
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Union? I believe that these questions are important in understanding the fluid nature of foreign
relations between two powers in times of stress.
While access to the Soviet documents remains a problem for scholars, this difficulty
should not become an excuse for ignoring this crucial period and delaying a re-assessment of the
long held assumptions concerning the Soviet Union, Germany, the West, and the origins of
World War II. A close and sober analysis of the available published documents illustrates a
substantive desire for peace on the part of the Soviet Union. If an alliance with Nazi Germany
was the ultimate goal, it seems curious that the Soviets spent so much of the 1930s engaged in
furious diplomatic interchanges with Britain and France. While the Soviets pushed for peace
throughout the 1930s, Britain and France ignored them and hoped for a Soviet-German war
wherein both totalitarian states would destroy the other and the West would pick up the pieces.
British and French documents, unknown to the Soviets at the time, indicate a specific intent to
sabotage and unduly delay the diplomatic contacts which the Soviets initiated so as to create an
anti-Nazi front. The West wanted an “eastern front” with the Nazis moving toward the Soviet
Union and away from Britain and France. The politically popular stance was anti-communism,
no matter the facts. The Soviet Union “appeared” dangerous in all respects; it could not be
trusted in anything. This anti-Soviet attitude drove the Soviet Union into the arms of the Nazi
dictator and allowed him a quick victory in the East which then facilitated his westward
momentum. When a Nazi-Soviet alliance threatened, Britain and France sent representatives by
slow boat and train with no power to conclude a binding pact. Hitler was not so insulting;
Ribbentrop flew to Moscow.

24

As E. H. Carr so brilliantly asserted in his classic, What is History (1961), while the
documents limit our perspective as historians, in that we only see what documents we find or
those produced in collections, we must move forward with these limitations. We must hope that
future researchers will re-interpret and criticize our work with new material. A.J.P. Taylor
asserted that we only go where the documents lead. 60 The documents here lead to the conclusion
that the west misinterpreted and ignored Soviet intentions regarding collective security. Although
collective security was in the interest of the USSR, such a policy did not contradict the interests
of the western powers. Britain and France were bogged down in anti-Soviet rhetoric. Indeed, the
USSR still stood for world revolution, but, after Stalin’s declaration of “Socialism in One
Country,” it made no direct attempts to carry it out. If presented with an opportunity, the USSR
sought to exploit circumstances, such as the Spanish Civil War, but it did not act alone in the
Spanish conflict, seeking only to oppose fascism in the Iberian Peninsula. The western powers
could not get past the dogmatic divide. Why did the West not put the Soviets to the test and agree
on a united front against the clearer aggressor? If the USSR was indeed secretly seeking alliance
with Germany, call the bluff of collective security and expose the Soviet desire for union with
Hitler for what it was. Instead of attempting to direct Hitler eastward and believing that he would
somehow be content or that a war could be contained, why not stand up to the bully and attempt
to preserve the peace?
In the following chapters I will provide an overview of German-Soviet relations and
discuss the challenges of early Soviet foreign policy. Chapter One discusses the changing nature
of Soviet foreign policy from the revolution until 1930. Chapter two analyses German foreign
policy in the early Weimar Republic and relations with the new Soviet state. Chapter three
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continues the narrative into the early Nazi period and the split in German-Soviet relations.
Chapter four presents the crucial year 1938 and Soviet policy after Munich. Chapter five
highlights the delicate negotiations between the USSR, France, Britain, and finally Germany,
resulting in the Pact of 1939.
From the Decree on Peace of November 1917, to the formal announcement of “collective
security” in December 1933, and through most of 1939, the USSR desired peaceful relations
with the capitalist world in order to protect the Soviet revolution. The close relations of the
Weimar period quickly gave way to the contentious conflicts with the Hitler regime and the
substantive interactions with Britain and France. Finally the crucial years of 1938 and 1939 led
to the pact of August 23, 1939. As we re-visit the complex origins of World War II, we
understand that the Soviet Union was a nation opposed to the outbreak of a general
conflagration, even if simply to avoid war in order to carry out domestic terror and protect a still
fragile revolution. For the USSR, domestic policy drove foreign policy into the realm of
collective security.
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CHAPTER ONE: DIPLOMACY IN THE MARXIST/LENINIST MIRROR
In The Communist Manifesto, Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels predicted the inevitable
destruction of capitalism and the creation of a communist society. Western, bourgeois
imperialism contained the seeds of its own destruction. Marx and Engels declared that his
analysis was scientific and that capitalism had to collapse. For Marx and Engels, time was not an
issue; the forces of history would destroy capitalism from within. The long term need for formal
diplomacy did not exist in this model because it was not necessary. Relations between states
would simply set the groundwork for the coming cataclysm. In his 1848 masterpiece, Marx noted
that as the exploitation of peoples and nations wane, “The hostility of one nation to another will
come to an end.” 1 Marx warned, however, that peasants and workers still had to be aware of the
importance of foreign relations as they related to the class struggle. In his Inaugural Address to
the International Working Men’s Association in 1864, Marx asserted that it was the duty of the
working class:
To master themselves the mysteries of international politics; to watch the diplomatic acts
of their respective governments; to counteract them, if necessary, by all means in their
power; when unable to prevent, to combine in simultaneous denouncement, and to
vindicate the simple laws of morals and justice, which ought to govern the relations of
private individuals, as the rules paramount of the intercourse of nations. 2
While the state would slowly wither away, it remained the task of the proletarians to carefully
monitor the international situation.
By the time Marx’s vision became something of a reality in Russia, the German
philosopher was long dead. His successors quickly found out that ruling was quite different than
agitating for change. The first generation of Bolshevik leaders had to adapt Marxism to the
realities of governing the former czarist empire, and to do so under the conditions of a civil war.

30

This transformation of peasant Russia into the industrial Soviet Union required international
stability even at the price of betraying the master.
Although radical upheaval remained the theoretical foundation of Bolshevism, Lenin,
Stalin, Georgi Chicherin and Maxim Litvinov realized that co-existence with the hostile West
was the only way to maintain the gains of the Soviet revolution. Starting with the Decree on
Peace in 1917, the Communist state sought substantive relations with the capitalist world.
From the revolution through 1930, the foreign commissariat became a critical component
of the Soviet state. It would enhance that status in the 1930s. While undergoing both theoretical
and practical reformation, it remained deeply rooted in the search for a broad European alliance
in order to prevent any war while the Soviet Union underwent revolutionary domestic
transformations. Soviet diplomacy became the foundation for the success of the Bolshevik
experiment. The extreme pronouncements of the Comintern, the Third Communist International
founded in 1919 in order to move Russia into Communism and promote Soviet propaganda to
the world, hindered the efforts of Soviet diplomats and fueled an anti-soviet western press
already shaken by the upheaval of 1917. Despite the seeming contradictions (Ämterstreit) in
Soviet policy, the diplomats pushed forward in their quest for stability. In this chapter, I will
illustrate the realistic and conciliatory nature of Soviet foreign policy in the early years of
Communism. I will argue that a broad- based peace was indeed a component part of Lenin’s
construction of the Soviet Union. Based on world conditions after the revolution, combined with
domestic crises, Lenin had little choice but to adopt a flexible international outlook.
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LENIN’S DIPLOMACY
Vladimir Illich Ulyanov, known as Lenin, the founder of Bolshevism and the guiding
force of the Russian revolution, agreed with Marx’s worldview and underscored in his
voluminous writings the importance of Russia’s relationship with the wider world. According to
Lev Davidovich Bronstein, known as Leon Trotsky, however, Lenin was surprised to think that
he would need to trifle with foreign relations. 3 According to communist theory, it was Lenin’s
task to light the fuse of universal upheaval. He merely had to prepare for the establishment of a
workers’ and soldiers’ paradise in Russia and to observe the emulation of his utopia throughout
the world.
With the advent of civil war, foreign intervention, and economic chaos, Lenin and the
Bolshevik leadership went about the daunting task of establishing a government for the new,
socialist Russia. The prophets of radical transformation soon learned that actually creating and
managing a huge bureaucracy was a completely different matter from attacking the Tsarist
regime. The Bolsheviks inherited “a whole empire walking” from the displacement of the First
World War. 4 The peoples of the vast, former Empire needed food, shelter, and protection. The
civil war unleashed a widespread terror directed against internal enemies of the new regime.
According to official Cheka reports, 12,733 prisoners perished. Other estimates put the figure as
high as 300,000. Still others languished in concentration camps. 5 In addition, the new
government had to requisition and to distribute grain to the population. Because there was never
enough food to go around, the black market flourished. Disease and malnutrition killed eight
million people in 1918-1920. 6 The population demanded leadership, support and stability. They
wanted the society to function smoothly after the bloody revolution. Lenin and the Bolsheviks
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had to deliver on their promises in order to remain in power. Lenin had no time for foreign
policy theory in late 1917. Diplomacy took on a decidedly pragmatic tone.
Despite his Marxist orientation, Lenin quickly adapted to contemporary conditions. Russia
was still involved in World War I and Lenin had promised the war-weary population peace.
Indeed on November 8, 1917 (the day after the storming of the Winter Palace), Lenin had drafted
his Decree on Peace in Wilsonian terms (before Wilson addressed Congress in January 1918)
and placed it before the Second Congress of Soviets for approval. In it he proclaimed that “an
overwhelming majority of the workers and the laboring classes of all the belligerent countries,
exhausted, tormented, and racked by war, are longing for a just and democratic peace…” He
went on to explain that “by such a peace the Government understands an immediate peace
without annexations (i.e. without seizure of foreign territory, without the forcible incorporation
of foreign nationalities), and without indemnities.” Lenin also asserted that “the Government
abolishes secret diplomacy and on its part expresses the firm intention to conduct all
negotiations absolutely openly before the entire people…” Like Wilson, Lenin demanded the
abolition of secret treaties (for example, the Sykes-Picot agreement) such as those designed “as
they were in the majority of cases, to secure profits and privileges for Russian landowners and
capitalists, and to retain or increase the territories annexed by the Great Russians.”
Furthermore, Lenin called for the publication in full “of the secret treaties concluded and
confirmed by the Government of landowners and capitalists.” 7 Lenin needed to avert the
possibility of a German invasion of Russia, appeal to the workers and peasants, and turn his
attention to the domestic crisis. He had to call for peace in the broadest and most acceptable
language.
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Now, after the seizure of power, diplomacy occupied a central position in his political
agenda. With the fronts collapsing and the country in chaos, he had to reach an accommodation
with Imperial Germany. Because in 1917-1918, Lenin believed that the universal revolution was
imminent, he proposed acceptance of Germany’s harsh terms. In Lenin’s view, territorial shifts
were temporary and the proletarian upheaval would bring permanent re-alignment. Furthermore,
Lenin saw Germany as the home of the proletarian revolution and this harsh treaty would only
accelerate the inevitable.
Until this revolution occurred, Lenin had to create a viable foreign office. The new
government needed international contacts in a formal setting. In order to placate the extreme
wing of his Bolshevik party, in November, 1917 he chose his comrade and often harshest critic,
Leon Trotsky, to serve as the first People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs. 8
Trotsky approached the new position with the zeal of a committed communist. For him,
diplomacy was a bureaucratic chore with little importance. He proclaimed, upon taking office,
that “I’ll issue a few revolutionary proclamations to the people and then close up shop.” 9 He
grossly misunderstood the complexity of international politics. Russia’s position was one of
weakness and vulnerability. The radical Trotsky had to become a seasoned negotiator, and
quickly. He was used to forceful and incendiary rhetoric; he expected rapid results. In December,
1917, while he admitted that the new government in Russia had to negotiate with bourgeois
systems, “The Council of People’s Commissars does not for a moment deviate from the path of
social revolution.” He described a “dual path” for Soviet diplomacy; one path would lead to “the
quickest possible cessation of the shameful and criminal slaughter which is destroying Europe,”
and the second would lead to the “overthrow of the domination of capital” and the working
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classes’ seizure of state powers. 10 He was not comfortable with the formalities of diplomacy.
He found this role quite difficult; he preferred confrontation over compromise as his actions
concerning Brest-Litovsk would illustrate. Soon he and Lenin would split over Trotsky’s
extreme position.
Trotsky advocated a hard line toward Germany and the Central Powers during the peace
negotiations at Brest-Litovsk. He did not want to sign a simple act of surrender. He described the
Soviet position as one of “neither war nor peace.” 11 In declaring Russia’s interest to terminate
hostilities without formal capitulation, Trotsky demonstrated his conviction that the war-ravaged
European working classes would rise up against the Imperial Governments. He asserted in an
impassioned speech at Brest-Litovsk on January 28/February 10, 1918 that:
We do not wish to take part any longer in this purely imperialist war, in which the claims
of the propertied classes are being paid in blood…While awaiting the time, which we
hope is not far off, when the oppressed working classes of all countries will take power
into their own hands, as the working people of Russia have done, we are withdrawing our
army and our people from the war. 12
Lenin, who threatened to resign over Trotsky’s stance, demanded a pragmatic policy; peace must
be the cornerstone of the Bolshevik regime. 13 Lenin clearly understood the vicissitudes of the
past. In Lenin’s view, “Every zigzag turn in history is a compromise between the old, which is
no longer strong enough to completely negate the new, and the new, which is not yet strong
enough to completely overthrow the old.” 14 Diplomatic stability would allow for the
establishment of communist institutions in Russia during a hectic period. The Soviet leadership
endorsed Lenin’s plan and agreed to the harsh peace of Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918. The
new Soviet government now faced a dilemma: it was now a revolutionary state and a functioning
system in the world community. 15 Russian foreign policy suffered from an internal and
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philosophical crisis of credibility. 16 Somehow it had to define itself and protect Russia’s
interests.
Trotsky had neither the experience nor the interest to remain as foreign commissar. He
was dedicated to the spread of revolution and the establishment of soviet states throughout the
world. He could not be distracted or limited by the niceties of foreign policy. On March 13, 1918
Georgii Vasil’evich Chicherin replaced Trotsky as foreign commissar. Trotsky was ecstatic and
commented that “with a sigh of relief I handed the diplomatic helm over to him.” 17 He would
turn his energies toward the organization of the Red Army.
CHICHERIN
As Richard K. Debo explains, Chicherin was not like the other diplomats in the early
Soviet foreign office. Most of these officials (like Trotsky) were grossly unprepared for the
challenges of diplomacy. Chicherin, on the other hand, graduated from the University of St.
Petersburg and then spent several years reading documents in the Foreign Ministry archives. He
gained a deep respect for Alexander Gorchakov, Foreign Minister to Tsar Alexander II. Both
Chicherin and Gorchakov had to cope with a declining Russia. They both realized that Russia
was too weak to confront foreign powers and had to seek an alliance system to preserve peace.
Chicherin was a former Menshevik, admitted into the party in January 1918. Having had
experience with both wings of the Russian Social Democratic Labor movement, he was well
versed in Marxist theory. With his classical education, he excelled at foreign languages. He
mastered all the major European languages and some Asian languages as well. He often wrote
memoranda to foreign governments in the local languages. For example, at both Genoa and
Lausanne he addressed the delegates first in English and then French. He did not require a
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translator. He was a rigid taskmaster. He had no family, so he literally lived at the Foreign
Ministry. His long hours did not translate into efficiency, however; he often turned night into day
with his demanding schedule. Chicherin’s lack of order upset some foreign representatives
except his friend Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, the German Ambassador, who possessed
similar habits. 18
Chicherin clearly understood Russia’s precarious position in the world and he quickly
realized that the Soviet regime had to keep its head above water in a capitalist ocean. Lenin
echoed this assessment in a report to the party group at the Eighth Congress of Soviets on
December 21, 1920. He commented on the value of flexibility, “There is no doubt that
concessions are a new kind of war.” He quickly turned to the importance of the survival of the
Socialist experiment; reality must outstrip doctrine, “But we must also agree that it is our task to
ensure the continued existence of an isolated socialist republic surrounded by capitalist
enemies…” 19 The Soviet state must craft new doctrines based on existing realities.
Under Chicherin, the Soviet Union sought normalization of relations with both hostile
enemies and supporters alike. He developed a special affinity for Weimar Germany and German
Ambassador, Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau. Chicherin and Brockdorff-Rantzau realized that
their respective nations needed the other. The two diplomats were striving for common goals. As
career diplomats, personally they had a great deal in common: both were aristocrats with similar
intellectual interests, they represented reforming nation states ostracized in the international
community, both opposed the Versailles order. In fact, Rantzau chose to resign rather than accept
the Versailles Diktat. 20
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While Soviet diplomats urged restraint, revolutionary rhetoric from the recently formed
Comintern (Third International) would prove a hindrance to Russia’s credibility. 21 Gregori
Zinoviev, the president of the Comintern howled in 1919 that “we shall be glad if we can
succeed in transforming the place of residence of the Third International and its executive
committee as quickly as possible to another capital, for example, Paris.” 22 The USSR seemed to
have no coherent policy: world revolution from the Comintern and peaceful negotiation from the
foreign office. Chicherin, while a supporter of world upheaval, would not allow Comintern
doctrine to hinder the important work of Russian foreign policy after 1919, especially regarding
Germany. 23
In this task of peaceful co-existence the foreign commissar had the backing of Lenin,
who proclaimed in 1920 that, “Peace will further our cause infinitely more than war…any peace,
therefore, will open channels for our influence a hundred times wider.” 24 While the Bolshevik
state was fighting for its existence against Poland (Polish armies had moved into the Ukraine)
and battling the remnants of the White armies, peace became the central tenet of Soviet foreign
policy. These conflicts were draining the fragile resources of the USSR. As Lenin explained,
commencing with the Decree on Peace, peace would provide the necessary breathing space for
the building of socialism. 25 Karl Radek, an important communist theoretician and organizer of
the German communist Party (KPD), called for “a modus vivendi with the capitalist states...” in
an open letter to the Heidelberg Congress of the KPD in October 1919. 26 In March 1921, in an
address to the ninth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, Lenin repeated the need for cooperation in
the international arena:
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Is such a thing thinkable at all as that a socialist republic could exist in a capitalist
environment? This seemed impossible either in a political or in a military sense. That it is
possible in a political and in a military sense has been proved; it is already a fact. 27
Writing in Pravda in December 1921, Stalin echoed the same tune, “A period of sober
calculation of forces has set in, a period of meticulous work in the preparation and accumulation
of forces for the battles of the future.” 28 All three voices urged a common theme: patience.
Although Russia had entered the international community in 1921 with a trade agreement
with Great Britain, Chicherin sought an alliance with Weimar Germany in the early 1920s. Lenin
recognized the precarious position of Germany and its relationship to Russia in a speech to the
eighth All Russian Congress of Soviets in November, 1920. Missing from the address was any
mention of world revolution. Lenin referred to Germany as “the most advanced country with the
exception of America.” He then commented that, “This country [Germany], bound by the
Versailles treaty, finds itself in conditions which do not allow it to exist. And in this position
Germany is naturally pushed into alliance with Russia.” 29 Lenin recognized that the western
nations had little support for the Soviet Union while Germany showed an interest in relations
with the USSR.
Brockdorff-Rantzu at first sought a lenient peace from the allies; when this agreement
was not forthcoming he turned to an eastern policy and sought a rapprochement with Russia. 30
At the same time, Chicherin wanted to exploit the economic potential of Germany. Gustav
Hilger, a German consular official, on his return to Moscow in June, 1920, reported that
Chicherin assured him that Soviet policy was “dictated by the sole wish to establish closer
economic, political, and cultural relations.” 31 Imperial Germany and Tsarist Russia had a long
and beneficial relationship, even after 1890, until the outbreak of war in 1914, and both nations

39

now represented attempts at reconstruction. 32 The two states had something in common in the
post-war world. The long conflict devastated Germany physically and the harsh provisions of the
Versailles Treaty were an additional insult to the German nation. The Soviets also roundly
criticized the treaties as western attempts to exploit the dislocation of the war. The Bolsheviks
asserted that the peace was nothing more than imperialism disguised as progressive
improvements. Lenin attacked the treaty in his work Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism
wherein, in the preface to the French and German editions, he asserted that “the ‘democratic’
republics of America and France and a ‘free’ Britain, have rendered a most useful service to
humanity by exposing both imperialism’s hired coolies of the pen and petty-bourgeois
reactionaries who, although they call themselves pacifists and socialists, sang praises to
‘Wilsonism,’ and insisted that peace and reforms were possible under imperialism.” 33 Both the
USSR and Germany sought to “revise” the harsh provisions of the Versailles arrangement.
Despite doctrinal differences, each nation had to support the other. In German and Soviet eyes,
the western powers simply wanted to extend their “imperialist” hold on Europe.
Grigori Zinoviev, the head of the Comintern, issued a proclamation in June 1919 which
concluded with the Soviet perspective on Versailles, “Down with the Versailles peace, down
with the new Brest! Down with the government of the social traitors! Long live the power of the
Soviets in the whole world.” 34 Allied intervention in Russia in 1918-1919 seemed to prove his
point in denouncing the west. Further, Germany and Russia sought acceptance as viable nation
states in the world community. They represented grand political experiments. Chicherin
exploited these connections and his own deep respect for Germany into the first substantive
treaty of the new Bolshevik government: the Treaty of Rapallo in April, 1922. Chicherin and the
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Soviet delegation took advantage of western intransigence over debts to attract an equally
isolated Germany into an agreement. Germany and Russia illustrated to the western powers,
paralyzed in their isolationism, that they could conclude important understandings in their own
name.
Rapallo represented a major breakthrough for the Soviet diplomacy. 35 After the West’s
horrified reaction to the establishment of the first socialist state, the Soviet Union reached out to
the wider world and found an ally. The communist experiment was now a long-term matter; it
had withstood attempts at its eradication. Policymakers and statesmen now viewed the world as
capitalist, communist, and colonial. After Rapallo, Soviet Russia became again a major actor on
the world stage. Even with this success, Chicherin again sought to build an alliance package with
the other nation states in eastern and Western Europe. Russia needed broad diplomatic stability.
The foreign commissariat increased in importance within the Soviet bureaucracy.
By 1920, Lenin and the Soviet leadership, with the possible exception of Trotsky,
admitted that the world-wide proletarian revolution was not as sure as they once expected. It
would come; it had to occur, but maybe not at this stage of industrial development. The predicted
German upheaval did not materialize. Lenin continued to counsel patience because capitalist
“contradictions” would bring the conflict as the western imperialist states competed for
economic domination in a shrinking market. “As long as we are alone and the capitalist world is
strong,” claimed Lenin in 1920, “our foreign policy must consist in part of the exploitation of
contradictions.” 36 While he waited for the expected upheaval, Lenin had to deal with more
pressing domestic problems, particularly the non-functional economy. He had little choice as
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factory output in 1920 was eighty-six percent lower than in 1913. The grain harvest of 1920 was
only about three-fifths of the annual average for the half decade before World War I. 37
THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY
In 1921, in a complete break with Marxist economic doctrine, Lenin announced the New
Economic Policy (NEP). 38 In essence, the NEP was small scale capitalism. Lenin explained his
position as one of dire necessity. He even admitted “mistakes” in the past which led to the
existing problems. He further asserted that this policy would be temporary until the economy
stabilized. He was making economic changes, not political ones. Initially, the Tenth Party
Congress opposed this heresy; however, after the revolt of the sailors at Kronstadt, Lenin’s new
idea seemed plausible. 39
Realizing that war communism was a failure with the peasantry, in 1921 Lenin shifted
course. In a report to the 10th Party Congress on March 15, 1921, the Bolshevik leader laid the
foundations for his New Economic Policy. Russia, he argued, must have economic stability in
order to build socialism. The peasantry would become the foundation of the new Bolshevik state.
It must have an interest in the building of communism. Domestic order would bring foreign
respect. He addressed the unique challenges of the former Tsarist Empire. He referred to “special
transitional measures”:
There is no doubt that in a country where the overwhelming majority of the population
consists of small agricultural producers, a socialist revolution can be carried out only
through the implementation of a whole series of special transitional measures which
would be superfluous in highly developed capitalist countries where wage-workers in
industry and agriculture make up the vast majority.

Because the hoped-for international proletarian revolution was not materializing, Lenin
concluded that “only agreement with the peasantry can save the socialist revolution in Russia.”
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He then turned to practicalities and was confident of success. He asked and answered two
important questions, “Can freedom of trade, freedom of capitalist enterprise for the small farmer,
be restored to a certain extent without undermining the political power of the proletariat? Can it
be done? Yes; it can, for everything hinges on the extent.” 40 Lenin was attempting to remain
doctrinally consistent in the face of economic collapse. All reform remained a matter of “extent.”
Lenin was not undermining Marx, just fine tuning him to the Soviet landscape.
At this point, domestic issues predominated. It was the task of the diplomats to buy time,
that is, to maintain peace, in order to insulate the Soviet Union from hostile forces abroad. In an
address to a Moscow party conference in November, 1920, before the announcement of NEP,
Lenin explained the importance of stability, “We have not only a breathing space, and we have a
new stage in which our fundamental position in the framework of the capitalist states has been
won.” 41 NEP would be a hard sell and even more difficult to administer.
With the conclusion of a trade agreement with England and the treaty of Rapallo with
Germany, during the first half of the 1920s, Soviet diplomacy reached a high point in its
development. The communist leadership recognized the importance of the foreign commissariat
as a substantive instrument of domestic policy. The People’s Commissariat had to build on the
momentum. Chicherin and his colleagues had to deliver on Soviet promises.
Although still subordinate to the powerful Central Committee and Politburo, Chicherin
and his staff began to form and implement a non-ideological approach to the outside world.
Soviet diplomats illustrated to the international community that the Marxist/Leninist diatribes
were largely for doctrinal purity and that the Soviet Union could and would take a flexible stance
on world issues. “Peaceful –Co-existence” became the guiding light of Soviet foreign policy. 42
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This doctrine admitted the failure of the international proletarian revolution. World communism
would have to wait. For now, European continental stability and real-world rationality, except for
the occasional rail from the Comintern, would guide Soviet actions.
Lenin’s NEP proved successful. At the Eleventh Party Congress in 1922, Lenin’s last, he
presented the delegates with a progress report on the New Economic Policy and its implications.
He referred to the NEP as the “the major question” while he hoped that “we have learnt
something from the launching of this New Economic Policy.” Lenin understood that NEP would
determine the success or failure of the revolution. This New Economic Policy also had important
foreign policy ramifications:
To some extent we could and had to ignore this bond [with the peasantry] when we were
confronted by the absolutely urgent and overshadowing task of warding off the danger of
being immediately crushed by the gigantic forces of world imperialism.
It was the task of diplomacy to control the “gigantic forces of world imperialism” so that the
Bolshevik state could re-connect with the peasants. Lenin concluded with a powerful dose of
realism, reminding his comrades that “we Communists are but a drop in the ocean, a drop in the
ocean of the people.” The main focus remained the peasantry and peasants looked for concrete
results. Because, according to Lenin, an important factor in stability was “whether we shall be
able to supply the peasants with goods in exchange for their grain. The peasants will say: ‘You
are splendid fellows; you defended our country. That is why we obeyed you. But if you cannot
run the show, get out!’ Yes, that is what the peasants will say.” 43 The Bolsheviks had to deliver
specific, economic incentives to the vast Soviet peasantry. In Lenin’s view, there was simply no
place for international adventures in the face of such overwhelming internal crises.
Soviet peasants and workers began to trust the Bolshevik leadership and the economy
slowly recovered. Lenin had the luxury to concentrate on domestic matters because the foreign
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commissariat expanded Soviet diplomatic influence in the world and allayed fears of upheaval.
The Soviet Union began discussions with France, and in 1924 the Third Republic gave official
recognition to the Soviet Union. After a series of conflicts, Great Britain followed by 1929.
Russia once again became a great power and a major force in world affairs by conducting not a
rigid, dogmatic policy based on nineteenth-century predictions, but a flexible, accommodating
strategy palatable to the international community.
DIPLOMACY AFTER LENIN’S DEATH
In late December 1922, after suffering a series of strokes, Lenin dictated several letters to
be read at the next party congress. These letters collectively became known as his “testament.”
Lenin detailed his vision for his new party as well as the problems facing the still fledgling
revolution. He mentioned six “comrades” by name but found fault with all of them. Lenin feared
that the conflict between Stalin and Trotsky would split the movement; Grigori Zinoviev and Lev
Kamenev opposed the seizure of power in October 1917; Nikolai Bukharin and Georgy Pyatakov
lacked sufficient grounding in Marxism. He did not name a specific successor. In a supplement
of January 4, 1923, he pointedly warned the party about Stalin. Lenin asserted that “Stalin is too
rude and this defect, although quite tolerable in our midst and in dealings among us Communists,
becomes intolerable in a general-secretary.” 44 He suggested that “…the comrades think about a
way of removing Stalin from that post and appointing another man in his stead…” 45 Lenin died
on January 24, 1924. Despite Lenin’s wishes, Stalin brutally assumed power by 1928 and
immediately began the transformation of the Soviet state from moderate Leninism to bloody
Stalinism.

45

Stalin inaugurated the process of collectivization through five-year plans. He wanted to
scrap the NEP as soon as possible. Like Lenin, Stalin required foreign stability while he carried
out his domestic revolution. In a pamphlet entitled Problems of Leninism (in Russian, Questions
of Leninism-an interesting translation), Stalin explained his doctrine of “socialism in one
country.” 46 In this explanation and extension of Lenin’s thought, Stalin was confronting the left
opposition who supported the doctrine of “permanent revolution.” The Fourteenth Party
Conference adopted Stalin’s formulation in 1925 as policy and the open conflict with the left
wing began. Stalin discussed his idea as a series of questions:
What does the possibility of the victory of socialism in a single country mean?
It means the possibility of solving contradictions between the workers and the peasants
with the aid of the internal forces of our country; it means the possibility of the
proletariat’s seizing power and using that power for the construction of complete socialist
society in our country, with the sympathy and the support of the workers of other
countries, but without the preliminary victory of the proletarian revolution in other
countries. 47
After a struggle for power, by 1928 Josef Stalin emerged as the next leader of the Soviet
Union. Stalin understood that the Marxist/Leninist gospel of world revolution was frightening to
many potential allies. Stalin had earlier announced the doctrine of “socialism in one country,”
arguing that the Soviet government could initiate and complete communism in the Soviet Union
alone without the international upheaval which Karl Marx predicted. 48 Stalin sought
compromise in an anti-communist world. He realized that the Soviet Union had to exist in the
international community, and if toning down the language was the first step, he would do it.
Stalin would not allow dogma to limit economic and political necessity. His writings and later
pamphlet, Problems of Leninism, [in Russian-Questions of Leninism] in 1924 provided the
doctrinal foundation of the flexible and realistic Soviet position in international affairs and set
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the stage for drastic and brutal reforms inside the Soviet Union. This explanation was intended
for the party faithful and signaled a deep shift in Soviet domestic and foreign policy; the
worldwide Marxist revolution was not required in order for Soviet communism to succeed within
the USSR. Stalin was calling off the extreme wing of the party and signaling to the West that the
Soviet Union was a stable system. Stalin was turning on the left wing of the CPSU and
centralizing his authority. This pamphlet was a demand for loyalty to him.
What did Stalin mean in this document? Robert Service argues that Stalin’s
pronouncement of “socialism in one country” represented “an exposition of ideological
inclination.” 49 Stalin was deeply committed to the success of the revolution without foreign ties.
In addition, this revisionist interpretation of Lenin provided the philosophical ammunition for the
purges of the Left Opposition, the followers of Leon Trotsky, who demanded international
revolution no matter the reality. Robert Tucker asserts, however, that “Socialism in One
Country” was not the exposition of Stalin’s deeply held ideas, but a “case, rather, of the
confluence of expediency and political belief.” Stalin seized the mood of the moment and crafted
a position to support his ambitions. 50 “Socialism in One Country” also gave Stalin the power to
rein in the Comintern. Starting in 1929 Stalin tightly controlled the Comintern with the expulsion
of Bukharin from the executive Committee. Stalin wanted to ensure that foreign communist
parties would not damage the interests of the USSR. 51 For Stalin, internal social and economic
revolution was too important.
After Lenin’s death, Stalin had to create a distinct intellectual persona. His declaration of
socialism in one country set the stage for the philosophical battle with the Trotskyites; a battle
begun with words, but one that would end in brutality. With the resolution of the Fourteenth

47

Party Conference adopting Stalin’s thesis, radical domestic reforms commenced. After his
victory at the conference, Stalin presented a report to the Activists of the Moscow Organization
of the Russian Communist Party on May 9, 1925 outlining the work of the conference and took
the occasion to explain his position in greater detail. He singled out Trotsky for special attention
while he slowly amassed power. 52 Trotsky emerged from this diatribe as the enemy of socialism
and Stalin had identified his first target. For Stalin, loyalty to socialism in one country was
loyalty to himself; he treated criticism as a personal affront. Stalin could now pursue his enemies
as the defender of a new socialist orthodoxy.
Stalin contrasted the victory of socialism in a single country with the final victory of
socialism which, he agreed, must await the international proletarian revolution. Stalin’s thesis
was a major deviation from communist doctrine. Lenin explained that socialism could begin in a
single country but could not be completed short of world upheaval. 53 Stalin countered that
socialism could begin and end in one country, Russia. Essentially, Stalin simply admitted the
realities of the time; Russia had to survive in a hostile world, reform its domestic system and
maintain international balance while preparing for the inevitable upheaval. “Socialism in One
Country” became a declaration of both domestic and foreign policy. It was a call to other nations
that Russia accepted its position in the international community. At this point, socialism was
only for the Soviet Union. In furthering the Decree on Peace, “Peaceful Co-Existence” (first used
by Chicherin in June, 1920) blended with “Collective Security” to define the substance of Soviet
foreign policy after Lenin’s death. Stalin’s assertion set the stage for the purges of the 1920s and
1930s. Anyone who disagreed with him on any point became an enemy of the people. He did not
seek confrontation with foreign nations because he created enough turmoil at home.
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Stalin’s personality drove every aspect of his policy. Stalin was a Slavic nationalist who
viewed the outside world as hostile and threatening. He perceived enemies where there were
none and used terror as an instrument of power. He had to construct a foreign policy that would
protect both him and the revolution. Raymond Birt argues that:
The narcissistic element of Stalin’s paranoia was fed by the fact that even as child Joseph
was physically repulsive…He suffered from a nearly fatal bout with smallpox at age 4
and thereafter had a severely pocked face, which Soviet photographers were careful to
retouch…So, in terms of a narcissistic element needing protection from perceived
aggressors, Stalin was like the bull who travelled with his own china shop…
Stalin’s behavior in power is indicative of the need of the paranoid to protect his fragile
narcissistic ego from external threats…the paranoid had created a system perfectly suited
to his personality needs. 54
Stalin’s paranoia became a national obsession. Because literally everyone was a potential enemy,
the atmosphere of terror reached into every aspect of Soviet society. Life and death revolved
around the unstable Georgian. Both domestic and foreign policy existed for defensive purposes.
Stalin had to create enemies even if none existed.
Starting in 1928, Stalin began to implement his interpretation of Marx. International
peace became the springboard for domestic reform on a wide and brutal scale. Robert Service
explains the importance of foreign policy to Stalin’s revolution:
The economic transformation, in Stalin’s opinion, could not be accomplished unless the
USSR stayed clear of military entanglements abroad. His five-Year Plan was premised on
the Kremlin’s need to purchase up-to-date machinery from these powers. It would
obviously be difficult to induce foreign governments and business companies to enter
into commercial deals if there remained any suspicion that the Red Army might be about
to try again to spread revolution on the points of its bayonets. 55
With the pronouncement of “socialism in one country” and treaties with Major European
states, Stalin asserted that the USSR should avoid involvement in the affairs of other countries.
Service concludes that, “Foreign policy during the Five-Year-Plan was made subordinate to
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domestic policy more firmly than ever.” 56 Timothy Snyder argues that, “The Soviet Union was
both a state and a vision, both a domestic political system and an internationalist ideology. Its
foreign policy was always domestic policy, and its domestic policy was always foreign policy.
That was its strength and its weakness.” 57
Socialism in One Country set the intellectual tone for Stalin’s revolution, while the five
year plans set the economic baseline. After assuming power after Lenin’s death, Stalin
unleashed unspeakable terror on the peoples of the Soviet Union in the name of collectivization
and state planning. The Soviet Dictator turned on the market oriented New Economic Policy and
implemented a rigorous transformation of soviet economics and society. No area of the vast
Soviet Empire escaped his brutal wrath. He claimed to follow the master Marx in rationalizing
the backward peasant base of exchange, that is in forcing the peasants into state planning. He
asserted that the USSR had to industrialize in order to protect the gains of the revolution.
Stalin inaugurated his reforms with the First Five Year Plan in 1928. This vision called for
the intense collectivization of agriculture while pouring vast amounts of income into developing
factories. The peasant friendly NEP now turned into impossible quotas and grain seizures,
resulting in wide-spread famines and death for millions of Soviet farmers. “By 1928, the
industrialized capitalist economies were at the peak of the inter-war trade cycle. The gap in
production per head of population between Soviet and Western European Industry was as wide
as ever.” More importantly, the technological gap between Russia and the other Great Powers
was considerably greater than in 1913. 58 The USSR was quickly slipping behind the capitalist
world and Stalin sought a radical remedy.
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Stalin took advantage of a significant rise in unemployment, by the end of 1926 some 9
per cent, to populate the early factories. Additionally, more farmers were leaving the land and
migrating to the growing urban centers of the USSR. The key to initial success remained in the
countryside. The peasants, however, were none too happy with the sudden end of the NEP. They
decided to use what little power they possessed.
Stalin’s new system face a severe test in 1927-1928, when the peasants sold only half as
much grain to the official grain collection agencies as in the same period in 1926. With this
downturn, the towns and military faced substantial shortfalls. 59 Instead of increasing the price of
grain, Stalin reverted to a type of War Communism, utilized in the Civil War, and enforced
wide-ranging compulsion. At least 10 million perished in the man-made famine in the Ukraine in
the early 1930s. As a consequence, “Agricultural production per head of population in 19371939 was lower than in 1928 and only a few percentage points higher than in 1909-1913.” 60 This
“Third Revolution” was not at all irrelevant to the cause of Soviet diplomacy. Stalin was
terrorizing his own population; he had no time or ability to terrorize others.
Collectivization replaced the New Economic Policy and the bloody purges of all aspects
of Soviet society commenced. The first five year plan revolutionized the industrial base of the
Soviet Union while Stalin forced the total mobilization of the population. Stalin quickly reversed
the lax religious policies of the 1920s and centralized all administrative functions around his
position. Stalin also oversaw forced famines, especially in the Ukraine, and unleashed
indiscriminate oppression throughout the Soviet Union. 61
In the late 1920s, Chicherin began to suffer from the effects of diabetes and polyneuritis.
He took a leave of absence in 1928 and effectively lost control of the foreign commissariat. The
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Deputy People’s Commissar, Maxim Litvinov, took over the office in Chicherin’s absence and
became foreign commissar in 1930. 62 Litvinov did not agree with the German orientation of
Soviet foreign policy and shaped his own agenda. In his view, the Weimar Republic had taken a
pro-western turn in 1925 with the Treaty of Locarno with Britain, Italy, Belgium, and France. He
feared an anti-Soviet swing in German foreign policy. As a result of Locarno, Germany had
joined the League of Nations in 1926 as a great power with a seat on the League Council.
Litvinov argued that Russia had to develop a multilateral treaty arrangement system with the
west and the new states bordering Russia in order to hinder German expansion and prevent war.
Litvinov was concerned about the rising level of anti-Communist nationalism (National
Socialism) in Germany and the uncertain status of the Weimar Republic. Above all he feared a
western coalition including Germany against the Soviet Union. He set out to court the western
powers, particularly Britain, France, and the United States. The task was a difficult one. Prior to
1914, Great Britain and France had large financial interests in the Imperial Russian state. After
1917, they opposed the new government, especially since the Bolsheviks had defaulted on the
tsarist debts. Furthermore, the western powers were terrified at the rhetoric of the Comintern and
their own communist parties. Economic dislocation exacerbated their domestic problems. These
nations were not seeking ties to a country which would add to their difficulties. They attempted
to overthrow the Bolshevik regime in 1918-1919. They did not trust Russia and furthermore they
feared the spread of the cancer of communism. Recognition was one thing; collaboration and
exchange of information was quite another.
Litvinov attempted to engage the hostile nations in a series of non-aggression pacts. 63 This
strategy illustrates Litvinov’s goals in the 1930s: prevent war, support neutrality, and maintain
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substantive diplomatic, political, and economic contact with the major capitalist powers, Britain,
France, the United States, and Germany. He made clear Russia’s desire for peace and stability in
the world. He did not see the world revolution on the horizon. He doubted whether it would ever
arrive. He understood the importance of international balance separate from doctrine.
Marxist/Leninist threats had no place in his vision of Soviet foreign policy.
While Litvinov pleaded for peace, the dogmatic zeal of the Comintern continued to
undermine these benevolent efforts. Litvinov asserted to other diplomats and to the foreign press
that this organization was a unit independent of Bolshevik policy. He knew otherwise. Still, he
became so frustrated over the activities of the Comintern, that in 1929 he told Esmond Ovey, the
British Ambassador to the Soviet Union that, “You can hang them [British communists] or burn
them alive if you catch them.” 64 During a conversation with Ovey in 1930, the Foreign
Commissar called the Comintern “hopeless” and added that “Why don’t you take the thing? You
are a free country. We don’t want it here. Do arrange for it to hold its sessions in London.” 65
Litvinov was a realist in the strictest sense in that he sought accommodation with all states and
wanted no interference in his conception of foreign policy. He understood the precarious position
of Russia. The Comintern could quickly ruin his delicate balance. From the founding of the
Soviet state, Russian foreign policy was a complex mix of doctrine and pragmatism. The foreign
commissariat showed itself to be quite professional and accommodating in a hostile
environment, both inside and outside the Soviet Union. This calculated juggling act protected
Russia until 1941.
Events in Germany soon dominated the attention of the foreign commissariat. Germany,
like Russia, had undergone profound changes. Germany and the new USSR had common goals
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and problems. Germany’s experiment with democracy was teetering under economic strains in
the late 1920s. Of greater concern to the Soviets were those who sought to replace it. Litvinov
and his staff found themselves on the front lines of an important struggle; the struggle for
diplomatic stability and peace. While the Weimar Republic sought to construct a foreign policy
which would favored a western orientation, with the Soviet Union a secondary player, Soviet
diplomacy remained flexible, overlooking political differences. The new USSR had to survive in
difficult and uncertain times, both foreign and domestic, especially with the advent of Stalin. The
decade of the 1930s would prove decisive.
END NOTES
1

Karl Marx and Frederick Engles, The Communist Manifesto with Related Documents, John E. Towes (ed.),
(Boston: Bedford St. Martin’s, 1999), 82.

2

V. Semyonov, “The Leninist Principles of Soviet Diplomacy,” International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 4, (April,
1969): 4.

3

Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (eds.), The Diplomats, 1919-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1953), 235, note 1.

4

Peter Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia During World War I (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1999).

5

Robert Service, A History of Modern Russia from Nicholas II to Vladimir Putin (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press: 2003), 108. Hereinafter referred to as Service, A History.

6

Service, 119.

7

Dokymenty Vshnei Politiki SSSR, vol. I, (Moscow: Institute for Political Literature, 1957), Doc. 2.

8

Adam Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-67 (New York: Praeger,
1968), 54.

9

Teddy J. Uldricks, Diplomacy and Ideology: The Origins of Soviet Foreign Relations, 1917-1930 (London: Sage
Publishers, 1979), 17.
10

Leon Trotsky, Sochineniya, iii, ii, 206-209, as quoted in E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923,vol. 3
(Baltimore: Penguin Books), 41.

11

Geoffrey Roberts, The Unholy Alliance: Stalin’s Pact with Hitler (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989),
25.

54

12

Mirnyne Peregovory, 217. See also Issac Deutscher, The Prophet Armed Trotsky: 1879-1921 (New York:
Vintage, 1965), chapter XI.
13

Roberts, 26.

14

Lenin, Sochinenie, vol. 13, (Moscow: State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1947), 8-9.

15

E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, vol. III, (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966), 60.

16

Craig and Gilbert, 241, 253.

17

Trotsky, Moia Zhizn, vol. II, 72 as quoted in Uldricks, 29. For an interesting discussion of Chicherin’s career, see
Craig and Gilbert (eds), chapter 5.
18

Richard K. Debo, “G.V. Chicherin: A Historical Perspective” in Gabriel Gorodetsky(ed.,), Soviet Foreign Policy,
1917-1991, A Retrospective (London: Frank Cass, 1994), 22-23.

19

Lenin, Sochinenie, vol. 34, (Moscow: State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1950), 452.

20

Debo, 26.

21

Roberts, 29-30.

22

Carr, 132.

23

Ibid., 136, 323.

24

Lenin, Sochinenie, vol. 30, (Moscow: State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1950), 422.

25

E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, vol 3 ( London: Macmillian, 1953), 22-26.

26

Karl Radek, Zur Taktik des Kommunismus: Ein Schreiben an den Oktober-Parteitag der KPD (Hamburg, 1919),
11-12, as quoted in Ibid., 318 (emphasis in original).
27

Lenin, Sochinenie, vol. xxvii, (Moscow: State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1935), 117-118.

28

Stalin, Sochinenie, vol. v, (Moscow: State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1935), 117-120.

29

Lenin, Sochinenie, vol. xxvi, (Moscow: State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1935), 14-15.

30

Debo, 26-27.

31

Hilger, Soviet Russia (N.Y.), 14 August 1920, 48 as quoted in Carr, 323.

32

Richard E. Pipes, “Domestic Politics and Foreign Affiars,” Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical
Perspective, Ivo J. Lederer(ed.), (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), 151-152.
33

Robert C. Tucker (ed), The Lenin Anthology (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), 207.

34

Kommunisticheskii Internatsional, No. 2 (June 1919), cols. 149-150, as quoted in Carr, 137.

55

35

See chapter 2 for details.

36

Roberts, 31-32.

37

Service, A History, 124.

38

Tucker (ed), The Lenin Anthology, 503-510.

39

Service, A History, 125.

40

Lenin, Sochinenie, vol. 32, (Moscow: State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1950), 191,192, 196.

41

Lenin, Sochinenie, xxv, 485, (Moscow: State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1935), 485.

42

Roberts, 31-32.

43

Lenin, Sochinenie, vol. 33, (Moscow: State Publishing House for Political Literature,1950), 238, 239, 260, 261.

44

Tucker, 728.

45

Tucker, 728.

46

Joseph Stalin, Problems of Leninism (New York: International Publishers, 1934), chapter VI.

47

Ibid., 65 (emphasis in original).

48

Ibid., chapter VI.

49

Robert Service, Stalin: A Biography (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2004), 245. Hereinafter referred to as Service,
Stalin.

50

Robert C. Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879-1929, A Study in History and Personality (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1973), 378.

51

Service, Stalin, 282.

52

J.V. Stalin, Works, vol. 7, 1925(Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1954), 90-134.

53

Donald W. Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, (Boulder: Westview Press, 7th ed., 1990), 201-202 (emphasis
added).

54

Raymond Birt, “Personality and Foreign Policy,” Political Psychology, vol. 14, no. 4(Dec. 1993): 616.

55

Service, A History, 177.

56

Ibid., 177-178.

57

Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 74.

58

R.W. Davies, Soviet economic development from Lenin to Khrushchev (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998), 30-31.

56

59

Davies, 31.

60

Ibid., 45.

61

Snyder, chapters 1-3.

62

Uldricks, 90. Also, Craig and Gilbert, chapter 11.

63

Roberts, 42.

64

Hugh D. Phillips, Between Revolution and the West: A Political Biography of Maxim M. Litvinov (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1992), 107.

65

Phillips, 107. He made similar remarks to the Norwegian Ambassador. Phillips, 206, note 45.

57

CHAPTER TWO: GERMANY’S GREAT EXPERIMENT: WEIMAR DEMOCRACY
AND FOREIGN POLICY
When the guns fell silent in November 1918, Imperial Germany was gone and the
economy lay in ruins. While a popular revolution determined that Germany would become a
republic rather than a communist state, the allies forced democratic institutions on Germany in
1918 without understanding their impact. Despite the bloodshed of 1918-1919 and the Kapp
putsch, Germany hesitatingly became a democracy. Creating a full-fledged, stable democracy in
interwar Germany was no easy matter. In addition to the difficulties all states in this era faced in
attempting to stabilize their currencies and political systems in the wake of the devastating Great
War, the new Germany had inherited a rather mixed tradition of broad popular participation,
competitive campaigns, well- organized political parties and authoritarian rule from above. In the
age of Bismarck, the Second Reich had become a contradictory mix of royal absolutism and
parliamentary functions. 1 Power continued to be concentrated in the hands of the Kaiser and
Chancellor; while individual states in the federal union retained a great deal of sovereignty. The
Reichstag had little oversight authority, especially with respect to military and diplomatic issues.
Nationalism, generated by Bismarck’s wars and sustained and enflamed, at least amongst the
middling and upper classes, by Wilhelm II’s Weltpolitik, held the state together, in spite of a
burgeoning socialist movement.
Weimar politicians, largely socialist, struggled with the imperial legacy while attempting
to create viable democratic institutions. Friedrich Ebert, the first President of the Republic,
wanted to destroy the vestiges of the Wilhelmine system and, acting pursuant to the liberal
Weimar constitution of 1919, constructed a fully parliamentary democracy with complete
proportional representation of political parties. Unfortunately for the Republic, this system
58

encouraged chaos in the Weimar Reichstag as parties dedicated to the destruction of democracy
took seats in the parliament in proportion to its vote. Economic dislocation fueled political
confrontation in the streets of Germany’s cities. Although Berlin succeeded in restoring
confidence from 1924-1929, the new Republic would prove unable to stabilize Germany in the
long run.
In this chapter I will discuss the foundation and goals of Weimar foreign policy in the
1920s, with emphasis on German-Soviet relations. Germany was attempting to forge a delicate
path between east and west, realizing that it needed support from all quarters. Specifically under
the able leadership of Gustav Stresemann, first as Chancellor in 1923, and then as Foreign
Minister until 1929, Weimar foreign policy would at first attempt to undermine the Russian
Revolution economically and then, in an act of Bismarckian Realpolitik, conclude economic and
diplomatic arrangements with the Soviet state.
Until May, 1919, Germany had faced the devastating allied blockade, which had starved
the nation during the hostilities while food remained scarce for some time thereafter. With the
allied demand for reparations and the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr valley in January,
1923, the economy collapsed. Economic and political uncertainty reined in this one proud nation
of Goethe and Frederick the Great.
In the troubled years of the early Republic, German politicians struggled to forge a new
identity for their state. Liberal and socialist leaders sought to do away with the nationalist
excesses of the past and to seek support from the victorious allies. Some, like Gustav
Stresemann, the Chancellor and long serving Foreign Minister who dominated German foreign
policy from 1923 until his death in 1929, even advocated exploring rapprochement with the ally
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Germany had defeated in 1918, revolutionary Russia. Under Stresemann, Weimar foreign policy
attempted to stabilize and enhance the historic position of Germany and return it to great power
status.
Both Germany and Russia suffered as a result of the Great War. Imperial Germany lost
the war and Russia fell into revolution. Both were seeking status and recognition on the world
stage; both were coping with new economic and political systems; both wanted to revise the
Treaty of Versailles. Western powers distrusted these nations and marginalized them. Despite
their similarities, Russia and Germany had significant differences, not the least of which was the
ever-present threat of communist upheaval in Germany. The Russian Revolution forever altered
the landscape of Imperial Europe. The great question in the west was, what do we do about it?
Gustav Stresemann, the Chancellor and long serving Foreign Minister who dominated
German foreign policy until his death in 1929, realized that Germany possessed a potentially
powerful economy with vast natural recourses that could lure western interests. He had to
navigate between east and west in order to address the needs of the German economy. He could
not afford to alienate either side.
Weimar Germany maintained the twin pillars of the Empire: the army and industry. E. H.
Carr records an agreement between General Paul von Hindenburg and Friedrich Ebert, the Social
Democratic president of the Council of People’s Commissars and future Reichspresident on
November 10, 1918 (the day after the Kaiser’s abdication and the day before the armistice),
whereby the army would support a Social Democratic regime and maintain order. The
implication was that the new government would support the Reichswehr and not undermine its
authority. German industry settled outstanding disputes with the trade unions on November 15,
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1918. Ownership and labor would work together. 2 On March 15, 1919, the new, republican
Reichswehr emerged, now under the ostensible control of the Reichspresident.
These twin supports were attractive to the USSR. The Red Army needed the expertise of
the Reichswehr and the struggling economy required credits. German heavy industry needed
markets for its products and looked to both the east and west for outlets. 3 International trade
would be the foundation for German recovery. Despite the dislocation of World War I, Germany
retained a larger population and greater economic assets than France. Stresemann, unlike Hitler,
was willing to sacrifice economic nationalism for the moment for more practical considerations.
Moreover, he had to illustrate to the United States the devastating effects of reparations. If
America intervened on Germany’s behalf, Germany could regain its rightful place in world
affairs. He needed to tie the U.S. economy to German recovery, while recognizing that Russia
remained a secondary, but important factor in the German economic agenda. German foreign
policy had to face both east and west.
1919 TO RAPALLO
After 1919, the clear answer to the Bolshevik question was: do nothing and hope the
Communists would go away. President Ebert favored a western orientation and distrusted
Russia. 4 Communist theory identified Germany as the home of the anticipated proletarian
liberation and the establishment of a socialist state. Indeed, Germany possessed powerful
socialist and communist parties. Local governments as well as the Republic itself were subject to
left- wing upheaval. In 1919, a short-lived communist republic emerged in Bavaria. How could
Weimar Germany and Communist Russia cooperate for their common benefit? Herein lay the
conundrum of Weimar foreign policy.
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Weimar politicians employed economic policy for political ends regarding the USSR.
Comintern propaganda continued to target the new republic as the home of proletarian
revolution. The German communist Party [KPD] agitated in the streets for an end to democracy
and the establishment of a People’s Republic. Within the Foreign Office some diplomats
believed that if the Russian economy somehow stabilized, then the workers would reject the
oppressive yoke of communism and Russia would become a “moderate” nation. Diplomacy
became a tool for the manipulation, and, the ultimate destruction of the Bolshevik menace. The
Wilhelmstrasse sent Carl Graap, an expert on the Soviet economy to Russia in October, 1919.
After travelling widely and observing the Russian economic landscape, Graap concluded that:
A massive, large scale [military] offensive [against Bolshevism] is impossible, a
defensive strategy questionable, and a campaign of enlightenment and propaganda too
late. Salvation can only be brought about by working to remove Bolshevism’s root
causes. Only thus can the Bolshevik ideal as envisioned by utopians lose its appeal
among the broader masses….The struggle against, or perhaps, more accurately, the cure
for Bolshevism can only be achieved through the reconstruction of Russian economic
life. 5
Germany would undertake substantive economic relations in the hopes of returning capitalism to
Russia while enjoying the benefits of exchange. By spring1921, Berlin, both inside and outside
of the Wilhelmstrasse, had come to adopt Graap’s analysis. 6 Trade policy had a decidedly
ideological tone.
Germany and the USSR were extremely short of hard currency needed for trade. Military
materials and training were limited at best. Britain and France pressed demands for reparations
payments. On May 6, 1921, the day after an allied ultimatum to Germany threatening sanctions
in the event of non-compliance with treaty obligations, Germany and Russia signed a trade
agreement. This action had far-reaching implications. Weimar Germany expressly recognized the
Soviet government as the legitimate power in the former Czarist Empire. The new Bolshevik
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system would now interact with capitalist powers. This arrangement provided the impetus for
substantive interaction between the two nations: economic and military connections. Germany
had to extricate itself form the shackles of Versailles and the Red Army sought German military
expertise. Before the formal conclusion of the trade agreement, on April 7, 1921, Victor Kopp,
the Soviet representative in Berlin, reported to Trotsky with copies to Lenin and Chicherin, that a
project had been worked out under which airplanes would be manufactured in Russia by
Albatrosswerke, submarines by Blöhm and Voss, and guns and shells by Krupp. Kopp further
suggested that a mission of five or six German technicians should go to Moscow for detailed
discussions. Kopp demanded the highest secrecy. The German mission arrived in early summer
1921. Results were mixed, but a front company appeared in Berlin under the names of
Gesellschaft zur Förderung gewerblicher Unternehmungen. It acted as a cover on behalf of the
Reichwehr and of German firms for illicit arms transactions with the USSR. 7 In an article in
1922, Leonid Krasnin, Commissar of Foreign Trade, bluntly discussed the economic positions of
Germany and the USSR, while including a historical perspective. In this position, Krasnin
echoed Lenin’s speech of November, 1920 to the eighth All Russian Congress of Soviets 8 :
Russia and Germany, to judge by their former economic relations, were so to speak,
made for each other… None of the western European countries has such experience of
working with Russia or such profound and exact knowledge of all conditions in our
country as Germany. Hundreds of thousands of Germans used to live in Russia before the
war; many of them are complete masters of the Russian language, and have the most
extensive personal connections throughout the length and breath of Russia. Finally our
whole civilization, in particular our technical development, industry, and trade, have been
based for decades past mainly on work done in partnership with Germany, and it is easier
for the Russian industrialist, merchant, and even worker to get on with the German than
with any other foreigner. 9
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Because “none of the western European countries has such experience of working with Russia or
such profound and exact knowledge of all conditions in our country as Germany,” economic ties
would soon lead to political cooperation.
Russia was a vast market with unlimited potential for the western nations. With the
financial uncertainty of the 1920s, Germany, Britain, and France all recognized the possibilities
of substantive economic relations. Each also wanted to block the others from dominating the
Russian business landscape. Diplomacy took on a decidedly negative tone and this
“preventative” status would dominate the interaction between Europe and Russia until the
signature of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939. The race for the Russian
market was on. Diplomacy now existed as a catalyst for western economic penetration of the
Bolshevik state.
In the 1920s, France and Germany sought carefully to exploit the Russian economy, but
with each nation serving as a buffer for the other. Neither France nor Germany had the resolve to
go it alone in relations with Russia. The Comintern’s threats of world revolution caused extreme
fear in Paris and Berlin. The Third Republic and Weimar Germany both faced extensive
economic pressures after the First World War and each looked to Russia for relief. In the mid1920s the franc collapsed on world markets and French politicians scrambled to re-establish
fiscal stability. French business needed new markets and ventured eastward. As mentioned
above, in the words of the Soviet trade representative, “Russia and Germany were made for each
other.” Especially during the New Economic policy, the Soviet Union employed capitalist
practices in an attempt to stabilize its economy and establish political order making it attractive
for western investors. 10 Each nation had its own agenda, however, concerning the USSR.
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France was divided in its policy between the Foreign Office, the Finance Office, and
private business interests. The French Government disliked the huge trade deficits which the
USSR accumulated in the early 1920s and the Soviets’ delay in implementing a repayment plan.
France demanded recognition of the Czarist debts and the sanctity of contract in international
business agreements. 11 France had won the war and it wanted economic security in its dealings
with the USSR.
Germany saw a different Russia. By the end of 1921, the Wilhelmstrasse had already
concluded trade talks and an economic agreement arrangement with the USSR. Herbert von
Dirksen, then Chief of the eastern European division of the foreign office, in a memorandum of
July 19, 1927, concluded that the German government, despite the Comintern, hated Versailles
more than it feared Communism. Because both Germany and the Soviet Union wanted to revise
Versailles, they had a common point of reference, and Germany regarded Russia as a “necessary
evil” to counterbalance France and Great Britain as well as to limit the effects of Versailles. 12
Because substantive trade relations continued during periods of communist agitation in
Germany, “Even Soviet complicity in an abortive Communist rising in 1923 did not disturb
German policy. In fact, stern repression of the 1923 putsch gave the German government
confidence that it could trade with the Communists in Russia, while safely shooting them at
home.” 13 Furthermore, as a result of secret talks concerning military collaboration in 1921 and
1922, the German army operated three military bases in the Soviet Union beyond the reach of
Versailles and the Weimar government sought economic stabilization in Russia in order to
enhance its own military expansion. According to George Kennan, the two nations entered into a
military relationship “for reasons of the coolest expediency: by the Germans, because it [the
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collaboration] enabled them to evade some of the restrictions imposed by Versailles on their
rearmament; by the Russians, because it permitted them to get German help in rebuilding the
new Red army.” 14 Unfortunately George Stein reports that specifics concerning Russo-German
military cooperation remain difficult to re-construct because the Reichswehr destroyed the
primary military documents for security reasons. In the German diplomatic dispatches, however,
Red Army leaders evidenced a deep respect for German military methods. Additionally, primary
source material dealing with German technical assistance is virtually non-existent. 15
As was the case in most western nations, the goals of the German Finance and Foreign
Offices often conflicted, leading to an inconsistent and duplicitous policy toward the Soviet
Union. The German diplomats wanted all of the benefits of Soviet trade with none of the
political risks. These two offices, in particular, evaluated the results of the Communist revolution
through different prisms. The Weimar Government had to improve the economic conditions in
Germany if it had any hope of survival. This fact meant that if trade was indeed necessary with
Bolshevik Russia, so be it. German business did not care where its capital came from. German
diplomats, on the other hand, feared the “infection” of Communism and advocated a more
restrained position.
With Lenin’s New Economic Policy and a Soviet-German agreement in May 1921
regarding the repatriation of prisoners and the establishment of official missions, communist
Russia seemed to be well on the way to economic, and as the Germans predicted, political
“evolution.” Ago von Maltzan, director of the Russian Desk at the Wilhelmstrasse, sensed a
definite shift in Soviet policy:
Along with Lenin, [the Commissar of Foreign trade Leonid] Krasin is an advocate of a
moderate form of Bolshevism, leans toward a policy of evolution and prefers the new
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principle of state capitalism to that of communism. Such policies…have gained a great
deal of influence in Moscow. The practical results of these policies would mean the
reintroduction of trade, a closer approximation of the capitalism of the western states, the
granting of concessions, and exceptions regarding private property and the acquisitions of
foreigners in Russia. 16

Maltzan optimistically reported that these reforms would lead to a re-adaptation to the economic
systems of non-Bolshevik nations. 17 While he cautioned against “exaggerated hopes,” he argued
that recent developments could offer “considerable prospects for the future.” 18 Expectations
were high in Weimar Germany as 1922 dawned.
In the face of tremendous obstacles, the Weimar government attempted to bring order to
a tattered and defeated Germany. The new system needed recognition and a place in the world
community. It had to prove somehow that it indeed could do what to the west(and to many
within Germany) seemed impossible: re-build the greatness of Germany within a full-fledged
democratic model. In this endeavor Weimar Germany had something in common with Soviet
Russia. Each was struggling for existence. Because England and France ostracized both nations
and demanded payments for debts, the two newest states looked to each other for support. Both
sought international recognition in order to construct domestic stability. Each suffered severe
economic dislocation. Germany and Russia felt isolated in an increasingly hostile world and they
strove for diplomatic attention. Each waited for the proper moment. The moment arrived in
1922.
RAPALLO
An international conference convened in the Italian city of Genoa to discuss the European
economic situation, and, specifically, the issue of Czarist debts owed to European nations, the
inclusion of Russia in the process of European integration, and the question of German
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reparations. French President Raymond Poincaré did not want to give the Germans the
opportunity to debate the reparations issue. The conference was left with the sole problem of
Russia. 19
Foreign Minister Chicherin led the Soviet delegation. Genoa represented the first time
that a Soviet representative had appeared at a major international gathering. Chicherin made the
most of the opportunity. He had to convince the western powers of the Moscow’s peaceful
intentions. He chose his words carefully. The communist government sought substantive ties to
the capitalist powers freed from ideological constraints. Britain and France demanded
substantial concessions from the Bolshevik government despite its rather weak economy. The
Soviet delegates responded with detailed counter arguments and evidence illustrating the
suffering and damages which the World War visited on Russia. Russia wanted to reduce any
debts. After all, as Chicherin asserted,
As for Russia, her war losses were greater than those of any other country: she accounted
for 54 per cent of the Entente’s losses. The Russian Government spent 20,000 million
gold rubles on the war, the profits from which went exclusively to the other side. That is
why when speaking of war debts it should be borne in mind that our [Russian] counterclaims are far in excess of the amount of war debts. 20
In his address to the delegates at Genoa, he explained the importance of mutual recognition and
of economic interdependence despite political differences. Communist and capitalist must
interact peacefully for the common benefit. He explained that “in the first place, the Russian
delegation wish to state that they have come here in the interests of peace and of the general
reconstruction of the economic life of Europe…” While the Moscow was not abandoning its
“communist principles…economic collaboration between the States representing these two
systems of property is imperatively necessary for the general economic reconstruction.” 21
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Chicherin skillfully laid out Russia’s case and its economic status. He attempted to
allay the fears of the still uncertain western powers. As the Foreign Commissar explained,
the Soviets were acting, not out of blind self interest, but in the spirit of good faith
cooperation. He asserted that “the problem of universal economic reconstruction is, in present
conditions, so immense and comprehensive that it can only be solved if all countries, both
European and non-European, sincerely desire to co-ordinate their efforts…” Chicherin then
outlined Russia’s philosophy on peaceful relations and the avoidance of war. The Foreign Office
looked forward to proposing its own ideas for stability. It wanted to be a part of the international
conversation seeking:
To support every proposal designed to lighten the burden of militarism, on condition
that this limitation is applied to the armies of all countries, and that the rules of war are
supplemented by the absolute prohibition of its most barbarous forms, such as poison
gas, aerial warfare, etc., and in particular the use of means of destruction against
peaceful populations. 22
Chicherin concluded that Moscow welcomed the opportunity to play its part in the new order
and reminded his audience that “[we] are prepared to support all proposals of a progressive
nature made by other countries.” 23 The Soviet position was clear. Chicherin was re-asserting
Lenin’s peace principles from 1917. In the Soviet view, common diplomatic action could block
the outbreak of any conflict.
Casting aside these rational arguments, the wartime allies wanted re-payment of their lost
investments. Quickly, the conference split and the Soviets began to look elsewhere for binding
alliances in order to maintain at least some position in diplomatic discussions. The Soviets could
not afford international isolation lest the allies turn on the Soviet state in its time of economic
dislocation. Weimar Germany provided the perfect partner because the conference had ignored
German concerns over reparations. The Soviets shared this German isolation. The German69

Soviet delegations decided to meet at the nearby village of Rapallo where the Russian diplomats
resided for the conference. As would occur in 1939, the anti-Soviet policies of Britain and
France left Germany and Russia little alternative; they forced the anti-Versailles powers together.
Friedrich Ebert, the German President, looked westward while a powerful coalition of
“Easterners” emerged in the Foreign Office. Even Ebert soon realized that the wartime allies had
little interest in Germany or its recovery. The Germans sought compromise, “Three times in that
first week of the conference, Rathneau asked for an appointment with Lloyd George. The
German Chancellor made the same request. None of these requests was granted—a fact which in
itself was a signal discourtesy.” 24 As both Russia and Germany stood outside the substantive
discussions at Genoa, representatives from both sides decided to explore mutual interests. Ebert
followed the diplomatic correspondence closely and reluctantly supported an agreement. He had
little choice. The delegations worked long into the night and early morning of April 16, 1922,
Easter Sunday. Resurrection for the dispossessed was at hand.
Although the British and French would later claim German-Soviet duplicity, in fact, the
Germans attempted to inform the English of their plans:
At five o’clock in the morning, therefore, word was sent to the Russians that the Germans
were willing to talk. Two attempts were made, in the early morning hours, to get in touch
with Mr. Wise [advisor to Lloyd George] and to let the British know of the German
decision. On the first occasion word came back that Mr. Wise was asleep and could not
be disturbed. The second time a chilly voice answered that the gentleman has gone out of
town for the day, and could not be reached. 25
British representatives were uninterested in the German position. German diplomats did not
attempt to hide or disguise their intentions, trying instead to inform the British in the hopes of
moving the discussions in a substantive direction. A German-Soviet meeting did not arouse
British curiosity.
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Despite, or possibly because of, the rebuke of the English delegation, Bolshevik Russia
and Weimar Germany concluded the Rapallo Treaty. The agreement provided for the resumption
of diplomatic and consular relations between the parties, the renunciation of claims, and most
favored nation trade status. The Soviet Union received de jure recognition. Republican Germany
became a substantive player on the world stage, despite its dire economic situation, because
Russia’s vast trade potential was now open to German business. No longer could the western
powers discount Germany and Russia. In addition to the diplomatic articles, each party agreed
“to co-operate in a spirit of mutual goodwill in meeting the economic needs of both countries.”
The treaty restored hope to the tattered nations and opened the potential for far reaching
agreements. With the western economies struggling, Germany and the Soviet Union formed a
powerful bloc. Although important, and contrary to popular belief, a military accord allowing
German tank, air and chemical officers to train in the Soviet Union in order to avoid the
restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, was not part of the Rapallo agreement, but resulted from
secret conversations in 1921 and 1922. This military arrangement developed for reasons of
necessity for both nations quite apart from political considerations. 26 In any case, both political
and military ties bound the two states together in a deep spirit of understanding despite the
ideological differences. Each complemented the other as a force in international relations.
AFTER RAPALLO
When the pact became public, France and Great Britain were incensed. Before leaving
Italy, Lloyd George inquired of the Germans why they had not informed him of the negotiations.
The Germans replied calmly that they had indeed attempted to contact his advisor, Mr. Wise. As
George Kennan relates, “Lloyd George’s reply to this argument stands as a classic example of
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the political art: ‘Who’ he asked with ruffled brow, ‘is Mr. Wise.’” 27 Lloyd George did not even
know the name of his own advisor. Unfortunately, such narrow- minded incompetence would
become characteristic of the English foreign office in the 1920s and 1930s. The elitism was
palpable.
Chicherin worked to spread the Soviet position of peace and cooperation. He would
speak to anyone who would listen. The intensity of Soviet diplomacy illustrated its position of
European stability and the avoidance of conflict. Chicherin deftly explained the impact of
Rapallo in an interview with the London Observer on August 13, 1922:
All I can say is that Russia needs money and technical equipments too, and these last she
can best obtain from Germany, whose engineers, in my opinion, have been those to show
the most initiative when setting up plant and industries in a foreign country. But the
money Russia is willing to take from anybody who will befriend her.
France is suffering from an illogical psychology. Hostile to both Russia and Germany,
what is more natural than that the two should be driven into one another's arms?
He continued and repeated the consistent line of Soviet foreign policy. “Russia” declared the
People’s Commissar, “Desires peace, and an offensive is the last thing in the world entering
our minds at present.” However, he warned that, “This menace to universal peace is a very
real one indeed, necessitating constant watchfulness. . .” 28 Chicherin severely attacked French
policy towards Russia in another Observer interview on August 20. He made it clear that it
would be a mistake to underestimate the power of the Soviet Union. Russia remained a force
in international politics. While the USSR “needs economic collaboration with other
countries… we can afford to wait… Russia suffers as well as the whole continent from the
aggressive policy of French imperialism. . .” 29 Although the USSR sought partners in its
quest for peace, Chicherin was clear that the Soviet Union would be nobody’s fool.
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Although Rapallo was a bright light for both states in the darkness of the early 1920s, the
stability for Germany was still far away. Partly because of the allied demand for reparations and
other fiscal limitations, because the war had been financed “off the books”, and the German
government insisted on paying striking workers in the Ruhr, inflation wracked Germany in 1923;
France and Belgium invaded the Ruhr causing further economic dislocation, the mark was
trading at one trillion to the dollar, radical political parties fought each other in the streets. The
new Republic was torn from the right and the left. In November, 1923, a small Bavarian radical
group, the National Socialist German Worker’s Party, attempted to seize power while Bavarian
separatists sought to establish a new state. In Saxony and Thuringia, Socialists and communists
rose against the local governments. A mood of uncertainty permeated German society. Weimar
foreign policy faced tremendous domestic challenges.
While Franco-German antagonism continued, by 1924 cooler heads prevailed across this
wide divide in the persons of Gustav Stresemann and Aristide Briand. In Soviet eyes, Germany
seemed to adopt a western orientation, particularly because the Weimar Republic seemed to be
under the economic domination of the United States with the Dawes Plan. With Stresemann’s
conciliatory policy toward France, Soviet uneasiness increased. The always suspicious Soviets
now feared a western alliance, including Germany, directed against the Soviet Union.
Stresemann would carefully steer German policy on a middle path without destroying the
Russian connection.
Perhaps the new Republic had found a substantive and less dangerous partner. As the
talks in Genoa and Rapallo illustrated, Germany was luring its eastern friend into the western
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camp of capitalist states. Herbert von Dirksen, who served in the Eastern Section from 19251928 and then as Ambassador to Russia from 1928-1933, echoed Maltzan’s assessment:
German policy toward Bolshevik Russia consisted and consists of the efforts to establish
and then constantly intensify political, economic and cultural relations with Soviet Russia
and thereby gradually to moderate the revolutionary and subversive tendencies of the
Soviet government and bring it closer to the West. 30
Stresemann also recognized the value of the USSR as well as its threats. He advocated a cautious
but direct approach:
We have carried on credit negotiations with Russia and are involved in active trade with
Russia, not only because we need this, but because I am of the opinion that it is necessary
to so bind up the Russian economy with the capitalist system of the Western European
powers that we thereby pave the way for an evolution in Russia which in my opinion
presents the only possibility of creating a state and an economy out of Soviet Russia with
which we can live. 31
Both the Dirksen and Stresemann recognized the potential of close economic relations with the
USSR. Both hoped to create the fiscal pre-conditions for a more moderate Soviet Union.
Economic evolution continued in 1922 and 1923 as Lenin’s NEP took shape and
stabilized the foundations of the Soviet economy. Peasants and workers were motivated by the
lure of profit, even if it was to be minimal. With Lenin’s illness and death in early 1924,
economic flexibility dissipated. A power struggled ensued in the Kremlin. Russia looked inward
and old fears of the west re-emerged. In Berlin, the Wilhelmstrasse began to re-assess the
implications of the NEP and whether it was leading the USSR away from Communism. Further
complicating relations, German police raided the Soviet Trade mission in Berlin. By early 1924,
trade with the USSR seemed anything but hopeful. During 1923, German exports to the Soviet
Union constituted only 1.2 per cent of total German exports; German imports from the USSR
accounted for only 2.4 per cent of total imports. By late 1924, trade with Germany quickly
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declined, economic treaty negotiations were broken off, and a mutual distrust permeated
relations. 32
Erich Wallroth, head of the Eastern Section, became convinced that Lenin’s death
marked a turning point in Soviet economic and political expansion. In a detailed memorandum
entitled “Russia at the Crossroads”, he predicted that the first half of 1924 would clarify Russia’s
“evolution”:
Over the course of the next six months one will be able to ascertain whether the present
Soviet regime will end up in a hopeless dead end or whether perhaps under Trotsky’s
leadership or that of other determined, reform-minded communists the Soviet
government will yet come to its senses. 33
Unfortunately, no “reform-minded communist” entered the arena to continue Russia’s movement
to the west. Instead of Trotsky, Joseph Stalin would emerge as Lenin’s successor. He quickly set
out to quickly destroy all remnants of the NEP and thereafter established a rigid and brutal
dictatorship. The Soviet economy went from the New Economic policy to a type of forced grain
requisition. From the euphoria of the early 1920s, Wallroth soon realized that the “evolution”
just would not occur; the Weimar government must change course in its relations with the Soviet
Union. He expressed these views in another memorandum in late 1924:
This important prerequisite [Russia’s evolution from communism to capitalism] seemed
at that time (i.e. the signing of the treaty of Rapallo) to be altogether the case, because at
the Moscow Communist Party Congress of December 1921(sic) Lenin had successfully
put the entire weight of his forceful personality behind the New Economic Policy…the
beginnings of German-Russian co-operation in economic reconstruction glimmered at
that time on the eastern sky of a promising new dawn both economically and to a large
and fundamental extent politically, in all of these hopes Russia has proved a bitter
disappointment. 34
While “disappointed,” the Weimar Republic could not afford to sever ties completely with the
Soviet Union.
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Most of the diplomats and economic experts in the Wilhelmstrasse agreed with
Wallroth’s assessment while German-Russian relations bent but did not break. Russia’s
economic and political “evolution” simply did not occur. Russia remained an important
component of Weimar foreign policy, but with complications. Germany now viewed Russia with
great trepidation and distrust. This was not an atmosphere in which to develop substantive
relations. Russia realized its possible isolation and continued its policy of a western orientation,
at least in foreign policy. The Soviets did not want Germany drawn exclusively into the western
orbit as negotiations opened in early 1925 leading to the Treaty of Locarno. Chicherin reported
to the All-Union Congress of Soviets in May, 1925, that “If the pact of guarantee with the
western Powers should be put into operation…if Germany should enter the League of Nations,”
then Germany will “find itself in a position which will make it scarcely possible to continue, at
least in the same degree as hitherto, the relations established between us.” 35 Despite the Soviet
concerns, the USSR understood that it had to be politically flexible in order to survive.
Although the United States Senate had refused to ratify the treaty of Versailles, the
United States introduced the Dawes plan in late 1923 and the German market began to stabilize
by early 1924. Until the outbreak of the Great Depression, Stresemann’s policy proved
successful. Under the provisions of the Dawes plan, an American economic expert could modify
reparations if the German economy faltered. Germany gained a protector in the United States. As
U.S. investment increased, the voices of radical revolution dimmed as Germans returned to
work, invested money, and came to support the teetering democracy. They came to believe that
Gustav Stresemann would re-direct German foreign policy and restore the once shattered nation
to world prominence.
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GERMANY AND THE WEST
As Franco-German relations slowly improved in 1924, both nations sought to establish a
détente. In early January, 1925, the German Foreign Office circulated a memorandum suggesting
a border settlement in the west, guaranteed by Italy and England, and arbitration agreements in
the east with no specific finality concerning the boundaries of Poland. The eastern territories
remained a point of contention with possible revision at a later date. In this way, Germany would
appear peaceful and conciliatory to the western powers, while keeping the hope of eastern
revision alive. Both Britain, which by 1925 had already begun to doubt the wisdom of the
Versailles policy toward Germany, and France, had received the memorandum with interest.
Briand and Austen Chamberlain, the British Foreign Secretary, were skeptical however, of a long
term settlement and both wanted further guarantees for Poland. Chamberlain was quite
enthusiastic about the prospects of German recognition of at least a part of the Versailles Treaty.
Briand amended the German plan with a demand that Germany join the League of Nations as a
great power. Briand was not becoming a German patriot; he wanted the provisions of the League
Covenant to apply to Germany, making Germany a tool of the league and subject to League
control.
Stresemann understood Briand’s intent and deftly maneuvered the powers to exempt
Germany from the military provisions of the League Covenant because of Germany’s weakened
armaments position. Stresemann realized that he had to walk a fine line, both at home and
abroad. He could not appear to be relinquishing revision of the hated Treaty of Versailles while
acquiring western support for his policies. He clearly understood the political value of
cooperation, especially, peaceful relations with the west, at least to a degree. He explained to his
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domestic critics that Germany could not exist solely on the basis of hatred of Versailles. While in
May, 1919, he referred to the treaty as “a moral, political and economic death sentence,” he now
understood that Weimar Germany must subtly “revise” the harsh provisions of the treaty while
working through diplomatic channels. 36 The Republic had to enter the world arena in order to
modify it over time. With western support, Germany could continue to discuss possible revision
of the border with Poland. This new arrangement would at least buy time for Germany to make
its case as a European power. He would not compromise on the eastern border with Poland,
which he referred to as “unpolitical and oppressive.” 37
Stresemann was caught between support for and revision of Versailles. While the USSR
remained skeptical concerning German intentions, Stresemann was careful to maintain close
contact with the Soviets. Germany concluded a commercial treaty on October 2, 1925 and
followed up with a railway convention, a navigation convention and an agreement on taxation
signed in Moscow on October 12, 1925. After some rather tense negotiations between Britain,
France, and Germany, the parties signed the treaties of Locarno on October 16, 1925. The
western powers further agreed that the provisions of the agreement would come into force only
when Germany entered the League of Nations as a great power with a seat on the League
Council, which it did in 1926. This breakthrough, “the Spirit of Locarno,” which cost Germany
nothing, was a major component of Stresemann’s policy.
In a mere six years from the humiliation of Versailles, Germany had now regained a
substantive place on the world stage with a seat at the table as an equal partner. Germany now
had diplomatic recognition in the east and west. With the Dawes plan in full swing, Stresemann
turned his attention to economic interaction with Russia. Although he clearly favored a
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Westorientierung, he did not want to destroy the Soviet connection. He feared the reach and
threat of Bolshevism and hoped that western support would lessen Germany’s need to look to the
east. As most western statesmen, he simply distrusted and detested the Soviet Union. He felt that
Bolshevism constituted a fundamental and long term threat to western stability. He cautioned
against entrance into the Soviet orbit.
We should avoid the utopia of flirting with bolshevism. When the Russians are in Berlin,
the red flag will at once fly over the palace and in Russia, where they want world
revolution, they will be quite content to have bolshevized Europe as far as the Elbe and
they will leave the rest of Germany to be devoured by the French. 38

While Germany should not “flirt” with Bolshevism, Stresemann could not ignore the position of
Russia as a base for stability in foreign affairs. “Russia”, he asserted in the Reichstag on the eve
of the arrival of the Soviet delegation on its way to Genoa, should not be treated “as a colony for
international capital to exploit.” Further, Germany should not become “a member of an
international consortium economically hostile to her.” 39 The USSR, Stresemann acknowledged,
was not going away, and in his view substantive diplomatic relations would make for a better
policy than confrontation. Like Bismarck, Stresemann could keep his hand on the diplomatic
pulse if Germany and the USSR aligned. The Soviet Union should not become a free agent in the
world community.
TREATY OF BERLIN
Stresemann and the Foreign Office allayed Soviet fears of an anti-Communist western
alliance with the conclusion of the Treaty of Berlin, signed on April 24, 1926. The treaty
contained a guarantee of neutrality in the event of a war between the Soviet Union and a third
party despite the “peaceful behavior” of the USSR. In addition, Germany agreed not to join an
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economic boycott of the Soviet Union. Finally, Germany succeeded in avoiding sanctions against
a third party (Russia) as long as it was disarmed. 40 The Soviets did not need to fear a hostile
Germany entangled in the legal requirements of the League of Nations. The Soviet foreign
ministry was satisfied with the arrangements and tried to deepen economic relations. Germany,
though taking a decidedly western path, could not afford to alienate a powerful nation with the
potential of the Soviet Union.
After the treaty of Berlin, German foreign policy steered a course between Ausschaltung
(exclusion) and Alleinbleiben (isolation). German fears centered, on the one hand, a Russia
drawn into a western orbit through alliances with Poland and France, and, on the other hand, a
Germany drawn into Russia’s isolation. The Berlin treaty represented the median point in
German relations with the Soviet Union. The mechanism for the implementation of this policy
was the so-called “Schlesinger Line,” named for the German Foreign Ministry’s expert on trade
and financial relations with the USSR, Moritz Schlesinger. A group of private German banks
granted the Soviet State Bank a short- term financial credit of 100 million marks in October
1925. The German cabinet followed this gesture, approving a long-term credit of 300 million
marks in February 1926. Although private German funds accounted for the credit, both the Reich
and Länder governments agreed to guarantee 60 per cent of the credit against default. 41 This
credit was to form the basis of political negotiations between Moscow and Berlin.
For Schlesinger, economic interaction was the most important factor in German-Soviet
relations. Both states could benefit from close financial connections and Germany could monitor
Soviet policy and guide the USSR away from the western camp. Germany must support the
stability of the USSR as its major eastern ally and trading partner. Schlesinger’s method was the
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extension of German credits to the Soviet Union. Germany would become the USSR’s
middleman. 42 Thus, he was binding together both economic and political partnerships.
In late 1929, Weimar-Soviet relations underwent a test during the “Colonist” crisis
involving German-speaking Mennonites inside the Soviet Union. These peasants reacted to
forced collectivization by leaving their traditional lands and moving to Moscow seeking
permission to leave the country. Initially, they sought to immigrate to Canada, but Canadian
officials resisted the influx of such a large group. The Weimar government offered to allow these
people into Germany. Initially, the USSR allowed the Mennonites to leave for Germany quickly,
but then reversed this decision. Tensions mounted and the German press took an anti-Soviet
tone. Finally, in late November, the USSR allowed about 5,600 to leave for Germany. 43
In the early 1930s, the Comintern and the KPD increased pressure for upheaval in
Germany. These calls for action, largely limited to rhetoric, strained the economic ties between
the two states. German industrialists demanded increased trade while diplomats sought to smooth
the anti-soviet press. Continuing military contacts became more important. The Reichswehr had
just entered a new phase in its rearmament program. At a contentious cabinet session on
February 20, 1930, Reichswehr Minister Wilhelm Groener underscored the importance of the
military interests, “Only relations with Russia give the army the opportunity to familiarize itself
with the most modern weapons and to keep abreast of manufacturing processes.” 44
While German-Soviet relations stabilized in the early 1930s, internal pressures threatened
the fabric of the Weimar Republic. The western financial collapse destroyed the fragile German
economy. Germany’s dependence on American capital was now a hindrance to recovery as U.S.
funds no longer flowed into the Weimar economy. In fact, they were being pulled out after the
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stock market crash of October, 1929. Radical voices all along the political spectrum emerged
with renewed vigor. Weimar politicians seemed helpless against the rising tide of revolution.
One group in particular, the radically anti-Soviet National Socialist German Worker’s Party, felt
that the time was ripe for electoral victory and eventually the seizure of power. Weimar
diplomats, even after the death of Stresemann, attempted to continue his legacy of a balanced
east-west policy. With the worldwide depression deepening, Soviet foreign policy now faced its
greatest threat.
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CHAPTER THREE: EVERYTHING CHANGES: HITLER IN POWER
On January 30, 1933, President Paul von Hindenburg appointed Adolf Hitler Chancellor
of the German nation. Initially, the government of the Soviet Union welcomed this change in the
German leadership. Even before his appointment as Chancellor, Pravda asserted that extreme
fascist terror would merely serve to sharpen the class struggle and the growth of the KPD. 1 In
early 1933, Kommunisticheskii Internatsional announced that, “Hitler’s rise to power hastens the
revolutionary crisis.” 2 Some communist theorists, such as Karl Radek, predicted that Hitler’s
election represented the first step toward the proletarian revolution in Germany; 3 others in Russia
preferred Hitler over Franz von Papen, Chancellor from June to December 1932, who was a
staunch anti-communist and a supporter of closer ties with France. 4 The Soviets had read Mein
Kampf but felt that it was aimed at a domestic audience for internal political consumption. 5 In
any case, the Soviets believed that Hitler could not last long owing to the domestic difficulties
plaguing Germany at the time. 6 This early optimism soon faded as Hitler and the National
Socialist government pursued a narrow-minded, dogmatic, and inflexible policy of conflict and
confrontation with the Soviet Union and world communism.
In this chapter I will argue that the Nazi regime effectively destroyed a substantive and
viable relationship with the USSR in the name of doctrinal purity while the Soviet Union
continued to practice its policy of collective security in seeking to avoid conflict of any kind. The
USSR showed itself the more flexible partner in the face of ever-increasing German pressures.
The Soviet Union then became an international voice for the containment of fascism within the
European diplomatic system. Hitler succeeded in forcing a shift in Soviet revolutionary policy
from confrontation to conciliation. England and France refused to heed the USSR’s warnings at a

85

time when Hitler’s revolution was still somewhat weak. Hitler would quickly put the Soviet
position to the test.
HITLER’S ANTI-SOVIET ACTIONS
As the self proclaimed bulwark against Bolshevism, 7 Hitler ignored the economic and
political linkages that had been forged between Germany and the Soviet Union during the
Weimar era. After the conclusion of the Berlin treaty the German military, limited by the treaty
of Versailles to a professional army of only 100,000 and deprived of an air force, had continued
the substantive relationship with the Red Army formed in 1921, whereby German soldiers and
airmen trained in the Soviet Union, to the benefit of both parties. 8
But Hitler had clearly explained his Eastern Policy in Mein Kampf, his political
manifesto, written while imprisoned after the failed Putsch of November 1923:
If land was desired in Europe, it could be obtained by and large only at the expense of
Russia, and this meant that the new Reich must again set itself on the march along the
road of the Teutonic Knights of old, to obtain by the German sword sod for the German
plow and daily bread for the nation. 9
Later, in the famous Chapter XIV dealing specifically with his eastern orientation, Hitler was
more specific, ”if we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia
and her vassal border states.” 10 The Soviet Union remained his primary objective; only in the
vast regions of the Soviet empire could he obtain “daily bread for the nation.” Because his
ideology was vehemently anti-slavic, he had to apply it to all aspects of his party.
Hitler predicted the collapse of Bolshevism in the Soviet Union because the communists
deprived Russia of the German minds that organized and built the Russian state system. In
addition, Judaism had infected the Slavic spirit and made it “impossible for the Russian by
himself to shake off the yoke of the Jew by his own resources [and] it is equally impossible for
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the Jew to maintain the mighty empire forever. He himself is no element of organization, but a
ferment of decomposition.” 11 “Jewish-Bolshevism” was the greatest threat to the German Volk,
and this disease had to be eradicated. 12 Jews and Slavs were peoples “des Lebens unwürdiges
Leben” ( unworthy of life). He had no intention of modifying his anti-Russian, anticommunist
stance after coming to power. He was going to move eastward; the only question was when.
War in 1933 was, of course, out of the question. Germany, at the time of Hitler’s
Machtergreifung, was a deeply troubled nation. With the spread of the depression,
unemployment and monetary instability were rampant, communism and socialism constant
threats to his leadership. Germany needed stability, both at home and abroad. Hitler needed
time to rearm and to defeat his internal enemies. He had to establish himself and his cabinet as
responsible and capable leaders while turning his attention to the military up the army. He made
it clear, at least superficially, that he wanted no change in policy toward Russia. Constantin
Freiherr von Neurath, the German Foreign minister, informed Herbert von Dirksen, German
Ambassador in Moscow, by cipher letter on February 22, 1933 (shortly before the Reichstag
fire), that, in general discussions with Hitler, the Chancellor wanted to distinguish between the
“internal treatment of communism and international relations with the USSR.” Hitler, reported
the Foreign Minister “would allow no change to take place in the political, economic, and
military policy with respect to Soviet Russia.” 13 For that matter the Führer made few changes in
the German Foreign Office after becoming Chancellor until the shake-up of early 1938. 14 He
wanted to establish a feeling of continuity in foreign relations while he dealt with Germany's
mounting domestic difficulties and prepared for future conflicts.
Hitler, like Stalin, was a radical who employed terror as a means of social control. For
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Hitler, war was a necessary element of his policy, a war directed initially against Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union. As early as 1933, Hitler had started to move the Germany economy into a
rearmament mode. In a cabinet meeting on June 8, 1933, the financial underpinnings of Nazi
militarism took shape. The cabinet agreed that military spending was to be almost three times
larger than the combined total of all the civilian work creation measures announced in 1932 and
1933. 15 Hitler had to plan carefully this racial struggle against Jewish Bolshevism; he certainly
could not move too early. He began to establish the economic and political superstructure in
1933. He first eliminated opposition parties, especially the KPD, after the Reichstag fire and the
resulting emergency legislation. He then turned on the Sturmabteilung in order to win the loyalty
of the regular army. Pravda, the official organ of the Communist party, saw “the Night of the
Long Knives” as the beginning of the open class struggle in Germany. On July 1, 1934, the day
after Hitler’s purge of his private army, Pravda, even predicted the long awaited proletarian
victory in Germany as the result of Hitler’s terror:
On June 30, 1934, the fascist dictatorship itself admitted the failure of its policy. It
again resorted to machine guns, but this time against its own guard. No other way
remains to it, even if the shots fired in Berlin and in other large centers of Germany
at the same time destroy the confidence which the broad strata of the petty
bourgeoisie had reposed in the fascist regime… 16
On July 2, 1934, Pravda kept up the journalistic offensive and detailed Nazi problems inside
Germany:
Fascism has shown itself to be the most deadly enemy of the petty bourgeoisie,
whose hopes it exploited to the full in the struggle against the revolutionary
proletariat. Considered from this standpoint, the events of June 30 represent the
biggest defeat of fascism, not only in Germany but also far beyond its frontiers. 17

Hitler’s terror had unleashed the power of the masses against Nazism, argued Pravda, and the
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new regime had indeed constructed the foundations of its own demise. Hitler in a sense became a
friend of the Soviet revolution and should not be bothered in his work of destroying Germany.
Despite Pravda’s predictions, Hitler’s personality would dominate the Nazi state and
especially foreign policy. In Hitler’s twisted mind, the National Socialist Movement faced
dangerous enemies, both inside Germany and abroad. No matter the reality, for Hitler, the great
menace was Russia and the Jews. 18
DIPLOMATIC RESPONSES FROM THE WILHELMSTRASSE
In 1933, the German Foreign Office continued the Prussian tradition of professional
diplomacy. At the time of Hitler's appointment as Chancellor, Herbert von Dirksen was the
German ambassador to the Soviet Union and had been since 1929. Dirksen was a career diplomat
and deeply committed to his work. During his tenure in the Soviet Union, he had developed a
deep respect for Russia and understood its value as a German ally. Dirksen had a successful
career before the ascent of Hitler. He was one of the Foreign Office’s most able diplomats, had
been counsel general in Warsaw, spoke several languages fluently, and possessed a doctorate in
law. Dirksen was a member of the DNVP (Deutschnationale Volkspartei) from its founding until
its dissolution in 1933 when he then reluctantly joined the NSDAP in 1936. He was not an
enthusiastic supporter of Hitler and distrusted the Nazi regime, but felt that good relations
between Germany and Russia would continue and possibly improve because of “the strength of
their mutual interests.” 19 He was able to put aside doctrinal differences and practice the subtle art
of diplomacy. Hitler and the Nazi Foreign Office chose basically to ignore his rational
suggestions.
On January 31, 1933, Dirksen reported to Bernhard von Bülow, the State Secretary for
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Foreign Affairs, that the appointment of the Hitler-Papen (particularly Papen) cabinet caused
"great uneasiness” 20 in the Soviet Union. He felt that he should return to Berlin to report to the
new leaders and enhance his credibility with the Soviets. 21 He explained his position to the State
Secretary: because the Soviets knew that he “has no personal connections with the National
Socialist party… it would therefore increase the effectiveness of my words and be important for
my authority if I could speak on the basis of my own conference with those who are the leading
persons at present.” 22 Bülow cabled Dirksen on February 6 and explained that, although he
understood that there was “great unrest” in Moscow, he believed that the Soviets “overestimate
there the importance in terms of foreign policy of the change of government. When they have the
responsibility the National Socialists are naturally different people and pursue a different policy
than they proclaimed before.” 23 Bülow then rejected Dirksen's request that he return to Berlin
because his visit “could arouse the impression that something is going on in our Russian
policy…” 24 Bülow assured Dirksen that the diplomatic atmosphere was indeed stable. Bülow
reported that “the situation here is much less tense than people abroad seem to suppose…at any
rate, please do not let yourself be made uneasy or irritated in any way by any rumors which may
circulate, even if they come from Berlin.” 25 Bülow closed with an idiom, “es wird hier wie
anders wo immer noch mit Wasser gekocht” 26 (Things are boiled in water here like anyplace
else). The Nazi government had to keep up impressions; it did not want to arouse Soviet
suspicions. Internal matters took precedence at this moment in 1933.
On February 20, 1933, in a political report to the Foreign Minister and the Chancellor,
Dirksen asserted that the new government should announce its position publicly regarding
German-Soviet relations. 27 The Soviet Union had recently concluded a non-aggression pact with
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France, and Germany wanted no increase in French influence in Eastern Europe. 28 The Foreign
Minister agreed, but this must not be done in such a way "as to give the impression that we
[Germany] were anxiously pursuing the Russians." 29 As the Foreign Minister explained, good
relations with Russia were not that important.
Dirksen was attempting to mediate a delicate situation: Soviet doubts about the German
position resulting from the latter's official silence, and a Foreign Office in Germany falling under
the increasing influence of the new leader. The ambassador was looking for a positive statement
of German policy towards the Soviet Union to allay Soviet fears and stabilize relations.
Hitler responded to these suggestions with a speech on March 2, 1933 in the Sportpalast in
Berlin, wherein he attacked the entire Marxist-Soviet system, identified Russia by name, and also
made reference to the famine in Soviet Ukraine:
Has this Marxism there where it has secured a one hundred percent victory, where it is in
fact and without exception supreme, in Russia, --has it there removed distress? It is
precisely in Russia that facts speak with such devastating effect. Millions of men are
starving in a land which could be a granary for the whole world. Millions of men are
reduced to misery in a country that could today overflow with abundance 30
He continued with a criticism of Marxist goals:
Freedom? Where does there rule a greater oppression? Where is there a greater fear lest
one who is not a member of the Party should have a glimpse of things as they are? Where
is one in greater trepidation before every photographer, before every reporter than in the
land of freedom and of equality? 31
Now Dirksen and the Soviets had their public statement of the German position.
SOVIET REACTIONS
Soviet diplomats were quite incensed over the Führer’s words. Nazi policy was
becoming clear. Leo Khinchuk, the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin, lodged a formal protest with
the Foreign Ministry over Hitler's remarks on March 7. Khinchuk asserted that the Führer’s
speech “contained extremely violent attacks on my country.” He further argued that Hitler
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“characterized the economic, social, and political system and the condition of the USSR in a
contemptuous and offensive manner.” 32 Constantin Freiherr von Neurath, the German Foreign
Minister, replied that he saw no grounds for complaint. Neurath explained that in the Reich
Chancellor’s speech “all expressions were aimed exclusively at German communists.” 33
(Remember, Hitler mentioned Russia by name.) Dirksen, in a meeting with Litvinov on March
11, 1933, explained to the Soviet Foreign Commissar that:
the Reich Chancellor in his radio address had expounded his views on the Bolshevik
ideology in general and had occasionally referred to the Soviet Union for specific
examples…the drastic action of the German police authorities against Soviet citizens and
the German Communists in the employ of Soviet institutions has a ready explanation in
the events of the past weeks and the uncovering of Communist acts of terrorism as well
as other treasonable plans. 34
Soviet diplomats, instead of receiving reassurance by a conciliatory statement on German
policy, were now more unsure than ever. Nikolay Krentinsky, the Deputy People’s Commissar
for Foreign Affairs, in a meeting with Dirksen on March 20, 1933, asserted that “the Soviet
public was very uneasy and uncertain over the future attitude of the Reich Government on
Russian policy.” 35 At a time when words alone could have solved problems, Hitler chose to
remain doctrinally consistent. Dirksen found himself in a difficult position; he sought a
consistent policy towards the Soviet Union. Unfortunately he could not get a handle on Nazi
intentions. In the best Prussian tradition of obedience to authority, the Foreign Office began a
slow shift to the National Socialist ideology. 36
German attacks on the Soviets were not limited to words. Soviet journalists were banned
from the opening of the Reichstag in March 1933. Because a "divine service” 37 opened the
session, the Germans felt that the Soviets would not be present and therefore need not attend the
regular Reichstag session. Krestinsky saw through the charade and told Dirksen that “The Soviet
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Embassy had been told, in reply to representations it had made in the Foreign Ministry, that the
representatives of the Soviet press had been barred from the opening session because of the tone
they had used in recent weeks.” 38 Relations were quickly deteriorating as the German attitude
grew more threatening.
In March 1933, S.A. men arrested and private citizens harassed Soviet nationals, searched
and looted Soviet businesses and clubs, and occupied Soviet trade missions. 39

Litvinov

complained sharply to Dirksen, who countered that these events should not become a political
matter. Soviets, too, were abusing Germans in Russia without German protest. If Hitler feared
internal communism, as he explained, continued attacks on Soviet individuals and business
interests in Germany served no useful foreign policy purpose. These attacks only alienated the
Soviets and strained a profitable economic relationship.
Hitler relaxed the tense atmosphere somewhat by his speech on March 23, 1933:
Toward the Soviet Union the Reich Government intends to cultivate friendly relations,
advantageous to both parties. It is precisely the Government of the national revolution
that finds itself in a position to pursue such a positive policy toward Soviet Russia. The
fight on communism in Germany is our internal affair, in which we shall never tolerate
interference from the outside. Political relations with other powers with which we are
linked by important interests in common are not affected thereby. 40

This presentation cleared the air temporarily, but it was not to last. Hitler was assuring the USSR
that his emphasis was on the KPD; he was not waging war on external communism.
Anti-Soviet actions continued in Germany after the speech. On April 1, the police searched the
premises of the Soviet commercial mission in Leipzig. On April 3, Dirksen cabled the Foreign
Ministry and reported on the attacks in the Soviet press concerning this incident. 41 While the
Soviet Union attempted to coordinate rhetoric and practice, in Hitler’s Germany, words and
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actions were entirely different matters when it concerned the USSR.
In a private letter to State Secretary Bülow on April 4, Dirksen asserted that, “Developments
of the past few days have led to a very serious crisis. The great tension which already existed
here was temporarily relaxed as a result of the Chancellor’s speech. The new incidents of recent
days then filled the cup to overflowing.” 42 Dirksen, always attempting to solve problems and
bring some sense of reality to the Foreign Office, demanded that the anti-soviet policy stop
unless there are "really cogent reasons for it." 43 He requested that the searches and arrests cease
and evidence be produced offering reasons for the raids. Dirksen maintained that the alternative
could be devastating. "One thing is certain,” he cabled, "If we do not reach a settlement, we must
expect a conflict with the Soviet government, the consequences of which will be very severe in a
political and economic respect.” 44
Surprisingly, the Foreign Office agreed and instructed Dirksen to inform Litvinov that the
Reich Government would look into police excesses and would allow Soviet businesses to operate
without interference. 45 Dirksen remained optimistic that relations could be salvaged if German
policies stabilized. However, German policy was too firmly entrenched in anti-Soviet ideology to
undergo long term change and Nazi practice quickly reverted to anti-Soviet actions.
Shortly after carrying out his instructions and informing the Soviets that excesses would
cease and Soviet business interests would be allowed to operate undisturbed, information that
pleased the Soviets, 46 the German police searched the house of a Soviet trade representative.
This incident outraged Dirksen, who cabled the State Secretary personally on April 14 and
complained that, “The officers who conducted the search had behaved with extreme rudeness.” 47
He continued, “Renewed police action contradicts the promises made by me to Litvinov by
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direction of the Foreign Minister and serves to complicate the situation in so far as the police
authorities seem this time to have disregarded diplomatic prerogatives established by treaty.” 48
This episode characterizes the shallow, shortsighted and contradictory attitude of the German
political and foreign policy leadership towards the Soviet Union. The Nazi government chose to
embarrass a career diplomat and contribute to the separation of the two nations. Career,
diplomats, such as Dirksen, sought a positive and straight-forward Soviet policy; the Nazi
officials both inside and outside of the Wilhelmstrasse, continued their assault on domestic
communist influence.
German actions continued to upset the Soviets.

Hitler, promising to receive Leo

Khinchuk, the Soviet Ambassador, for a formal visit since March 7, did not do so until April
28. 49 At this meeting, Hitler informed the Soviet representative that “no change must occur in
the friendly relations between the German Government and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics….both states had common enemies, and their economic interests were complementary
in many ways.” Furthermore Hitler assured Khinchuk “that he was trying and would continue to
try to order German-Russian relations on a permanently friendly basis.” 50 Perhaps the Reich
Chancellor had forgotten the earlier anti-Soviet policies while in the presence of the Soviet
ambassador. Hitler sought to maintain a modicum of contact with the USSR while dealing with
domestic concerns.
In attacking the Soviet Union from all sides, the Nazis alienated a powerful ally. Dirksen
asserted in an incisive, detailed political report of May 5, 1933 that the value of German Russian
relations was to be found in their potential, not in their present state. Dirksen analyzed the
positions of Russia and Germany in 1933 and looked to the future. As he stressed, substantive
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relations with Russia remained in Germany’s best interest. The Nazis should quickly moderate
their attitude and actions. There was no reason to change course:
In German-Russian relations it was never the present ratio of strength that exerted a
political effect with respect to third countries. The world has always been aware of the
present weakness of Germany and of Russia. To this extent it has been entirely correct of
speak of a Rapallo bluff. The strong positive political effect which the Rapallo policy has
always had, despite this realization of the weakness of the two partners, lay in the
realization of the potential strength of the two countries. 51
Dirksen clearly understood the position of Soviet Russia and its value as an ally. He realized that
it would take some time for the Soviet Union to manifest its position in world affairs, but that
Germany could only benefit from continued close cooperation with such a potentially powerful
ally.
But Dirksen could not halt the street violence and finally, in June 1933 the Soviet
government retaliated. The three joint Russo-German military stations inside the Soviet Union
were to be closed and dismantled. 52 The intimate military cooperation, which served to rebuild
the defeated German army after World War I, was now a casualty of the National Socialist
anti-Soviet policy. What took years to develop, the new German government had destroyed in a
matter of months. Additionally, the German army now lost a source of influence and
intelligence. Hereafter, the Soviet military and its operations remained outside of German eyes.
Perhaps more importantly, the atmosphere of trust and respect, built up during the Rapallo years
of cooperation, was now nearly dissipated.
Again, Dirksen responded with a rational, sensible approach to the problem. In August
he suggested that the German government take the initiative and approach the Soviets regarding
a discussion of fundamental principles. 53

The Soviets themselves provided a perfect

opportunity: Nikolay Krestinsky, the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, was
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planning to visit Germany in September or October. Therefore, the Germans would not be
'running after the Russians'. 54 As in the past, Dirksen’s suggestions went unheeded. The Foreign
Office did not reply to his proposal. 55
Although the anti-Soviet incidents severely strained relations, hope remained for a
rapproachment. At the farewell dinners for German military commanders leaving the Soviet
Union, Red Army leaders expressed regret at the unfortunate turn of political events and hoped
that the past cooperation could be re-established quickly. 56 However, it was now up to the
Germans to show their good faith towards the Soviet Union by taking concrete initiatives toward
the total normalization of relations. 57 The Soviet Union understood the value of Germany as an
ally and hoped that the prior military cooperation would serve as the basis for a meaningful
interaction. The Soviets now waited for the Germans to show their good faith.
On September 22, 1933, the Nazi government responded in characteristic fashion. Two
Soviet journalists, who were denied permission to cover the Reichstag fire trial at Leipzig, as
was the entire Soviet press corps, were arrested. 58 The Soviets reacted by lodging a protest the
next day and requesting that all German journalists leave the USSR within three days. 59 Hitler
explained that the Russian journalists could not possibly report the proceedings objectively,
owing to their communist ideology. Therefore, they were not permitted to cover the trial. Instead
the Russian press representatives were forced to rely on second and third hand information,
increasing the possibility of distortion. On September 26, 1933, the Soviet Ambassador visited
von Bülow and the two diplomats discussed the confusion caused by the Leipzig incident. Von
Bülow reported that the Ambassador agreed to send his Counselor of the Embassy to Moscow
“in order to bridge the present tension in some way or other.” 60
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As the German domestic situation quieted, Hitler paid more attention to the conduct of
foreign affairs. Because the British would not agree to German partial re-armament and
frustrated with the progress of the Geneva talks, in October 1933 he withdrew Germany from the
League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference. 61 Rudolf Nadolny, a non-Nazi, replaced
Dirksen as ambassador to Russia. 62 Nadolny was a career civil servant who once served in the
Reichspresident’s office in 1919 and later headed the German delegation to the Geneva
Disarmament Conference. Dirksen became ambassador to Japan, and by his own admission,
"was merely an observer." 63
Nadolny arrived in Moscow in November 1933 with instructions to “restore a better
atmosphere” in German-Soviet relations. 64 The Foreign Office regarded Russia as a "valuable"
ally and sought, at least officially, to re-establish close ties. However, it was now too late for
mere words and promises. The Foreign Office had no intention of instigating substantive
changes.
As Franco-Soviet relations warmed after the conclusion of the 1932 non-aggression pact,
on December 20, 1933, the Soviet Politburo promulgated its proposals for collective security.
The USSR wanted to reach out to the European nations in order to secure the balance of power
and preserve the precarious peace after Hitler’s Machtergreifung and the continuing anti-Soviet
actions. The proposals contained conditions for Russia’s entry into the League of Nations, the
creation of a regional agreement concerning mutual defense from aggression on the part of
Germany, and the compulsory participation of France and Poland. Further, the USSR demanded
that:
Independently of the commitments under an agreement on mutual defense, the
participants in the agreement must undertake to render each other diplomatic, moral and,
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as far as possible, also material assistance in the event of a military attack not provided
for in the agreement, and, in addition, to influence their press accordingly. 65
Litvinov explained the importance of the collective security policy in a speech to the
Central Executive Committee on December 29. Notice that the People’s Commissar was
addressing his comrades in the party. If Soviet policy was a ruse, as the German school asserts,
was he misleading his own colleagues? Seeking his own glory before the “Great Stalin?”
Collective security was indeed the foundation of Soviet foreign policy. Litvinov began by
outlining the parameters of Soviet foreign policy in the face of a quickly shifting landscape. He
then asserted that Europe now stood “at the junction of two [diplomatic] eras.” He then told his
audience that the consequences of the present international climate had direct ramifications for
the USSR. He argued that,
The responsibility resting on our diplomacy is great and is growing greater, for all or nearly
all the international problems I have mentioned touch or may touch the interests of our
Union… The guiding thread of our foreign policy has been put in Comrade Stalin's
brief but expressive formula: We do not want any foreign land, but we shall not give
up an inch of our own. Since we do not want foreign land, we cannot want war… That
is why we shall not only continue but intensify our struggle for peace, which was and
is the chief task of our diplomacy. 66
Litvinov explained the vital role of Soviet diplomacy in the overall stability of Europe; He
specifically mentioned the example of treaty revision. The USSR must be concerned, Litvinov
stated, that treaty revisions do not create greater problems than they are supposed to solve.
Essentially, all international issues involved the Soviet Union. Litvinov further explained that the
USSR did not exist in a vacuum; it was ready to enter into international arrangements designed
to secure the peace:
The ensuring of peace cannot depend on our efforts alone; it requires the collaboration
and co-operation of other States. While therefore trying to establish and maintain
friendly relations with all States, we are giving special attention to strengthening and
making more close our relations with those which, like us, give proof of their sincere
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desire to maintain peace and are ready to resist those who break the peace. We have
never rejected and do not reject organized international co-operation designed to
consolidate peace. 67
Litvinov was again reaching out for international support in his peace initiatives. As he stated, “peace
cannot depend on [Soviet] efforts alone.”68
In the wake of this speech, while relations with fascist Italy and republican France improved,
the new Nazi regime in Germany proved a bit more difficult. Before the Hitler revolution, as
Litvinov explained “for ten years we have been bound to Germany by close economic and political
relations… Germany held first place in our foreign trade. Enormous advantages, both for
Germany and for us, followed from the political and economic relations established between
us.” With the advent of the Hitler government, according to Litvinov, Soviet relations with
Germany became “unrecognizable.” Still he asserted that the USSR has “no desire to expand
to the West or to the East, or in any other direction. We bear no hostility to the German
people…” He was not looking to pick a fight with anyone. Litvinov concluded by reminding
his audience of the uncertain times while assuring them of the resolve of the Soviet Union. He
did not want the Central Executive Committee to interpret his peace platform as a sign of
weakness:
Since we are compelled to provide for our self-defense, we shall as before, and even more
than before, continue to strengthen and improve the chief defense of our security, our
Red Army, Red Navy, and Red Air Force. We shall bear in mind that, should the united
efforts of the friends of peace fail, the attack on peace may be directed in the first
instance against us. 69
Litvinov’s speech aroused considerable German attention and the new German ambassador
reported to Berlin quickly thererafter.
Nadolny took his instructions to heart. If Hitler believed that the new ambassador was
only to function as a messenger, he was soon to be quite surprised. In a long, detailed, and
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insightful political report to the Foreign Office in January 1934 wherein he referred to Litvinov’s
speech of December 29, 1933, Nadolny recommended substantive changes in German foreign
policy toward the Soviet Union, such as limiting support for Japan and suppressing the antiSoviet German press. In his opinion, Russia was too valuable and powerful an ally to lose to
such foolish German actions. Nadolny feared that Nazi actions were driving the Soviets into the
French camp. Additionally Germany should exploit the economic benefits of Soviet commerce
“in order to supplement and further our political intentions, we should consider measures in the
economic field, particularly such as entail an intensification of German-Russian trade and which
might particularly serve to document our confidence in the Soviet Government.” 70
Nadolny was clear that there was no time for delay, “I would assume that if we take
immediate energetic steps in this direction, we might still succeed in frustrating the intentions
of Litvinov aimed at the inclusion of Soviet Russia in the French ring. If she overcomes her
aversion to participation in a community of states, her importance may even increase. In these
circumstances, we must do everything to prevent her going over to the other side.” 71 Nadolny
saw no sense in continued confrontation with the Soviets over insignificant issues. Both he and
Dirksen understood the potential power of the Soviet nation and the benefits of that power for
Germany. The Nazi government was preoccupied with ideology and the historical conflict
between Teuton and Slav.
Not surprisingly, the Foreign Office rejected Nadolny's proposals. Neurath replied that:
The attitude of the German government toward Russia has not changed in any way of
late; it is ready for friendly relations in all areas, economic, political, and military. Thus
it depends solely on the Russians whether and to what extent the former friendly
relationship with Germany can be restored. Concrete offers and proposals in this respect
on our part are out of the question at present. 72
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Neurath continued with his instructions to Nadolny concerning German-Soviet relations. The
Foreign Minister suggested that “no initiative be taken in conversations…about the GermanRussian relationship,” but that “one await further developments in cool, self assured reserve.” 73
This rather narrow response illustrates a complete misunderstanding of Russia's value as an ally.
Nadolny was not demanding that the Nazi government abandon its philosophical foundation;
only that it treat the Soviet Union with the diplomatic formalities befitting a major power and
former partner.
Nadolny, a diplomat in the Dirksen mold, requested that the Foreign Office re-examine
his proposals. 74 This time von Bülow replied that Germany's "field of vision (and the scope of
our worries) is larger, and consequently Moscow is less in the foreground for us." 75 Answering
every Russian claim specifically would create a dangerous precedent for Russia and other
nations. Russia was important, but not overly so. Bülow felt that German policy toward the
Soviet Union, as articulated by the Foreign Office, was to remain unchanged.
Finally, after presenting his recommendations to Hitler personally, 76 only to be rejected
again, Nadolny submitted his resignation in June 1934, never to re-enter public service. 77 He
could not convince the Wilhelmstrasse of the importance of the USSR in German affairs and the
benefit of close relations for Germany. With the increasing frustrations of rejection, the ageing
diplomat did the honorable thing and resigned.
Nazi policy also caught the attention of Josef Stalin, who commented on the change in
the German attitude in his remarks to the Seventeenth Party Congress in January 1934. He
suggested that German policy had fragmented into the “old policy reflected in the treaties
between the USSR and Germany” and the “new policy which…recalls the policy of the former
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German Kaiser, who at one time occupied the Ukraine and marched against Leningrad…” Stalin
concluded that the fact that the advocates of the new policy were gaining supremacy “cannot be
regarded as an accident.” 78
After the series of outrageous actions in 1933, by early 1934, the Soviet leadership finally
noticed publicly a dangerous shift (“new policy”) in the German outlook. Now the Soviet Union
began to follow a policy of cautious pessimism regarding Germany and the Rapallo atmosphere
quickly dissipated.
POLAND
Poland remained something of a threat as well as a much-resented buffer state for both
the Soviets and the Germans. In the 1920s and early 1930s, Germany feared a Polish attack in
the east. Poland’s army more than held its own in the conflict with the USSR, leading to the
Treaty of Riga in 1921. In early 1932, Lithuania invaded German-populated Memel and deposed
the Minister President. The Germans considered this provocative action as a prelude to a joint
Lithuanian-Polish attack on East Prussia. 79 Josef Pilsudski was a dedicated nationalist and
realized Poland’s important geo-political position. He would not allow Poland to become the
pawn of either Germany or the USSR while he sought to restore Poland’s historical boundaries
and pursued a cautious yet forceful foreign policy.
This paranoid fear of Poland drove German politics to the right in 1932 with the fall of
the Brüning and Papen cabinets. Polish diplomats reported that this rightist shift would probably
bring Hitler to power, but that his entry into the government would split the party. The Polish
leadership did recognize the increasing tension in German-Polish relations in the early 1930s.
With the rise of Nazi agitation in Danzig, the Poles now feared a Nazi attack. When the Papen
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cabinet made overtures to France, Poland’s most powerful ally, Pilsudski had to re-consider
contacts with his old enemy, the USSR. Even after the settlement at Riga, Pilsudski still
considered the Soviet Union his greatest threat. Polish troops concentrated on the eastern borders
rather than the facing Germany. He may have looked to the USSR in order to get Germany’s
attention. Finally, in April, 1932, the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with Poland.
Pilsudski had, for the time being, neutralized the Soviet threat. Although Poland would sign a
similar agreement with Hitler’s Germany in 1934, the 1932 understanding acted as a barrier to
perceived German-Polish actions against the USSR. Pilsudski and his successors maintained a
delicate balance between Germany and the Soviet Union, concluding non-aggression pacts with
both, but formal alliances with neither. The Soviets, in particular, were quite careful in
preventing its western neighbor from slipping into the Nazi orbit. 80 Hitler would unilaterally
renounce this pact on April 28, 1939.
After the conclusion of the pacts with the USSR and Germany, Pilsudski turned his
attention to domestic politics while continuing to enhance Poland’s international position as
independent of either soviet or Nazi influences. Unfortunately for Poland’s Jewish population,
Pilsudski succeeded in building a conservative authoritarianism which incorporated the worst
elements of extreme anti-Semitism. After the dictator’s death in 1935, the radical rightist parties
continued and intensified the anti-Semitic practices. 81
In 1934, Soviet distrust of German intentions became so great that, even when German
diplomats made substantive suggestions with the support of the Foreign Office in response to
Soviet initiatives, the Russians refuted them. On March 28, 1934, Litvinov proposed that
Germany and Russia unite to guarantee the borders of the Baltic states “in the effort to improve
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mutual relations between the two countries.” 82
This cooperation, Litvinov believed, would serve as a foundation for the restoration of
meaningful relations. Nadolny, ambassador at this time, countered with the idea that the parties
eliminate the artificial necessity of protecting nations that were not in danger, and, instead, work
together under the auspices of the Treaty of Berlin, which already contained in Article 1 a clause
that the Governments of Germany and the Soviet Union should maintain friendly contacts in
order to bring about agreement on all questions of a political and economic nature affecting their
two countries. 83 Litvinov, aware of German actions in 1933, took this counter proposal as a
rejection of his plan and an example of German unwillingness to cooperate in international
affairs. On April 21, Litvinov verbally informed Nadonly of his “sincere regret” at the German
position. As Litvinov explained to the German ambassador, the proposal “was dictated by the
Soviet Government's policy of consolidating peace in general, and in particular in those countries
bordering on the Soviet Union. Incidentally, the realization of this proposal would have
unquestionably resulted in the restoration of relations of confidence between the Soviet Union and
Germany.” He then indirectly questioned Germany’s good faith, “Obviously, the point of any
measure designed to consolidate peace is directed against those States which intend to violate this
peace, but no State should see it as directed against itself if it does not entertain such intentions.”
Expressing a sense of frustration, Litvinov explained that the USSR was simply complying
with German wishes:
You yourself, Mr Ambassador, have asked me to point out some means whereby this
estrangement might be overcome or mitigated. I have, therefore, attempted to
propose to you one such means, which would sound more convincing than any
speeches and declarations, not only to the Soviet Union, but to the whole world. It
remains for me only to express once more my regret that this means has been rejected
by your Government and without any convincing reasons.
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Litvinov, though thoroughly disappointed, kept the door open for future arrangements. For
the Soviet Foreign Commissar, Germany now must keep its word and act as a rational
member of the international community. The Soviet Union sought substantive relations with
all nations in an attempt to maintain the peace. He concluded this difficult meeting with a
message of hope:
I can assure you, Mr Ambassador, that we shall always be prepared to give favorable
consideration to any concrete proposals of the German Government which would in fact
lead to an improvement of relations and strengthen mutual confidence between our
countries. 84
German credibility was now slipping in Russian eyes. The events of the prior year had caused a
fundamental shift in the Soviet view of Germany. 85
WESTERN INITIATIVES
In late April 1934, France proposed a multilateral treaty system, to include Germany and
Russia, which would guarantee the borders of the east European states. 86 After Germany’s
withdrawal from the League of Nations, France sought a substantive treaty system in order to
curtail the encroaching menace of the Nazi state to its east. Russia was the perfect partner in such
a plan. France sought to guarantee the sovereignty of the East European states, especially those
bordering on Germany.
André François-Poncet, the French Ambassador to Germany, delivered the outline of the
plan to the Germans for analysis on instructions from Foreign Minister Louis Barthou. 87 Notice
that the Soviets were dealing with Germany with and through third parties. The close
cooperation and understanding of the prior decade had now given way to a Soviet reluctance to
deal with Germany on a one-to-one basis. The Soviets made their position clear; if the treaty
system was not ratified, then Russia would align with France in a pact of mutual assistance. 88
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Russian policy toward France had now come full circle, from Litvinov's explanation in 1933 that
Russia would not align with France as this was not a goal of Soviet policy, 89 to Russian
readiness to join the French security system.
Alexis Leger, the Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry, declaring that he
was speaking in a personal capacity, proposed the conclusion of two interconnected pacts: an
Eastern Locarno pact in the form of a multilateral regional mutual assistance pact to include the
U.S.S.R., Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Baltic states (but without France) and a
bilateral Franco-Soviet mutual assistance pact. The regional pact would include mutual
obligations on the part of the parties. Further Germany and the USSR would be obligated to
“render each other assistance as neighbors.” 90 Leger argued that this arrangement was the most
effective formula for co-operation between the U.S.S.R. and France against Germany. 91 The
Soviet Union was now a major player in world politics and important to the west.
Pursuing to the policy of collective security, the Soviet diplomats responded to the
French proposal. The Russian Foreign Office suggested modifications in May, 1934, which
included the participation of Germany in a mutual assistance pact and a pact with France to
guarantee French assistance as well as including the USSR in the Locarno treaty. 92 The Soviet
Union wanted to maintain close contacts with Paris and Berlin as a means of keeping the peace.
On June 27, 1934, the French government handed the British government its draft of an
Eastern pact. Both France and the USSR sought British participation in the security system. Ivan
Maiskii, the Soviet ambassador to England, reported in the summer of 1934 that the British
Government’s attitude towards the idea of an Eastern Pact had always been “unfavorable.”
Because such an Eastern pact “would considerably strengthen our international positions, make
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secure our Western frontier and ease our position in the Far East...the attitude of British
diplomacy towards the proposed Eastern pact could not be enthusiastic.” 93 Maiskii quickly
understood that Britain would be a major stumbling block to collective security. He quickly
brought his concerns directly to the British government.
On June 19, 1934, Maiskii informed Sir Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Undersecretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, that public opinion in the Soviet Union “ascribes to Britain the role
of inciting both Japan and Germany towards war with us and sees this as the only reason for
Britain’s resistance to an Eastern pact.” 94 Britain appeared as the obstructionist and followed a
narrow policy of self-interest. England then demanded that Germany re-arm as a condition of
acceptance of the Eastern pact. After talks with France, the British government moderated its
demands and agreed to accept the proposed pact. 95 England’s agreement did not translate into its
enthusiastic support.
British policy was decidedly split regarding the USSR and the threat of Germany.
Historians have fixated on England as the center of the “appeasement” policy toward Nazi
Germany and a prime cause of the Second World War. 96 More sober, objective, and nonideological analysis serves to illuminate Britain’s position and its policy choices. Though shortsighted and conservative, British foreign policy was not pro-German, but anti-Soviet. British
policy makers painted the international aspirations of the USSR with a broad brush and distorted
the reality of the canvass. They ignored the sincere Soviet efforts at collective security without
investigating its value. If a proposal came from the USSR, in the English view, it must be
suspect. The west feared Communism more than Nazism.
Western leaders believed that the best way to avoid war was to move Hitler eastward.
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Orme Sargent, British Assistant Permanent Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, opposed close
relations with the USSR. “If” minuted Sargent on April 12, 1935, “We closed to Germany all
means of expansion in the east, where she is less likely to come into conflict with British, or
indeed any other, interests than elsewhere, we must be prepared for German pressure down the
Danube to be increased proportionately.” 97 Eric Phipps, British Ambassador to Germany,
quipped that England and France should not set up too much “barbed wire” in the east or south
otherwise the Nazi “beast” would be forced to the west. 98 Sargent concluded the exchange
stating that, “I have never quite been able to accept the truth of M. Litvinov’s dictum about the
‘indivisibility of peace.’” 99 In December, 1935, Winston Churchill invited the Soviet
Ambassador, Maiskii, to dinner. During the meal Churchill informed his guest that “in England
there are influential pro-German circles, who want to allow Germany freedom of action in the
East.” He concluded, perhaps to calm the ambassador, that “they are only a minority.” 100 Britain
wanted Hitler engaged in conflict far away from the Empire, no matter the effects on the other
states involved.
After Russia withdrew from World War I and the Bolsheviks seized power in November
1917, Britain and other allied powers dispatched forces to Russia to oppose the Soviet regime.
The British government sent vast supplies and munitions to support anti-Bolshevik fighters. In
spite of western efforts and against long odds, the Bolsheviks prevailed by 1921 and began to
build a socialist state. 101 Relations between the Soviet state and Britain did not get off to a good
start. Officially at least, both wanted to destroy the other.
British officials were conflicted as to the status and importance of the communist regime.
Some, such as David Lloyd George, took a pragmatic approach, while the conservatives,
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including Winston Churchill, decried the “foul baboonery of Bolshevism.” 102 England formally
recognized the Soviet Union in 1924 and trade increased. Pragmatism followed the purse, at least
for a little while.
In May, 1927, the British government broke relations with Russia over the so-called
ARCOS affair, when the British police arrested Soviet employees in England and accused them
of espionage. The raid turned up no substantive evidence of criminal activity and the Soviets
protested vehemently. The British action also set off a “war scare” in the USSR, as the Soviets
became convinced that a western plot existed to destroy the Soviet Union. The anti-communist
British press had a field day after learning of the raid on the Soviet office. In the hysteria, truth
became a victim. Public opinion guided the establishment of foreign policy in Britain. After all,
the politicians needed to be re-elected. Better to follow the popular will. Unfortunately western
policy was blind to diplomatic realities. While the USSR was no ordinary state in the classical
sense, the Soviet Union remained a viable and important entity in world affairs in spite of its
earlier actions in renouncing the Czarist debts and threatening Poland. The USSR had illustrated
its good faith in trade policy.
Although diplomatic relations ruptured between Britain and Russia, economic contact
continued, and a new Labor government restored full relations in 1929. Labor was willing to take
the political risks of contact with Russia and also to reap the economic benefits. Even the
conservatives, who thrived on anti-communist rhetoric, were supportive of the Labor gamble. 103
While Labor sought to expand trade relations in the form of credit guarantees, anti-Russian
propaganda limited its options. One foreign office official commented that “if the British anticommunist press called ‘a truce in the long range bombardment of Moscow…half their copy
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would go…’”. 104 In 1931, after the formation of a Tory dominated National Government, the
new foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon received a more ominous briefing paper from the foreign
office:
It is one of the unfortunate legacies of the War that Anglo-Soviet relations have become a
subject of the most acute internal political controversy…. From being a pre-war enigma
Russia has become a post-war obsession…a matter of party strife at most of the post-war
appeals to the British electorate. So long as one section of opinion, even if a small one,
hitches its wagon to the Soviet star, and another longs for nothing so much as the star’s
eclipse, the task of reducing Anglo-Soviet relations to normal remains hopeless…. 105
Events in the early 1930s illustrated the depths of the “hopelessness” and the power of
public opinion enflamed by the British press. In 1932, the British government cancelled the
Anglo-Soviet trade agreement; as payback for the ARCOS incident, in March 1933, Soviet
police arrested British engineers in Moscow working for the Metro-Vickers Company. Indeed,
relations deteriorated quickly in the atmosphere of fear that was Britain. Meanwhile another dark
cloud appeared on the horizon. Shortly after the Metro-Vickers affair, Paul von Hindenburg
appointed Adolf Hitler chancellor of Germany. Britain now found itself in the middle of two
dangerous powers. Which one posed the greater threat to the Empire became the guiding
question of British foreign policy. Throughout the 1930s the British Foreign Office chose to
ignore and discount substantive Soviet overtures designed to insure a peaceful balance in Europe
and prevent war. In British eyes, the Soviet Union was the greater danger.
Maxim Litvinov, who understood the value of substantive relations with the west,
personally intervened in the Metro-Vickers affair. He travelled to London in the summer of 1933
to renew old contacts with British officials and to patch up dangling relations. His visit bore fruit
and the two nations settled the dispute and resumed trade negotiations concluding a trade
agreement on February 16, 1934. The Soviets had illustrated their good faith and publicly called
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for improved relations. British intentions were a bit more juvenile; at a luncheon marking the
signature of the trade agreement, the British delegation could not agree who would attend or who
would pay the bill. Assistant Permanent Undersecretary Sir Lancelot Oliphant complained that it
[attendance] “was a corvée and the Secretary of State should be spared the bother. Let someone
else go instead.” 106 Despite the continued efforts of the People’s Commissar, the Soviets now
began to doubt English policy. The actions of the parties were clearly not equal. While Stalin’s
actions inside of the USSR caused great consternation in the west, Soviet diplomatic initiatives
received short shrift.
Diplomatic and press discourse continued to drive a wedge between Britain and Russia.
The British government constantly complained about Soviet propaganda while conveniently
ignoring its own. The Soviets were forthright in their quest for peace. In February, 1934, the
Russian government sent a message through Ankara that it wished improved relations with
London. The British ambassador expressed the negative British feelings toward Russia, “A very
large proportion of opinion in England held the view that the whole political system and creed of
Soviet Russia was the work of Satan and that in my country such widespread opinion had to be
taken into account.” 107 If Russia was the great Satan what hope existed for interaction between
these nations? The Soviets were willing to put aside doctrinal differences in exchange for a
security system beneficial to all. Maiskii concisely explained his government’s position, “At first
we were very excited with our revolution—and so were you! We thought your system could be
overthrown in a few months, and you thought we could not last beyond a few months. Now we
know that we must put up with each other.” 108
For all of the anti-Soviet emotion in the English foreign office, some level-headed
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diplomats indeed advocated a stable relationship with Russia. Sir Robert Vansittart, Permanent
Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign office and Laurence Collier, head of the Northern
Department, understood the value of Russia as a counterweight to an overtly aggressive and
dangerous Germany. Winston Churchill came to defend this position in the Parliament and the
press, or that portion of the press that would listen to him. Churchill, who earlier had referred to
Bolsheviks as “foolish baboons,” realized the implications of events in Germany. He advocated a
type of Realpolitik and forcefully argued for closer relations with Russia. He described his
position in 1933, “Nobody can watch the events which are taking place in Germany without
increasing anxiety about what their outcome will be. At present Germany is only partly armed
and most of her fury is turned upon herself. But already her smaller neighbors…feel a deep
disquietude.” 109 His words would prove prescient. The views of these parties would be in the
minority, but they continued to press their agenda against the tide.
French policy was also undergoing revision. On October 9, 1934, during a visit of the
King of Yugoslavia, a Croatian nationalist assassinated the King and the French Foreign
Minister, Louis Barthou in Marseilles. Pierre Laval took over as Foreign Minister. Quickly, right
wing politicians demanded a new course in French international relations, particularly toward
Russia. Shortly after the assassination, “The French ambassador in Moscow, (Charles) Alphand,
informed the Soviet government that the Embassy’s Counsellor had received a letter from Henri
de Kerillis, well-known Right-wing journalist, who wrote that ‘Right-wing circles, seized with
fear of the Popular Front, demanded a revision in France’s foreign policy.’” 110 The ambassador
reported that these right-wing circles, who earlier advocated an agreement with the USSR, “Now
think that the Communist danger is nearer than the German….” 111 Alphand concluded that the
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possibility of a Franco-German agreement “is gaining more and more adherents in France.” 112
Fear of Bolshevism, largely grounded in theory, now served to prevent substantive agreements
against the common German enemy. The Soviet diplomats understood the danger of the western
orientation to Germany, both to the west itself and to Russia. The Foreign Office clearly realized
that it could not substantively trust German intentions without a binding multilateral alliance
system. After the first meeting between the Soviet ambassador, Vladimir P. Potemkin, and Laval
on October 19, 1934, the People’s Ambassador noted that France’s pro-German policy was
“aimed only at intimidating Germany in order to wrest bigger concessions from her, in other
words, that France is only making use of us in her game.” 113 The Soviet Union was in no mood
to play; the stakes were simply too high as events would prove.
On February 3, 1935, Britain and France published a communiqué proposing to conclude
a “general settlement” with Germany, including an Eastern Pact and an arms agreement,
replacing Part IV of Versailles. This position served to undermine the Soviet policy of collective
security in Europe. In conversations with the Soviet Ambassador, Leger quickly blamed Britain
for the change in direction. Leger said that “the British were at first persistent in persuading the
French to entirely omit an Eastern Pact from the general scheme set out in the London
Agreements.” 114 Britain continued to exhibit something of a balancing act between Germany
and the Soviet Union. In a conversation with Vansittart on February 13, 1935, Maiskii reported
that “Generally speaking, all this part of our conversation left me with the impression that the
British Government’s position in regard to an Eastern Pact is very evasive, to put it mildly.” 115
The Soviets simply could not trust Britain and France. The continued Soviet efforts at collective
security, reflecting the ideas of Lenin, illustrate the substance of the policy: peace and
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multilateral relations. Litvinov’s December 29, 1933 speech clearly illustrated that the USSR
respected the Nazi threat and reached out for assistance. The western powers proved “evasive” in
their dealings with the USSR, ultimately destroying the possibility of a united front against
Hitler, even after he had regained the lost German territory. By adopting a policy of collective
security, they could ensure that Hitler would have no soft spots to attack.
After visiting Hitler in Berlin, Sir Anthony Eden, the Lord Privy Seal, stopped in
Moscow for talks with the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs in late March, 1935. Originally,
Sir John Simon, the English Foreign Minister was scheduled to make the visit, but he cancelled
at the last minute. Perhaps, this diplomatic initiative was not that important for Britain. The
Soviets reiterated their position on mutual assistance pacts and made it clear that Germany was
to be a part of this collective security system:
We [the soviets] do not want to encircle anybody. We do not seek for Germany’s
isolation. On the contrary, we desire to maintain friendly relations with her. The Germans
are a great and valiant nation. We never forget this. It was not right to keep this nation
fettered by the Versailles treaty for a long time. Sooner or later the German people had to
throw off the Versailles chains….However, the forms and circumstances of this liberation
from Versailles are such that they are capable of causing serious alarm on our part, and in
order to exclude the possibility of any unpleasant complication a certain warranty is now
required. This warranty is an Eastern mutual assistance pact, naturally with the
participation of Germany, if this is at all possible. 116
The Soviets reasoned that in order to control German aggression, Germany needed to be part of
the treaty system. Although the talks covered a variety of topics, the British did nothing to
facilitate the conclusion of an Eastern Pact. Beginning with the introduction of general
conscription in March 1935, Hitler and the Nazis relished the western contradictions and
prepared for conquest.
France, unlike Britain, feared the threat of fascism in Germany and its implications for
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the Third Republic, especially after the riots of February, 1934 and increasing right-wing
extremism. Although the Eastern Pact did not materialize, France and Russia continued
discussions for a mutual assistance pact. France wanted to limit the threat from Hitler by turning
economic interests with the USSR into political and military agreements. After attempting to
include Germany in diplomatic arrangements, France and the Soviet Union embraced each other,
recognizing the common threat.
As in 1890, Germany did not believe that Russia and France would align. Even if they
did, the treaty would have no meaning because Russia could not support France in Europe and
France could not support Russia in Asia or in Eastern Europe. 117 Therefore, Germany rejected
the Eastern Pact and ignored Soviet threats of alignment with France.118 The present Nazi
leadership forgot about the Franco-Russian Pact of 1894 and its disastrous effect on German
history. But, as the old adage has it, those who forget the past are fated to repeat it. Nazi policy
forced France and the USSR together. Had Hitler simply followed the advice of his own
diplomats, the USSR may have taken a different track.
In September 1934 the Soviet Union Russia enhanced its position in the world
community by joining the League of Nations, replacing Germany. Litvinov welcomed the
invitation to join the League. The Soviet Union desperately needed the international status of a
member of this organization. The Soviet Minister was direct and frank in his remarks to the
League in September 1934. Again following Lenin’s Decree on Peace in 1917, Litvinov made it
clear that the USSR sought an international balance of power in order to prevent war. He stated
that, “as to the first condition which we have named, the peaceful coexistence of different
social-political systems at a given historical stage, we have advocated it again and again at
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international conferences.” The USSR, asserted the People’s Commissar, was like any
other state, “With regard to common aims, these have long ago been established in many
spheres. Workers in the fields of science, art and social activities in the Soviet Union have long
been co-operating fruitfully with representatives of other States, both individually and on
organized lines, in all spheres of science and culture and on problems of a humanitarian
nature.” He reminded his audience of the Soviet record of peaceful relations, “The Soviet
Government has also not abstained from co-operation of a political nature whenever some
alleviation of international conflicts and increase of guarantees of security and consolidation of
peace might reasonably be expected from such co-operation.” He gave the example of Soviet
activities in the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference and the Conference
itself as well as the Soviet demand for the definition of aggression. Finally, Litvinov could not
restrain himself, “The organization of peace! Could there be a loftier and at the same time
more practical and urgent task for the co-operation of all nations?” While clearly excited,
Litvinov concluded on sobering note, returning again to the theme of peace:
We are now confronted with the task of averting war by more effective means.
…Finally, we must realize once and for all that no war with political or economic aims
is capable of restoring so-called historical justice, and that all it could do would be to
substitute new and perhaps still more glaring injustices for old ones, and that every
new peace treaty bears within it the seeds of fresh warfare. 119
At Geneva, the USSR had a worldwide platform in which to advocate its policy of
collective security. Perhaps, the nations of the League would carry out the dictates of the League
covenant against the Nazi threat. Soviet entrance into the League shocked the German
government, which felt that Russia was now supporting anti-German positions. 120 Hitler decided
to test the coherence of the newly expanded League of Nations.
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SOVIET PLEAS FOR ACTION
Convinced of the weakness and disinterest of the west, in March, 1935, Hitler reintroduced general conscription (Allgemeine Wehrpflicht), in direct contravention of the
Versailles treaty. He calculated that England and France would not intervene in internal German
affairs while he began to test the limits of western tolerance. Hitler was right as the western
powers showed little interest in this blatant act of defiance. On April 17, Litvinov, sensing
problems, appealed to the League of Nations in impassioned tones. He implored the members of
the League to undertake aggressive action against this overt assault on the Versailles settlement.
He questioned the very essence of the organization. He sought to confront the dictator with the
full weight of the League. Although he was quite focused, he proposed an interesting example in
order to illustrate the seriousness of the German threat: (The whole story needs to be told in
Litvinov’s words to demonstrate his resolve for collective action)
May I be allowed, in order to make my line of argument clearer, to resort to the
following illustration? Let us suppose that in a certain town private citizens are allowed
to carry arms. Theoretically this right should be extended to all the inhabitants of
such a town. Should, however, any citizen publicly threaten his fellow-townsmen,
near or far, with attack or with the destruction of their houses, the municipality is
scarcely likely to hasten to issue to such a citizen a license to carry firearms, or quietly to
tolerate his furnishing himself with such arms by illegal means. The promises of such
an aggressive individual to spare certain quarters and only to give free play to his arms
in other quarters can hardly be taken very seriously. The municipality is bound to preserve the peace of the whole town. Moreover, is not an individual who is capable of
infringing the law and attacking his fellow-citizens also capable of breaking his
promise with regard to the precise object of his threats? The least that the town would
be likely to require from him, first and foremost, would be effective guarantees of
good behavior. The inhabitants of those quarters with regard to which the aggressive
individual demands a free hand would be the first to insist on such guarantees, and it
would scarcely be reasonable to expect them to defend the illegal acquisition by him of
arms on the ground of the abstract principle of equality. 121
Litvinov believed in the League and urged a collective front against this direct attack on the
Versailles Treaty and European peace. His colleagues were not so concerned. The USSR had
to take care of itself. He concluded his impassioned presentation by re-asserting the Soviet
“aspirations to collaborate in the creation of an international order under which the
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infringement of peace…would be hampered to the utmost possible extent.” 122 His reasoned
and factual arguments fell on deaf ears.
On May 2, 1935, the Franco-Soviet alliance became a reality. What the Germans felt was
impossible to carry out now acted as a major obstacle to their policy in the east and west. On
May 16, the Soviets concluded a similar agreement with Czechoslovakia. Germany was now
diplomatically isolated, cut off on all sides by potentially hostile enemies. 123 Only a minor
nonaggression pact with Poland, tenuous at best, remained to tie Germany into the world
community. Herein lay the fruits of Nazi policy: an isolated and distrusted Germany.
Although the Pact of 1935 was not nearly as far reaching and concrete as the
Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894, Adam Ulam concluded that:
The importance of the treaty lay precisely in the fact that it blocked, insofar as any
written agreement could block, the first phase of the German attempt to gain a free hand
against the U.S.S.R. Stalin was under no illusions that the essentially right-wing
government that signed the agreement was motivated by tenderness toward the U. S . S
.R. or that it would cease its efforts to relax the tension between France and Hitler
(especially in view of the British pressures toward that end.) But the possibility of
Western support for Russia could no longer be excluded from German calculations. If
Hitler’s whole anti-Communist stance was an attempt to isolate the U.S.S.R.
diplomatically and make sure that Germany could deal with her at her leisure, then the
Franco-Soviet agreement was a resounding defeat for that policy and propaganda. In the
nature of things and given the conditions of 1935, it forced Hitler to look to less risky
adventures. 124
After the conclusion of the pact, Hitler had at least to consider the possibility of joint FrancoSoviet cooperation.
NAZI REACTIONS TO THE FRANCO-SOVIET PACT
German reaction to the Franco-Soviet Pact took a European rather than a national
perspective. The Germans argued that the Franco-Soviet agreement violated the collective
security provisions of the Rhine Pact of Locarno. The Nazis were quite concerned that they were
now “encircled” by hostile powers. The Germans asserted that the Franco-Soviet pact would de119

stabilize Europe. Foreign Minister Neurath circulated a telegram to the West European
embassies explaining Germany’s position; accompanying it were orders to hand deliver a
memorandum to the respective governments clarifying German objections to the Franco Soviet
agreement. The German government felt that the provisions of the recently concluded
Franco-Soviet arrangement violated Article 16 of the League Covenant “in that France claims for
herself, in the event of a conflict between Germany and the USSR, the right to take military
action against Germany…even if she cannot cite a recommendation or some other decision of the
Council of the League of Nations…” The Foreign Minister concluded that actions undertaken
outside the scope of Article 16 would “consequently, constitute a flagrant violation of the Treaty
of Locarno.” 125
In a similar vein, Adolf Hitler addressed the Reichstag on May 21, 1935 and commented
on the ramifications of the recently concluded Franco-Soviet agreement. No matter the
shortcomings of the pact, Hitler had to deal with the possibility of a two-front conflict. He told
his audience that “an element of legal insecurity has been brought into the Locarno Pact.” He
continued, stating that “these military alliances are contrary to the spirit and letter of the
Covenant of the League of Nations.” 126 Perhaps he had forgotten that he had withdrawn
Germany from the League of Nations in October, 1933. Neurath and the Foreign Office were
concerned that the Franco-Soviet alliance would allow unilateral military action against
Germany without intervention of the Locarno powers. By these reactions Germany was
attempting to create an atmosphere of European concern over the new alliance.
Besides the Locarno argument, Germany, concerned about its own security, felt that the
purpose of the Franco-Soviet Pact was distinctively anti-German. 127 The introduction of the
USSR into western European arrangements changed the balance of forces and put Germany on a
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collision course with the Soviet Union. Neurath echoed this attitude when he reported on Hitler's
interview with the British Ambassador, Sir Eric Phipps, during which Hitler commented that “if,
by means of treaties of alliance, Russia was now to be drawn into the European system, then we,
the country after Poland most directly affected, would have to take this fact into account when
determining the army strength required for our defense.” 128 Phipps asserted that it would
possibly reduce tension by bringing the Soviet Union into the European security system rather
than to exclude the USSR from Europe through an anti-Soviet front. Hitler replied that this
seemed to him like "having plague germs shut up in a cupboard and then believing that one could
make them less dangerous by opening the door and letting the germs loose on mankind." 129 This
strange comparison illuminates Hitler's inflexible attitude toward the Soviet Union in general and
European security in particular. Hitler's mind was made up and unwavering toward the Soviet
Union, no matter what the reality.
Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, German Ambassador to Russia since Nadlony's
resignation, illustrated a more realistic understanding of the importance of the Franco-Soviet
agreement when he commented in a report to the Foreign Ministry that “Nevertheless, the fact
that, despite all difficulties, the Franco-Russian entente has been consolidated by a treaty is a
political factor which will have far reaching effects on our Eastern policy, since, as far as can at
present be seen, the Soviet Union and France will now pursue a common policy in Europe.” 130
Schulenburg also felt that Soviet Foreign policy had taken a decided shift toward collaboration in
an effort to maintain domestic stability. As the Ambassador reported, the new alliance shifted the
diplomatic landscape in a way that Germany could not afford to ignore.
Germany, by appealing to the signatory powers of Locarno, was attempting to protect
herself from the potentially harmful effects of an unchallenged East-West anti-German coalition.
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If the Locarno powers agreed that the Franco-Soviet agreement indeed constituted a breach of
the Locarno Pact, then perhaps France and Russia, under organized European pressure, would
dissolve, or at least modify their relationship. Such was not to be the case. Germany now had to
deal with major powers east and west; powers at least potentially dangerous and adverse to
German expansionism.
Despite the pact with France and recent German affronts on all sides, the Soviets
maintained their moderate attitude. They sought to re-establish the close ties of the Weimar and
early National Socialist periods. Litvinov understood that collective security would be more
substantive with Germany as an active participant. As in the past, the People’s Commissar did
not want to close the door on German-Soviet arrangements.
In the spring of 1935, the Soviets sought an improvement in relations with Germany.
Schulenburg reported on a conversation with Litvinov on May 8, 1935, less than one week after
the pact, wherein Litvinov expressed his hope that “. . . the Franco-Soviet Treaty would soon be
followed by a general pact of the kind suggested by Germany.”

Further, according to

Schulenburg, “He (Litvinov) considered the conclusion of a general pact urgently desirable.” 131
Litvinov also displayed outward feelings of a pro-German attitude. At the farewell
dinner for Fritz von Twardowski, the departing Counselor of the German Embassy in the Soviet
Union, Litvinov raised his glass and commented in a loud voice to Schulenburg "I drink to the
rebirth of our friendship." 132 The Soviets desperately desired German support and cooperation
and entrance into a European treaty system in order to ensure that war would not break out
accidentally and destroy the Soviet Union. Litvinov moved Soviet policy toward France only
because of continued and unrelenting German attacks and not because of any special trust or
favoritism for the French. The Soviets hoped that the Franco-Soviet alliance could somehow
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pressure Germany into entering a binding arrangement with the Soviet Union and other
nations. 133
Soviet economic representatives attempted to illustrate Russia's willingness to improve
relations with Nazi Germany. Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, the Reich Director of the Economics
Ministry, reported that the leader of the Soviet trade delegation, David Kandelaki, questioned
him as to the possibility of improving German-Russian political relations. Schacht replied that
these negotiations and requests should take place through the Foreign Ministry and not through
the Economics Department. 134 This visit has aroused a great deal of controversy concerning the
intentions of the parties. Who was courting whom? Was Kandelaki’s mission an example of the
Soviets pursuing the Nazis in an attempt to reach a secret agreement and prepare for the
dissection of Europe or did the Germans actively seek a settlement with its old ally? The
documentary evidence is conflicting, depending on the source. Although Schacht concluded that
Kandelaki broached the subject of substantive political relations, on April 12, 1935, Sergi
Bessonov, a counselor in the Soviet Embassy in Berlin and Kandelaki’s aide in the economic
negotiations, had a different interpretation:
Schlacht spoke a lot about the need for closer economic rapprochement between the
Soviet Union and Germany. He said that it will be hard to keep to the course of
improving relations with the Soviet Union, in which rapprochement he saw a guarantee
of the prosperity of both countries…Returning to the question of the necessity of
rapprochement with the USSR, Schacht reiterated, to both me and Comrade Kandelaki,
that his course of rapprochement with the USSR was being carried out with the consent
and approval of Hitler. 135
Unfortunately to date, regarding subsequent meetings, we have only the self-serving German
records, which indicate Soviet demands for closer ties to Germany. Soviet actions in the later
1930s seem to contradict Herr Schlacht and the Nazi Foreign Office. However, some Soviet
diplomats in Germany inquired about the possibility of improving German-Soviet relations. One
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even went so far as to suggest that the Berlin Treaty be supplemented by a bilateral
non-aggression pact between Germany and Soviet Russia. 136
Finally, the Red Army, long a proponent of close ties with Germany, continued in its
pro-German stance. Von Twardowski reported that at his farewell reception the Deputy
Commissar for war, Marshal Tukhachevsky, commented that, “. . . even today the Red Army still
felt great sympathy for the Reichswehr.” While the Soviet Union was indeed communist and
Germany fascist, the Marshall concluded that “that ought not to present any obstacle to our
cooperation.” 137 Tukhachevsky clearly understood the implications and authority of a
German-Soviet arrangement, particularly from a military viewpoint. Had Germany and Russia
aligned in a substantive, binding pact, this would have created a major political and military
east-west bloc upsetting West European arrangements. That is, England and France would have
had to take both the USSR and Germany more seriously and not attempt to play off against the
other. This dimension of power politics obviously eluded the German Foreign Policy leadership.
INCREASING DISTRUST OF NAZI INTENTIONS
Despite the bantering between Germany and Russia concerning improved political and
economic relations, Jacob Surtiz, the Soviet Ambassador in Germany, penned a prescient letter
on November 28, 1935 to Litvinov. While he met a great number of eminent “Nazis,” all of his
contacts with the Germans had “only strengthened [his] earlier conviction that the course against
us [the USSR], on which Hitler has embarked, will remain unchanged and that we[the Soviet
Union] cannot expect any serious alterations in the immediate future.” Unfortunately for the
Soviets, concluded the Ambassador, “There is nothing we can do, it seems, but wait patiently
and continue to strengthen and develop our economic work.” 138 Surtiz was clearly aware of the
mood in Germany and argued for a united front of anti-fascist powers to oppose Hitler’s clear
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intentions. He knew that Russia had economic authority with which to entice Germany into at
least discussions and to maintain German interest in Russia. Hitler and his entourage, as Surtiz
explained, could not be trusted and the USSR had to make other plans and make them now.
Vyacheslav Molotov, Chairman of the Council of Commissars and future Foreign
Minister, also sought a cautious policy toward Germany as he explained in a speech to the
Central Executive Committee of the Supreme Soviet in January, 1936. Again, he was addressing
his comrades in the party. If there was a “secret plan” to align with Germany, as the German
schools asserts, why not discuss this possibility with his own party members? Molotov cited the
portions of Mein Kampf specifically mentioning Russia as the lands of German conquest. He
further stated that the present Nazi government had done nothing to disown these plans of
aggrandizement. He was careful in his remarks, however, not to close the door on improved
relations in the future:
I must say quite frankly that the Soviet Government would have desired the
establishment of better relations with Germany than exist at present. This seems to us
unquestionably expedient from the standpoint of the interests of the peoples of both
countries. But the realization of such a policy depends not only on us, but also on the
German Government. 139
He quickly shifted tone with a long, detailed criticism of Nazi intentions:
Everybody knows that German fascism is not merely confining itself to elaborating plans
of conquest, but is preparing to act in the immediate future. The German fascists have
openly transformed the country which has fallen into their hands into a military camp,
which, owing to its position in the very centre of Europe, constitutes a menace not only to
the Soviet Union but to Europe in general. 140
These arguments do not indicate a desire to unite with Hitler and the Nazis in an axis of
domination. Soviet diplomacy correctly assessed the German threat and called for united action.
France and England, like other “bourgeois” individuals, were more afraid of communism than
fascism. These deeply held attitudes served to limit Soviet effectiveness.
German intransigence and the rightwing movement in the German position regarding the
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Soviet Union resulted in a fundamental shift in communist ideology and practice. The
Comintern, the organ of international communism centered in Moscow, strictly prohibited
collaboration between communist parties and left wing social democratic movements in Western
Europe. The communists had viewed social democracy as their main enemy and rival for
working class support among the masses of Western Europe. Stalin had stated in 1924 that
fascism and social democracy were twins. 141 In the heated atmosphere of the mid-1930s, the
twins separated and Moscow now considered Social Democracy as an anti-fascist weapon.
OFFICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE NAZI DANGER
Unrelenting German actions and contradictory policies altered this official communist
view of social democracy. The Comintern by 1935 understood clearly that Hitler's position was
quite permanent and that his policies and practices threatened not only German communism, but
also the entire international communist movement. At the Seventh Congress of the Comintern,
held in Moscow in July-August 1935, communist ideology shifted course in response to
changing conditions. The Congress called for the formation of a "Popular Front" of communist,
socialist, and democratic elements in an attempt to halt the spread of fascism in Europe. 142
Georgi Dimitrov, elected Secretary General of the Comintern, reported to the Congress
the importance of collective action and he explained the real threat of fascism. He posed the
provocative question regarding the limitation of the fascist threat. “How can fascism,” he
inquired, “be prevented from coming to power and how can fascism be overthrown after it has
been victorious.” To counter this condition, communists must “form a united front to establish
unity of action of the workers in every factory, in every district, in every region, in every
country, all over the world.” He argued that “unity of action of the proletariat on a national and
international scale is the mighty weapon which renders the working class capable not only of
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successful defense but also of successful counter-offensive against fascism.” Finally, while “joint
action by the parties of both Internationals against fascism, however, would not be confined to
influencing their present adherents” he concluded that “it would also exert a powerful influence
on the ranks of the Catholic, anarchist and unorganized workers, even on those who had
temporarily become the victims of fascist demagogy.” 143
Dimitrov's report led the Congress to pass a resolution which explained the new
communist view of fascism. The Congress declared that it was “the main and immediate task of
the international labor movement to establish the united fighting front of the working class.” It
was the duty of communist parties everywhere to recognize the changed conditions and to seek
reconciliation with working-class organizations in order to coordinate joint action on a local,
regional, national, and international scale. 144
This modification in communist ideology fit perfectly with Litvinov’s vision of collective
security in foreign affairs. With the resolution of the Comintern, workers, peasants and diplomats
now pursued a common front against the fascist cancer. International socialism, once the enemy
of Bolshevism according to Stalin, could now aid the cause of Soviet diplomacy.
Germany found herself isolated politically, diplomatically, and ideologically.
International Communism had now thrown its support behind anti-fascist policies. Despite the
Franco-Soviet pact and the Popular Front, Hitler decided to test the diplomatic waters yet again
in early 1936.
When German troops entered the demilitarized Rhineland in March, 1936, Litvinov
quickly recognized the dangers inherent in this aggressive action. He again appealed to his
colleagues in Geneva to take specific countermeasures against yet another violation of existing
treaty arrangements. As he so forcefully explained, either the League of Nations followed its
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own covenant or it did not. He reminded the delegates that:
This is the third time, in the short period of eighteen months during which the Soviet
Union has been a Member of the League of Nations, that its representative on the
Council of the League has had to speak on the subject of a breach of international
obligations.
These circumstances have not in the past prevented, and will not in the present case
prevent, the representative of the Soviet Union from taking his place among those
members of the Council who register in the most decisive manner their indignation at a
breach of international obligations, condemn it, and support the most effective
measures to avert similar infringements in the future.
“This attitude of the Soviet Union” continued Litvinov “is predetermined by its general policy of
struggling for peace, for the collective organization of security and for the maintenance of one of
the instruments of peace—the existing League of Nations. We consider that one cannot struggle
for peace without at the same time defending the integrity of international obligations…One
cannot struggle for the collective organization of security without adopting collective measures
against breaches of international obligations.” Peaceful intentions have their limit, however,
and he explained that it was imperative that the League fulfill its obligations or risk losing
creditability. He argued that if the League did not carry out its own decisions and pledges, that
“such a League of Nations will never be taken seriously by anyone. The resolutions of such a
League will only become a laughing-stock.” Litvinov addressed and refuted Germany’s
arguments. He stated that the Franco-Soviet pact, the subject of Germany’s ire, was purely
defensive in nature and posed no threat to Berlin. Neither the Soviet Union nor France sought
to modify the borders of Germany. If Germany was indeed peaceful, as it asserted, it had
nothing to fear from the recently concluded pact. As he pointed out to his party brethren in
January, 1936, Hitler’s clear agenda in Mein Kampf, speeches, and recent publications in the
German press, was the destruction of the Soviet Union. Hitler sought expansion by the sword,
not collective security. The League could not overlook this direct threat. Litvinov asserted that
Germany was not the target of aggression; quite the contrary. As he explained, “if there is one State in
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the world which is threatened by no external danger it is Germany.” He knew of “not a single country
which makes any territorial claims on Germany…and no literature preaching an attack on
Germany.”145 Germany’s claims of self defense were self serving.
Litvinov concluded with a reiteration of the Soviet position, “We are for the creation of
security for all the nations of Europe, and against a half-peace which is not peace at all but
war.” 146 The Soviets wanted peace, not a patchwork collections of meaningless resolutions.
Collective security remained the Soviet position in face of the Nazi aggression. Litvinov
needed the support of his European colleagues as all could become victims of Hitler’s wrath.
He was astounded that he had to make these arguments in the first place. Why all the effort if
the entire policy was a hoax to lure Hitler into an alliance?
Remaining consistent with the philosophy of Mein Kampf and National Socialism,
Germany rejected the many-faceted Soviet overtures and continued to call for modification of
the Franco-Soviet alliance along the lines of Locarno. Despite the threat that the pact and the
Popular Front presented, Germany refused to abandon its isolation.
By the end of 1936, Hitler was convinced of the weakness and fear of the western powers
and the inability of the USSR to find diplomatic supporters. He had violated the Versailles
Treaty with impunity and now threatened Austria. The Franco-Soviet and Soviet-Czech pact did
not concern him because of the difficulty of implementation and he was encouraged by the proGerman English attitude. He still had Russian economic ties, the respect of western leaders and
the support of the anti-Soviet press. In spite of the heavy-handed German attitude and practices,
the USSR remained resolute in its quest for collective security with or without German
cooperation. Litvinov, Stalin and the Soviet foreign office correctly calculated the danger of war
and overlooked any obstacle in order to create an effective coalition. 1938 would prove to be the
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high point of the Führer’s plans and the stress test for collective security.
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CHAPTER FOUR: 1938: THE TEST OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY
British and French fear of a western European war allowed Hitler effectively to destroy
the Versailles arrangement without firing a shot. The anti-German hysteria of 1918-1919 had
long since dissipated, especially in England. In June 1935, England and Germany signed a naval
agreement. In the 1930s English diplomats argued that the limitations of Versailles were indeed
unjust. Anglo-French foreign policy seemed decidedly pro- German. Hitler seized on this
position of weakness to forward his aggressive plans. In the west, Russia remained marginalized.
Despite this unsettling situation, the USSR doggedly continued to espouse collective security.
Even after the debacle of Munich, the Soviets re-energized their efforts to create an anti-fascist
front against further German aggression.
In this chapter, I will argue that the USSR maintained its consistent anti-fascist policy,
seeking to illustrate to the West the creeping danger of Nazism, despite the West’s clear
preference for Germany. Litvinov even tried to embarrass the League of Nations, hoping to rouse
collective action as Hitler moved from one triumph to another without resistance. While a move
toward Germany may have been easy for the Soviet Union while the West waivered, Litvinov
stayed the course of collective security.
If the Soviets had wanted to develop closer ties with Hitler and create a Moscow-Berlin
axis, as the proponents of the “German School” assert, the time was now. The western powers
seemed to favor Germany’s eastward momentum toward the Soviet Union. With the collapse of
the Baltic and Eastern Pacts in 1934-1935, the policy of collective security seemed dead.
Litvinov was not ready to bury it. Now more than ever, he understood the need for a tri-partite
front against Nazism; he had to convince the west that Hitler posed a threat to it as well.
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Although Soviet diplomats recognized the dangers of Nazism, economic ties between
Germany and the USSR remained solid in the 1930s and into the 1940s. The Soviet Union
desperately needed German credits to sell its goods abroad, while Germany sought the vast
natural resources of the Russian steppe. In addition, the Great Depression in the United States
contributed to shrinking foreign and domestic markets as unemployment increased. While
engaged in a political and diplomatic tug of war, on April 14, 1931 the two nations concluded a
detailed credit and guarantee arrangement referred to as the Piatakov Agreement. 1 In this
economic treaty, the USSR promised German industry additional orders for 1931 alone of
industrial goods worth 300 million marks on the condition that further credits of the same value
would be provided on terms more favorable than those for the credit in 1926, namely that the
Reich and Länder governments would underwrite a 70 percent guarantee against default. 2 After
the conclusion of this arrangement, German exports to Russia rose steadily to almost double of
the 1929 level and in 1932, Germany provided 46 percent of Russia’s total imports, while
German exports to the Soviet Union reached 763 million Reichmarks. 3 Deutscher Volkswirt
declared on August 17, 1934, that, “As far as economic interests are concerned, nothing has
altered the fact that no other countries complement each other in such a natural way as Germany
and Russia.” 4 After extensive talks, another agreement emerged on April 9, 1935 with the
controversial Kandeleki mission, wherein Moscow would pay off half of its outstanding 200million mark credit in gold and foreign exchange, the other half in goods, and would place
additional orders to the extent of 200 million marks with German industrial firms on the basis of
a new five-year credit from a German banking consortium. As the German and Soviet documents
indicate, the economic representatives took this occasion to broach the subject of improved
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political relations. 5 The German credits were extended with another economic understanding
signed on April 29, 1936. While diplomatic pressure increased, economic interaction remained
cordial. Each needed the other to survive economically; each was willing to use the other for
economic stability. Nazi-Soviet economic cooperation would continue until the Nazi attack of
June 22, 1941.
Stalin’s Soviet Union remained an attractive trade partner for Germany largely because of
the economic success of the five year plans. While rigid state planning devastated agriculture in
the USSR, the pure numerical increases in the production sector were indeed spectacular. For
example, the rate of growth of the GNP amounted to 56 percent in the period 1928-1940, 10
percent if measured in 1928 prices. 6 Industrial production in the rich Urals-Trans-Urals region
increased from 11-12 percent of the total in 1928, to over 16 percent in 1940. In addition,
employment increased while the number of children in school rose from 12 million in the school
year 1928-1929 to 35 million in the school year 1940-1941. 7 The USSR had products that
Germany needed as Hitler concentrated on expansion.
In March, 1938, Hitler commenced his plan to incorporate Austria into the German
Reich. Historians have chronicled in detail the events leading to the Anschluss. Our interest is the
Soviet position and the policy of collective security. When it would have been quite easy to
abandon its multi-lateral security policy and seek formal military relations with Germany, the
USSR maintained a consistent course.
As early as January, 1938, Litvinov defended his position and explained the importance
of a united front against fascism, “If we take a new position and show indifference, this would
deliver a shattering blow to all organizations for peace.” 8 Both the Soviets and the western
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powers expected a Nazi move on Austria; Hitler made it clear that Austria belonged in the Reich
whether it wanted to be or not. The important question for the USSR was, how would England
and France react?
As Hitler increased the pressure on Austria in early March, 1938, the show trials of
Bukharin, Krestinsky and other ‘enemies of the people” were winding down. Stalin needed the
diplomatic stability to complete his internal revolution. He had already decimated the peasantry,
the Red Army, especially those connected with the west, such as Marshall Mikhail
Tukhachevsky, the left Bolsheviks and, finally, by 1938, the Right Opposition. Even the lucky
few remaining officers recognized the weakness of the Soviet armed forces. The Anschluss
actually occurred on the eve of sentencing of members of the Right Opposition. The Soviets did
not protest Hitler’s occupation. International peace remained a necessary tool of Stalin’s
domestic reform.
On March 14, 1938 Litvinov wrote to Stalin and others that the USSR should have made
a public pronouncement condemning the absorption of a sovereign nation:
To be silent and to remain totally passive with regard to this event is incompatible with
our policy of peace and our position in the League of Nations. I consider it extremely
desirable for us to make our position clear in a statement addressed to the other states…I
do not expect any official replies to our statement, especially from England, who does not
want to tie her hands with any practical statements. Thus our statement will not lay any
obligations on us, but will nevertheless achieve its aims. 9
Litvinov asserted that a public criticism of the events of March, 1938, would serve to place the
blame for Hitler’s success on England and to address opinion concerning the weakness of the
USSR. Finally, the Minister for Foreign Affairs convinced Stalin to allow him to make a formal
declaration in an interview with a foreign journalist condemning the Anschluss. The People’s
Commissar repeated the Soviet position regarding collective security and regional pacts of
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mutual assistance. With Stalin’s permission, Litvinov explained that the Soviet Government
“has never missed a suitable occasion to recommend the most effective guarantees of peace
which it has seen in the organization of the system of collective security.” While the USSR
pursued peace, Litvinov pointed out the dangers of inaction against aggressors: “The Soviet
Government has voiced a warning that international inaction and the impunity of aggression in
one case would inexorably lead to the repetition and multiplication of similar cases.” He then
added a moral tone to the debate. He called on “all peace-loving States” to question their
responsibility “for the destinies of the peoples of Europe, and not only Europe.” Although the
USSR supported conferences, he concluded with a direct dose of realism, which illustrated the
seriousness of Soviet policy, “It [The Soviet Union] is prepared immediately to take up in the
League of Nations or outside of it the discussion with other Powers of the practical measures
which the circumstances demand. It may be too late tomorrow.” 10 Practicalities had to outweigh
doctrinal differences because the risks and the common threat of Hitler were simply too great.
Litvinov was pleading with the west to wake up.
Unfortunately for Litvinov and the USSR, the western powers persisted in their fear of
communist rhetoric and revolutionary goals, hoping that Hitler would simply go away, or, at
least be satisfied with seizing territory in the East. Britain and France sought desperately to avoid
the debacle of 1914, but failed to understand Soviet policy as peaceful in all respects, that is, the
USSR wanted no war in any area. Objectively, the western lethargy towards Hitler seemed to
indicate a preference for his actions as long as they were directed eastward. Britain was
conducting a split foreign policy in negotiating with both Russia and Germany. France, with its
ties to Russia and Eastern Europe, was hoping for a diplomatic miracle and a settlement short of
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confrontation. Hitler and the Nazis were not waiting for events; Czechoslovakia, the most stable
inter-war democracy, lay directly in Hitler’s sights. It would prove a more substantive opponent
than Austria. Litvinov believed that a unified bloc must confront Hitler sooner rather than later.
Soon the test arrived as both France and Russia had treaties with Czechoslovakia, they
had to consult and confront this latest threat to peace. Under the Soviet-Czech agreement, France
had to act first before the Soviets would be bound to defend Czechoslovakia. The diplomatic and
political give and take began in early in the crisis. Who would act first? Would the USSR protect
its Slavic brothers in union with France? The year 1938 would prove crucial, though not fatal, to
the Soviet policy of collective security.
Hitler’s incursion into the Sudetenland has been well chronicled. The historiography of
the Czech crisis remains contentious, particularly concerning appeasement. Our focus is on the
Russian position while facing a direct threat to an allied nation. Could collective security
withstand the strain of Hitler’s wrath? Recently released documents shed some light on this
confusing time. 11 Litvinov saw this latest Nazi move as a central test of western resolve and a
serious concern for the USSR. Initially, the Soviet Union urged caution in its relations with
Czechoslovakia.
As the summer wore on in uncertainty, Litvinov issued instructions to Sergi
Alexandrovsky, the Soviet ambassador in Prague. He urged the ambassador to “reinforce the
spirit of the Czechs and their resistance to that [Anglo-French] pressure.” Litvinov reminded him
that “we are not at all interested in the forcible solution of the problem of the Sudeten Germans
and we should offer no objections at all to such measures, which, while preserving
Czechoslovakia’s full political independence, would be able to diffuse the tension and prevent
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the danger of a military confrontation…” 12 Litvinov could not commit the USSR to military
action alone and wanted to avoid conflict altogether, while forcing a collaborative anti-German
front. He needed to proceed carefully without arousing the ire of Hitler. Ideally, the Czechs
would offer the needed resistance.
Later in June, 1938, Litvinov continued to explain the necessity of a consistent yet
forceful foreign policy. Hitler’s position was clear; he wanted a confrontation over
Czechoslovakia and he wanted to gauge western intentions as he had since 1935. He was
convinced that Britain and France, despite treaty obligations, would not fight for Prague. The
People’s Commissar continued to plead his case. He used the occasion of a pre-election speech
in Leningrad to analyze critically the international situation. He knew that he had to convince his
domestic audience and opponents within the Soviet hierarchy of the validity of collective
security. Again, he was explaining the policy of collective security to an internal party meeting.
He had no occasion to mislead his listeners with a false depiction of Soviet diplomacy. He did
not mention an alliance with Hitler. He was quite detailed and thorough, resting his substantive
arguments on the foundation of history. As he explained in emotional language, one could not
simply ignore the past and cling to theory and dogma; the reality was clear, “No special study of
international relations is needed, it is enough to read any daily newspaper in order to see and to
understand the alarming and ominous character of the present international situation.” He
informed his comrades that the German threat was indeed real:
The point, however, is this, that Germany is striving not only for the restoration of the
rights trampled underfoot by the Versailles treaty, not only for the restoration of its prewar boundaries, but is building its foreign policy on unlimited aggression, even going so
far as to talk of subjecting to the so called German race all other races and peoples. It is
conducting an open, rabid, anti-Soviet policy…
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He continued with a concise explanation of the interests of the USSR in the present
international situation. “Peace,” he opined, “Claims the interest of the working people of all
countries, to whose fate we cannot be indifferent. After all, is it not the ruling classes but the
working people who pay with their blood, their lives, their meager property for violations of the
peace, for the destruction inevitable in war.” 13 A broad based peace was in the interests of all
nations, not just the USSR, although it seemed that only the Soviet Union gave voice to its
concerns.
He concluded with a criticism of the narrow-minded, popular western appeal of antiBolshevism in the face of the fascist cancer. He seemed to have a handle on the limitations of
popular politics:

Further, there are not a few people among the governing classes of western countries who
naively believe that fascism is really a solid barrier against an advance of the working
class. And since the aggressor States are at the same time the bulwark of fascism, they
fear that a defeat of the aggressor states in a war, or even their diplomatic defeat, might
prove to be a defeat for fascism and destroy that artificial dam against the labor
movement.
As if these misguided arguments were not enough, he asserted to the party faithful that “to this is
added one more apprehension, that for the necessary balance in the struggle against the aggressor
countries, co-operation with the Soviet Union is essential, and this, it appears, might also have
repercussions upon the domestic political struggle.” The ramifications of this mentality could
have disastrous repercussions:
Thus it appears these reactionary circles prefer to sacrifice their national interests, to
endanger and even lose their State positions for the sake of preserving their social and
class positions. These are the kind of considerations that explain the inertia and passivity
of the foreign policy of certain foreign countries, the servile and conciliatory attitude to
the fascist aggressors which has radically changed the correlation of forces in Europe and
in the entire world.
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Finally, he assured his audience that the USSR would not stand idly by and witness the
destruction of the European order, “If, however, contrary to our expectations, the worst happens
and it will not be possible to preserve peace despite our policy, we know that the defense of our
country is in strong and capable hands.” 14
Litvinov had to maintain the integrity of his policy in the face of a crumbling west. In
July and August, 1938, the USSR adopted a type of wait and see attitude. Britain and France
were attempting to discover Hitler’s motives and his next move. They were doing nothing to
deter the German dictator, preferring, as Litvinov indicated, to maintain the façade of domestic
stability. Starting in March, 1938 and pleading throughout the year, Litvinov urged an
international conference of western powers to discuss the delicate Czech situation. 15 The
proximity of Czechoslovakia to the USSR was not lost on Soviet diplomats. The Soviet Union
was the voice in the diplomatic desert pleading for action. Nothing in the documents indicates
that the USSR sought an accommodation with Hitler at this crucial juncture. On the contrary, the
Soviet Union was Germany’s most vocal critic.
In early August, 1938, Litvinov, in a cable to Alexandrovsky in Prague, summed up the
precarious diplomatic and political position of the Soviet Union:
Of course, we are extremely interested in the preservation of Czechoslovakia’s
independence, in the hindrance of the Hitlerite drive to the south-east, but without the
Western powers it is doubtful whether we would be able to do anything serious, and those
powers do not consider it necessary to seek our assistance, ignore us and decide
everything concerning the German-Czechoslovak conflict among themselves. We are not
aware of Czechoslovakia herself ever pointing out to her western ‘friends’ the necessity
of bringing in the Soviet Union. In such circumstances, for us to criticize officially and
publicly the actions of England and France would result in accusations of us trying to
sabotage their ‘peaceful action’, and encouraging Czechoslovakia’s unyielding attitude
which would not be of any help to Czechoslovakia herself. 16
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As the western powers collapsed under powerful public pressure, Litvinov had to walk a political
tightrope and convince England and France of the importance of this moment. Because Litvinov
linked Soviet action to French participation under existing treaty obligations (a Czech
requirement in 1935) and remained vague as to Russian willingness to act unilaterally, the
Czechs themselves did not trust Soviet intentions, adding to Litvinov’s challenges. 17 Collective
security became a diplomatic nightmare but Litvinov was undeterred.
Summer turned to fall with Europe on the precipice of war. It became clear that France
would not honor its treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia and the Soviets would have to act alone,
if at all. The feared western coalition against the USSR, with the Soviet Union bearing the brunt
of military operations, seemed a close reality. France was waiting for the Soviets to declare their
position and the USSR wanted French assurances of aid to Czechoslovakia. Both nations
contributed to the atmosphere of uncertainty. Hitler was in no mood to wait.
As usual, Litvinov took the initiative and again addressed the League Assembly on
September 21, 1938. He began his analysis with substantive support for the authority of the
League of Nations and a call for united action at this most critical time. He pleaded with his
audience to accept the clear facts of the international situation. As he correctly stated, the
aggressor states had expanded their influence with little or no opposition. They had formed a
bloc of interested nations spreading the danger of conflict. He placed the responsibility for the
present tensions “with those States which restrained the League from resistance to the aggressors
when they were still weak and divided, and were still making only their first timid attempts to
break the peace.” 18 He was attempting, again, to illustrate the extreme urgency of the situation.
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What than should be done to counter this dangerous aggressive tendency? Where were
the splits in League policy? He demanded that the League enforce its own policies. “The
aggressor” explained Litvinov, “Should be met with the program laid down by the League
covenant, resolutely, consistently and without hesitation.” He then illustrated what he called
“another conception” which was a not so thinly disguised attack on Anglo-French policy. This
conception recommends “as the height of human wisdom, under cover of imaginary pacifism,
that the aggressor be treated with consideration, and his vanity not be wounded.” He went on to
give examples of the current Franco-British practices in attempting to engage Germany in
“conversations and negotiations…compromise agreements and breaches of those very
agreements overlooked.” The results of this activity, he asserted, has brought “three wars, and
threatens to bring down on us a fourth. Four nations have already been sacrificed, and a fifth is
next on the list.” 19
Despite the inertia of the League of Nations, Litvinov announced that:
We intend to fulfill our obligations under the pact and, together with France, to afford
assistance to Czechoslovakia by the ways open to us. Our War Department is ready to
immediately to participate in a conference with representatives of the French and
Czechoslovak War Departments, in order to discuss the measures appropriate to the
moment…It was necessary, however, to exhaust all means of averting an armed conflict,
and we considered one such method to be an immediate consultation between the Great
Powers of Europe and other interested states, in order if possible to decide on the terms of
a collective demarche. 20
Litvinov tried his best and, in forceful and clear language, carefully laid out the Soviet position.
At the Munich conference in late September, Britain and France gave away the Sudetenland and
Hitler had yet another bloodless victory. Despite this devastating defeat, the People’s Commissar
for Foreign Affairs and the Soviet leadership clung to collective security. The only other option

147

was the distasteful prospect of alignment with Germany and waiting for the promised attack on
the Soviet Union. Soviet aggression was not part of the plan.
Vyacheslav Molotov, the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, later to
become Foreign Minister, summed up the crucial year 1938 in a speech in Moscow on
November 6, the eve of the celebrations of the anniversary of the Revolution. Like Litvinov
earlier, Molotov was addressing a domestic audience. He had no reason to mislead his listeners
as to the true motives of Soviet policy. Again, there was no mention of alliance with Germany.
He underscored the crucial failure of western policy and the increasing danger of war. He urged
a pragmatic approach and identified “at least two victories” which endangered the peace, “the
first decisive event in the Czechoslovak question was the victory won by England and Germany
over the Government of France. Two Governments, the English and German, ‘defeated’ the
French Government by persuading it to renounce its treaty of assistance with Czechoslovakia.”
As a result, noted the Chairman, “The fascist and so-called democratic Powers of Europe came
together at Munich and the victory over Czechoslovakia was complete.” While the western
powers rushed to appease the Nazi dictator and France renounced its treaty obligations, “The
Soviet Union showed that its attitude to international treaties is utterly different. It demonstrated
to the entire world that its fidelity to the treaties it has concluded for fighting the aggressor is
unshakeable”
Molotov then assessed the implications of the failed western position. Britain and France
had allied with the fascist powers and brought Europe to the brink of war in the name of peace.
He was not seeking a modus vivendi with Germany. He pointed out that “despite the allegedly
peaceful character of the Munich Agreement, all who took part in it are now busily increasing
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their armaments, expanding their armies, increasing their military budgets. The bargain between
the fascist governments and the governments of the so-called democratic countries, far from
lessening the danger of the outbreak of the second imperialist war, has on the contrary added fuel
to the flames.” He argued that “At such a moment we cannot expect the second imperialist war to
cease or be extinguished. On the contrary, the danger of its breaking out at new points and
expanding its scope is obvious.” While pleading for peace and a realistic approach to aggression,
Molotov left no doubt as to the readiness of the USSR to defend itself, “Only the Soviet State,
strong in its foreign policy, ready for any test from the outside, only our State is able to pursue a
consistent policy of peace, firm in the defense of its frontiers and of the interests of socialism.
Anyone who wants to be convinced of the strength and power of our forces is welcome to try.” 21
Molotov did not want the fascist powers to mistake diplomacy for weakness. If conflict was
indeed the last resort, the USSR would fight for its survival.
Munich may well have represented the nadir of western diplomacy towards aggression.
Hitler became even more convinced of the inherent weakness and disinterest of England and
France in Eastern Europe. As a last resort, the Soviet Union could have sought an
accommodation with its fascist neighbor, although that neighbor was ineluctably opposed to
communism, and taken part in the spoils of great power diplomacy. The fact that it did not is a
testament to the status of collective security and peace, at least for the moment, as a foundation
of Soviet policy. The USSR was still reeling from the purges and collectivization while the Red
Army struggled to face the challenges of the vaunted Wehrmacht. War might have been on the
horizon, and, in communist doctrine, inevitable, just not in 1938. Although the forces of
capitalism remained the great theoretical enemy of the Bolshevik experiment in Russia,
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seemingly only the leaders of Soviet diplomacy realized that the Nazi menace was indeed a great
threat, not only to the USSR itself, but to the whole of Europe. Soviet diplomats tried to explain
to the western powers that war anywhere, east or west would be devastating for all.
At the end of 1938, Hitler turned his aggressive gaze to the remainder of Czechoslovakia
and then Poland, having no evidence that the western powers would risk a general war over these
Eastern nations. Litvinov understood that 1939 must be the year of direct diplomatic
confrontation with England and France. That is, he would make them an offer that they could not
refuse. They would have to “put up or shut up.” The peaceful rhetoric would have to be
supported with conciliatory gestures, including an alliance opposing fascism. In any case,
Litvinov would finally flush out British and French intentions. The peace of Europe and the
world depended on their response.
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CHAPTER FIVE: 1939: THE SHOE FALLS
Although British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain returned from Munich in 1938
with what he thought was “peace in our time,” his beliefs were illusory. Hitler had simply
succeeded in buying time for his planned invasion of Poland, and, ultimately, the Soviet Union.
Still hoping to avoid a general war, Britain and France capitulated to the Nazi pressure at the
Braunhaus and watched as the remainder of the Czechoslovak state disappeared in March, 1939.
In the face of such bold Nazi actions, especially after Hitler’s promise at Munich that he
was satisfied with the Sudetenland, it seemed that the western powers understood the danger of
Germany and the need for substantive political and diplomatic relations with the other nation in
the path of the Nazi juggernaut, the USSR. Britain and France were prepared to fight for Poland.
Such utopian hopes quickly dissipated and the Soviets were faced with a difficult choice in
August, 1939: they could continue to bang their heads against western delay, or sign a nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany. Although Poland appeared doomed despite western
promises, the Soviets did not collect their portion until September 17, unleashing Stalinist terror
on the population. Collective security died a slow and agonizing death in 1939. Russian policy
remained consistent in the face of a wavering west. Certainly the Soviet Union was defending its
interests and geopolitical position but not to the exclusion of the remainder of Europe. The
Soviets argued that a general war would devastate the entire continent. The Soviets were not
seeking to move Hitler westward and isolate a conflict; although Stalin sent the NKVD into
Poland and Latvia to root out opposition, the USSR wanted to avoid all war. For the USSR,
collective security meant anti-fascist coalitions, not a benevolent relationship with its eastern
buffer states.
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In this chapter, I will argue that the USSR tried valiantly to create an anti-fascist front
until the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Again and again, before both foreign and domestic
audiences, the Soviet Union preached collective security. Only when western inaction and
downright contempt for Russian initiatives became evident, did the USSR entertain German
overtures.
COLLECTIVE SECURITY ALIVE AND WELL AFTER MUNICH
After the Munich debacle, Litvinov refused to abandon collective security and argued for
a more forceful approach to England and France. He knew that he had to illustrate to the west
that the Nazi threat was equally dangerous to all nations and that Hitler could just as easily move
against France as against Russia. A collective pact of mutual assistance was the only hope of
deterrence. While the western powers feared war in 1939, fear of Bolshevism proved more
powerful than the fear of fascism. Western diplomats and politicians played to public opinion. In
many cases, such as Chamberlain and Daladier, political ambitions took precedence over
national security. The anti-Soviet press actually saw some favorable positions in Hitler’s
Germany and continued to berate the Soviet Union. In Britain and France, most leaders did not
want to seem soft on Communism no matter the risk.
Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin commented at length concerning the precarious international
situation and western fears in his speech to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party, the
first since 1934, on March 10, 1939. Like Litvinov earlier, Stalin was urging collective security
to a domestic audience. If Stalin himself opposed this policy, he would have said it and destroyed
it. After reviewing the events from 1935 and the increasing bellicose climate worldwide, Koba
(Stalin’s Georgian nickname) added a bit of sarcasm to his comments regarding Europe. His
feigned humor illustrated his frustrations:
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A military bloc of Germany and Italy against the interests of England and France in
Europe? Good gracious, do you call that a bloc? ‘We’ have no military bloc. All ‘we’
have is a harmless ‘Berlin-Rome axis’; that is, just a geometrical formula about an axis.
A military bloc of Germany, Italy and Japan against the interests of the United States,
Great Britain and France in the Far East? Nothing of the kind! ‘We’ have no military
bloc. All ‘we’ have is a harmless “Berlin-Rome-Tokyo triangle’; that is a slight penchant
for geometry.
A war against the interests of England, France, the United States? Nonsense! ‘We’are
waging war on the Comintern, not on these states. If you don’t believe it, read the ‘antiComintern pact’ concluded between Italy, Germany and Japan.
He continued with a harsh condemnation of British and French policy:
The chief reason [for concessions of territory without conflict] is that the majority of the
non-aggressive countries, particularly England and France, have rejected the policy of
collective security, the policy of collective resistance to the aggressors, and have taken up
a position of non-intervention, a position of ‘neutrality’.
He was especially contemptuous of non-action, “in fact the policy of non-intervention means
conniving at aggression, giving free rein to war, and, consequently, transforming the war into a
world war.” The anti-soviet western policy was not lost on the Soviet Dictator. He asserted that
England and France were “egging the Germans on to march farther east, promising them easy
pickings, and prompting them: ‘Just start war on the Bolsheviks, and everything will be all
right.’” In fact”, he continued,” it must be admitted that this too looks very much like urging on
and encouraging the aggressor…” He concluded with a straightforward presentation of the
intentions of Soviet foreign policy. The USSR stood “for peace and the strengthening of business
relations with all countries.” He quickly added that peaceful intentions should not be confused
with weakness, “we are not afraid of the threats of aggressors, and are ready to deal two blows
for every blow delivered by instigators of war who attempt to violate the Soviet borders.” He
then summarized summary of the goals of Soviet foreign policy:
The tasks of the Party in the sphere of foreign policy are:
1. To continue the policy of peace and of strengthening business relations with all
countries;
2. To be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers
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who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them(to rake the
fire with somebody else’s hands-zagrebat zhar chuzhimi rukami);
3. To strengthen the might of our Red Army and Red Navy to the utmost;
4. To strengthen the international bonds of friendship with the working people of all
countries, who are interested in peace and friendship among nations. 1
At the same Congress, Dimitry Manulisky, leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party,
remarked that “the plan of the British reactionary bourgeoisie is to turn Germany towards the
East—against the USSR—by sacrificing the small nations of Southeastern Europe to German
fascism.” He continued his criticism of western intentions, “British reaction would like to use the
Soviet Union to draw the teeth of German imperialism to weaken Germany for many years,
preserving for British imperialism its dominating position in Europe.” 2 The Soviets were not
playing favorites at this congress; all western powers came in for biting criticism. The threat of
war was imminent and the USSR had to determine western motivations.
Some historians have viewed Stalin’s speech as signaling a major shift in Soviet foreign
policy toward Germany. 3 Robert Tucker concluded that, “Stalin in his party congress speech set
in motion talks leading to an alignment with Berlin.” 4 In a mere five weeks, Russia would
propose a major anti-German initiative; hardly an invitation for an alliance with Hitler. If this
important speech was an invitation to Germany for improved relations and the conclusion of a
diplomatic pact, most contemporary observers missed the point. The British ambassador,
William Seeds reported to London that Stalin’s presentation “contained little that was new or
unexpected.” 5 Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, the German ambassador in Russia since
October 3, 1934, and former Minister to Teheran and Bucharest, reported on Stalin’s speech in a
memorandum to the Foreign Office on March 13. 6 As Shore points out, it remains unclear when
Hitler may have received this information. The original log books have been lost. 7 This time
delay may explain the lack of a substantive Nazi response to Stalin’s polemic. Indeed, the
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possibility of a pact may have dissipated at this crucial moment. Of course, Stalin attacked the
west broadly and did not directly indicate a preference for Germany. Characteristically,
Schulenburg was reserved about Stalin’s position. He related to Berlin that:
in that part of the speech devoted to foreign policy and in which was manifest unchanged
adherence to the policy hitherto pursued, it was noteworthy that Stalin’s irony and
criticism were directed in considerably sharper degree against Britain, i.e., against the
reactionary forces in power there, than against the so-called aggressor States, and in
particular, Germany. 8
Schulenberg perhaps ignored the direct criticisms leveled at Germany during the speech.
On May 26, Ribbentrop sent a detailed instruction to Schulenburg concerning future
relations with Russia. The gap between March and late May, considering Schulenburg’s
memorandum of March 13, indicates that Ribbentrop did not learn of Stalin’s speech for some
time. The Foreign Minister was concerned that Anglo-Soviet talks were progressing and he
suggested that “we need to emerge from our reserve more markedly.” 9 Schulenburg was to
engage Molotov in discussions intended to improve relations. Ribbentrop continued:
From certain events in recent months we have thought we were able to detect signs that
Russia’s views had undergone a change in this respect[desist from attacking Germany
with communist and world-revolutionary ideas carried into Germany itself]…we thought
we could recognize certain signs that that Soviet views were tending in this direction in
Stalin’s speech in March. 10
Ribbentrop then noted that, “a real opposition of interests in foreign affairs does not exist
between Germany and Soviet Russia.” 11 Stalin’s rant got Germany’s attention. It also
seemed to arouse Britain and France. Stalin, summing up the international situation and calling
attention to the danger of a devastating war, made it clear that Russia was nobody’s patsy.
Litvinov and the foreign office used the occasion of the speech to press collective
security on England and France once again. They had no intention of capitulating to the Nazi
dictator as had England and France. Perhaps with the disappearance of the Czechoslovakian
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rump in March, 1939, the west would finally pay attention. It was certainly in the USSR’s
interest to rouse the western powers. Although it was not in the interests of France and Great
Britain to go to war over Czechoslovakia, but perhaps a collective anti-fascist front would
prevent the feared conflict. To Litvinov, western inaction was merely provoking the very
conflict that the USSR so desperately wanted to avoid.
SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE BRITAIN AND FRANCE
Although relations between the USSR, Britain, and France had been strained in the 1920s
and early 1930s, it was Litvinov’s task to illustrate the common threat of annihilation linking
them together. Time was of the essence before Hitler’s next step toward war. The pace of
diplomacy had to speed up before it was too late. The Soviet Union would take the lead as it had
in the past and this time force the hand of England and France.
Perhaps the USSR should have learned from the events of 1937 that western intentions
were not always what they seemed. Although Russia had concluded a mutual defense pact with
France in May, 1935, ratification was delayed. The Soviet government wanted to test French
resolve and proposed military staff talks. Actually it was Pierre Laval who first breached the
subject in 1935. 12 While Soviet initiatives reflected its self-interest in participating in
international politics, duplicity and delay characterized French policy and the talks never
materialized. A powerful anti-Communist press, fear of communism, and the rise of the French
left undermined cooperation. That the talks failed was one thing; how and why they failed were
quite another. 13
British political and diplomatic leaders began a substantive reappraisal of British foreign
policy in early 1939. The voices of those who advocated a more realistic and forceful policy
began to echo throughout Britain and Europe. Unfortunately, they would not be able to sway the
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deeply held fear of communism in England and beyond.
Robert Vansittart, now demoted to chief diplomatic advisor, frankly commented on the
state of English-Soviet relations on invitation of Lord Halifax. Vansittart noted that, “AngloSoviet Relations are in a most unsatisfactory state. It is not only regrettable but dangerous that
they should be in this state, and a continuance of it will become a great deal more dangerous very
shortly.” Relations were at a low ebb because, Vansittart explained, that, “it is an incontestable
fact (at any rate it is a very widely stated one), that we practically boycotted them during 1938.”
The result of this policy, he concluded “accounts for the gradual drift towards isolation that is
going on in Russia. That fact and that tendency we ought to correct and correct soon.” 14 England
sent a trade representative to Russia in early spring. While Litvinov welcomed this gesture, he
demanded a change in action not more rhetoric. 15 Neville Chamberlain ignored Vansittart’s
advice and discounted Russia’s value. England saw no urgency in the diplomatic interchange.
France sent a new ambassador to the Soviet Union in February, 1939: Paul Emile
Naggiar. He continued the practices of his predecessor Payart: lots of possibilities but little
substance. Soviet patience was wearing thin. Still, Litvinov plowed forward. In a letter of March
20, 1939, he declared that, “The Soviet Union is in a better position than any other country to
provide for the defense of its own borders, but it still does not refuse to cooperate with other
countries. It conceives of such cooperation only in terms of joining in actual common efforts to
resist the aggressor.” 16 The Soviet Ambassador in France, Jacob Surtis, recognized the
dangerous game of great power diplomacy in a note to the Foreign Office on March 26, 1939. He
correctly assessed the western position. “It is not necessary,” he began, “To remind anyone that
the best way out for the Munichmen is to involve us in a war with Germany.” “But” continued
Surtis, “If despite all their efforts, war breaks out somewhere else, and if the aggressor, instead of
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moving in the direction pointed out to him by the Munichmen, actually attacks the Munichmen
themselves, then, of course, they will accept assistance from the USSR.” 17 As Surtis explained,
the hypocrisy was palpable.
As Hitler increased the pressure on Poland for access to the sea, Britain and France took
note of the threat, at least a little. On March 21, English ambassador Seeds submitted to the
Soviet Foreign Commissariat a draft of proposed declaration of the USSR, Great Britain, France,
and Poland:
We, the undersigned, duly authorized to that effect, hereby declare that, inasmuch as
peace and security in Europe are matters of common interest and concern, and since
European peace and security may be affected by any action which constitutes a threat to
the political independence of any European state, our respective Governments hereby
undertake immediately to consult together as to what steps should be taken to offer joint
resistance to any such action. 18
Following reception of the draft, the Soviets agreed and pushed for signature. The British would
ultimately blame Poland for the failure of ratification, but England at least broached the
possibility of common action against aggression.
Public fear was also increasing in France. On April 11, the Soviet Embassy in Paris
informed the Foreign Office that, “everyone is now convinced that war is inevitable. At a time
like this, aid should no longer be rejected, no matter where it comes from and that the Soviet
Union should no longer be ignored. The French government cannot avoid taking these feelings
into consideration.” 19 On April 14, Bonnet, the French Foreign minister, proposed that the USSR
and France should exchange letters stating the following:
In the event of France finding herself in a state of war with Germany as a consequence of
her providing assistance to Poland or Rumania, the USSR shall provide France with
immediate assistance and support.
In the event of the USSR finding herself in a state of war with Germany as a consequence
of her providing assistance to Poland or Rumania, France shall provide the USSR with
immediate assistance and support.
Both Governments shall without delay coordinate the forms of such aid and shall take
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every measure to guarantee its full effectiveness. 20
The Daladier government was going beyond mere superficial gestures.
Picking up the spirit of conciliation, the British government sent the following note on
April 14 to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs through its Moscow Ambassador
William Seeds. “His Majesty’s government” began the memorandum, “has noted Mr. Stalin’s
recent statement that the Soviet Union stands for the rendering of support to nations which are
victims of aggression and which fight for their independence.” Hence, concluded the dispatch:
it would therefore be in complete accord with this policy were the Soviet Government
now to make a public declaration on their own initiative in which, …they would request
that in the event of any act of aggression against any European neighbor of the Soviet
Union which was resisted by the country concerned, the assistance of the Soviet
Government would be available, if desired, and would be afforded in such manner as
would be found most convenient. 21
Molotov, the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, immediately noticed the
intentional vagueness and one-sidedness in the note. “Before we make any formal and public
commitments,” he cabled to Seeds on April 16 “we would like to know just what we are talking
about.” 22 Molotov’s attempts at definition would prove problematic.
SOVIET PROPOSALS AND WESTERN RESPONSES (OR NON-RESPONSES)
With the hope of cooperation in the air, the Soviet Union forced the issue on April 17,
1939 with a detailed proposal for collective action. This proposal would clarify the real
intentions of England and France and detail commitments. It would become the basis of Soviet
Foreign Policy until August 23, 1939. The Soviets delivered the proposal to Seeds, British
Ambassador to the Soviet Union. The Soviet plan envisioned a mutual assistance pact between
Britain, France and the USSR “in case of aggression in Europe against any one of the contracting
parties.” The parties also obligated themselves to assist the Eastern European states situated
between the Baltic and Black seas as well as to enter into military discussions. Finally, the
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parties were not to conclude a separate peace. 23 Soviet diplomats also made it clear to Seeds that,
“mutual assistance pacts not reinforced with a corresponding precise definition of military
commitments, often fail. The absence of such definition in the pacts between the USSR, France
and Czechoslovakia undoubtedly played a negative role in the fate of Czechoslovakia.” 24 The
Soviet Union had illustrated its good faith and peaceful intentions. The cards were now on the
table and Russia called. Britain and France had to stop bluffing.
Britain was in no hurry to respond. Chamberlain was a committed anti-Bolshevik and
Hitler and Mussolini were not concerned about the Soviet proposal. France was a little more
serious, but remained intentionally vague in its intent. On April 25, 1939, the French government
submitted its proposal to the Soviet Embassy in Paris. French the Quai d’Orsay finely tuned the
language to put the burden on the USSR. Perhaps the Soviets would not notice:
If France and Great Britain found themselves in a state of war with Germany as a result
of the action which they had taken with a view to preventing all changes by force of
the existing status quo in Central or Eastern Europe, the USSR would immediately
lend them aid and assistance.
However, “If the USSR found itself in a state of war with Germany as a result of the assistance it
had given France and Great Britain under conditions stipulated in the preceding paragraph,” only
then would “France and Great Britain would immediately lend it aid and assistance.” 25
Soviet diplomats quickly saw the one-sided nature of the French position. On April 26,
1939, the day after receiving the French document, the Soviet Embassy in Paris reported to the
Foreign Office:
Mutuality according to this proposal… turns out that when France and Britain deem it
necessary to fight Germany to protect the status quo in Europe we will automatically be
drawn into the war on their side, but if we were to defend the same status quo on our own
initiative, Britain and France would not be committed to anything. A strange equality. 26
Soviet ambassador Surtis met French Foreign Minister Bonnet on April 29 and explained the
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Russian position. As Surtis reported Bonnet,“even feigned a little embarrassment, that he had not
studied it enough and that the wording was unfortunate.” 27 The Soviets were better analysts than
France thought. The USSR wanted a mutual system of alliances. The quest for parallel
obligations remained the Soviet goal.
On April 29, 1939, France responded with what it thought was a clearer proposal:
If France and Great Britain found themselves in a state of war with Germany as a result
of the action which they had taken with a view to preventing all changes by force of the
existing status quo in Central or Eastern Europe, the USSR would immediately lend them
aid and assistance.
If the USSR found itself in a state of war with Germany as a result of the action which it
had taken with a view to preventing all changes by force of the existing status quo in
Central or Eastern Europe, France and Great Britain would immediately lend it aid and
assistance. 28
Although this reply was quick and to the point, it did not address the complete Soviet demarche
of April 17, specifically a mutual aid pact in case of attack on one of the parties, guarantees to
the Eastern European states between the Baltic and Black seas and the prohibition of a separate
peace.
Britain continued its wait and see attitude. Other diplomats noted Britain’s dangerous
game. Leger told American Ambassador to France, William Bullitt, that while Britain was
demanding that the USSR give unilateral guarantees to Poland and Rumania, England “was not
ready to give any British guarantees whatsoever.” 29 Bullitt continued in a note of May 5, 1939,
describing the English position regarding the USSR as “the dilatory and almost insulting
policy.” 30 Finally, Payart, the French Chargé d’ Affaires in Russia opined on the same day that
“from the Soviet point of view”, British actions, or non-actions, “merely added insult to
injury.” 31 If these astute observers could clearly interpret British intentions, how much more
frustrated and concerned must the Soviets have been in their attempts to craft a viable and
reciprocal alliance? Still, Soviet policy remained anti-German.
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These diplomats were correct. Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Chamberlain supporter who
had replaced Vansittart as Permanent Undersecretary, concluded that there would be “great
difficulty in refusing the Soviet offer. We have taken the attitude that the Soviet preach us
sermons on ‘collective security’ but make no practical proposals. They have now made such, and
they will rail at us for turning them down.” Cadogan identified a further risk, “if we turn down
this proposal, the Soviet might make some ‘non-intervention’ agreement with the German
government.” 32 Despite his concerns, he recommended rejection. 33 Although other voices in the
British government advocated a supportive approach, Halifax told Maiskii on April 29 that the
British government was simply “too busy” to respond to the “very logical and well constructed”
Soviet propositions. 34 British duplicity, fear of Bolshevism and war, or perhaps protection of its
self interest was becoming clear. In any case, diplomatic formalities required respect for the
Soviet efforts.
In the midst of these diplomatic maneuverings, Stalin intervened personally: on May 3,
he summarily dismissed Litvinov and replaced him with Molotov. Stalin, in his usual mysterious
way, explained the need for a change at the Foreign Ministry. The Soviet Dictator claimed that a
“serious conflict” had arisen between Molotov and Litvinov owing “to the disloyal attitude” of
Litvinov toward Molotov. Stalin announced that Litvinov requested “to be released from his
duties as People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs.” Finally “Molotov has been appointed as
People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs to serve concurrently as Chairman of the Council of
People’s Commissars.” 35
Was this appointment of a loyal and dedicated Bolshevik replacing a western leaning Jew
the beginning of a shift in Soviet policy and the precursor of a pro-German orientation? Stalin
never explained the alleged “disloyal attitude” of Litvinov. He continued to refer to the former
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foreign minister as “Tovarich (Comrade)”. Litvinov was not purged, a fate that befell many
members of the foreign office. As usual, Stalin’s motives remain unclear. In any case, Soviet
foreign policy remained consistent: the construction of an anti-German alliance.
Reliance on only the German documents seems to support the idea that after Litvinov’s
fall, the USSR began an all-out diplomatic assault on the Nazi state. Careful analysis of Soviet
material paints a completely different picture. As Geoffrey Roberts explains, German diplomats
understood the precarious state of Nazi-Soviet relations and wanted to project a positive
atmosphere to Berlin. Soviet diplomats were under no such illusion. 36 As discussed in chapter 4,
while diplomatic policy continued to diverge, economic relations increased in the 1930s.
Georgei Astakhov, the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires in Berlin met with Baron von Stumm,
deputy head of the German foreign ministry’s press department on May 9, 1939 and clarified the
Soviet position. “To all [Stumm’s] arguments,” explained Astakhov, “I made corresponding
objections, pointing out that the German side openly and on its own initiative had caused the
deterioration of German-Soviet relations, and that their improvement depended mainly on them.”
He noted that “The Soviet side has never shunned an improvement in relations provided there
was a basis for it.” 37
In order all remove all doubts concerning press reports of a détente between Berlin and
Moscow, Astakhov sent a letter to Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vladimir
Potemkin, on May 12. While the Germans were striving to “create the impression of an
impending or even already achieved improvement in German- Soviet relations… only one thing
can be stated as certain fact-this is a noticeable change in the tone of the German press in relation
to us…” Astakhov declared that this change in the German attitude did not “warrant any serious
consideration.” He went on to suggest that his reply inform the Germans “that for the present we
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have no grounds for trusting the seriousness of this ‘change’, although we are always prepared to
meet halfway when it comes to improving relations.” 38 Molotov was committed to collective
security and continued the initiatives of his predecessor. He waited patiently for a substantive
response to the Soviet proposal of April 17. His patience would be severely tested.
On May 8, 1939, Seeds, the British Ambassador in Russia handed Molotov the English
response. It was less than enthusiastic. The British demanded that the USSR “should make a
public declaration on their own initiative” and because of recent Anglo-French proposals
concerning certain East European countries, “the Soviet government would undertake that in the
event of Great Britain and France being involved in hostilities in fulfillment of these obligations,
the assistance of the Soviet government would be immediately available if desired and would be
afforded in such a manner and on such terms as might be agreed. 39
Britian’s proposal justified Soviet fears of western manipulation of the diplomatic
situation and the attempt to isolate the Soviet Union in a war with Germany without British and
French aid. The Russian Foreign Office again made it clear that it sought reciprocity of
obligations. English policy remained vague.
On May 11, 1939 Izvestia brought the diplomatic dispute to the Russian public in a
detailed front page article:
The USSR has felt and continues to feel, that if France and Britain really want to create a
barrier to aggression in Europe, the first thing that has to be done is for the four powers—
Britain, France, the USSR and Poland or at least the three powers—Britain, France and
the USSR, to form a united front, so that these three countries, bound on a reciprocal
basis by a mutual aid pact, could provide guarantees to other states in Eastern and Central
Europe who are threatened by aggression.
While the Soviet Union sincerely suggested mutual military responsibilities, the article criticized
the narrow and one-sided Anglo-French attitude. Izvestia correctly asserted that Anglo-French
proposals placed the burden of action on the Soviets alone. The article argued that because the
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USSR had no mutual aid pacts with Britain, France, or Poland, “the USSR is committed to
rendering aid to these three states, yet receives no aid from them, meaning that in the event of
direct aggression against the USSR, the latter would have only itself to rely on.” 40 Soviet
diplomats and the Soviet public were serious about mutual aid obligations directed against the
clear German threat. Soviet foreign policy was now publicly directed against Hitler and the
expanding Nazi state. If the Soviets really wanted a Berlin-Moscow axis, why not now? The
west provided the perfect excuse for a Nazi-Soviet understanding: delay in the face of
substantive Soviet initiatives.
On May 14, the Soviets replied to the British proposal of May 8. Again the Russians
demanded reciprocity and comprehensiveness. While the USSR recognized the inconsistency of
the western position, it proposed “at least three indispensable conditions for the creation of an
effective barrier by pacific States against a further extension of aggression in Europe.” The Soviets
remained determined to conclude a substantive pact of reciprocal obligations:

(1) The conclusion between England and France and the USSR of an effective
pact of mutual assistance against aggression; (2) The guaranteeing by these three
Great Powers of States of Central and Eastern Europe threatened by
aggression including also Latvia, Estonia and Finland; (3) The conclusion of a
concrete agreement between England, France and USSR as to forms and extent
of assistance to be rendered materially to each other and to the guaranteed
States, failing which (without such an agreement) there is a risk that, as
experience of Czecho-Slovakia proved, pacts of mutual assistance may be
ineffective. 41
Despite these efforts, Halifax told the British ambassador in Japan on May 16, that, “The Soviet
Government are still holding out for some closer arrangement than we are disposed to accept.” 42
When Maiskii informed Halifax in Geneva on May 21, that the Soviet government only wished
to “prevent aggression and war and that this is possible only if there is a concentration on the
side of peace[mir] of such mighty forces as would eliminate any hope of possible victory for the
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aggressor”, he concluded that, “judging from Halifax’s arguments, it was perfectly clear that the
British government is avoiding a three-power pact purely from a desire not to burn its bridges to
Hitler and Mussolini.” 43 The British did not take much time to analyze the new Soviet reply. As
Maiskii reported, England did not want to burn its bridges with Italy and Germany.
On May 27, 1939, after Germany and Italy concluded a military-political alliance, the
Soviet government received a new Anglo-French proposal. The western powers sought to
muddle the language regarding the requirements of action on the part of the states. The
obligation to intervene only arose if the target nation wished or requested aid. Finally, in the case
of “aggression by a European power against the contracting parties, the parties are to act in
accordance with the principles of Article 16, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Covenant of the League
of Nations” 44 Russia was concerned that some nations in Eastern Europe may fall to Nazi
aggression without seeking help from the USSR. The Soviet Union distrusted the non-action of
the League of Nations and did not want to be bound by League bureaucracy. France, and
especially England, played a dangerous linguistic game, inserting “consultations”, seeking to buy
time in order to move Hitler eastward without entering a binding alliance which might have
halted the dictator altogether.
Molotov and Soviet diplomats quickly identified the shortcomings of the proposal.
Article 16 of the League Covenant called for a recommendation of the League Council before
action could commence. Britain and France wanted more delay and uncertainty. The Soviets
wanted to counter aggression with unified and definite commitments, not another roundtable.
Words and resolutions were useless against the Nazi machine. As Molotov commented, “The
USSR desires agreement on effective defense against the aggressor. It is not interested in, nor
satisfied with, mere discussion.” 45 In addition, the provisions of assistance did not arise unless
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one state acted with the “wishes” of the state under attack or that state “requested” assistance.
Other diplomats understood the loophole in the proposal as well. On May 30, 1939, Charles
Antoine Rochat, the Deputy Head of the Political and Trade Department of the French Foreign
Ministry mentioned to Edwin C.Wilson, the Counsellor of the American Embassy in Paris, that
“for instance, if Latvia or Estonia should be attacked by Germany and should not defend
themselves or should refrain from appealing to Russia for assistance…then the pledge of mutual
assistance would not come into play.” 46
What about the Germans? Russia and Germany enjoyed substantive economic interaction
despite the diplomatic and political differences. Who wooed whom in terms of an improvement
in the political climate remains unclear depending on the source, but Soviet documents illustrate
a firm and resolute Soviet Union. On May 20, von der Schulenburg, the German Ambassador,
approached Molotov concerning a new credit treaty. The commissar responded that the USSR
had the impression “that the German government was playing some sort of game instead of
conducting business-like economic negotiations…” If Germany wanted to play these games, it
should seek other partners. He made it clear that the Soviet Union “was not going to participate
in such a game.” 47 Molotov set the parameters for improved relations, “We had come to the
conclusion that for the success of the economic negotiations it was necessary to create a
corresponding political basis. Without such a basis, as shown by the experience of negotiations
with Germany, it is not possible to settle economic questions.” 48 Germany was not a priority for
Russia, but Russia was becoming a priority for Germany.
Diplomatic discussions continued in Germany concerning closer relations, the thrust of
the pressure coming from the German side. Astakhov reported to the foreign commissariat that
Ernst Weizsacker, State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry, wanted to explore “the
168

possibility of negotiations with us about improving relations and to restrain our rapprochement
with England.” 49 He further indicated that the Germans refrained, however from “committing
themselves to any statement, avoiding even the term ‘improvement of relations.’” 50 The Nazis
were testing Soviet resolve. Astakhov did not want to terminate all contacts. On June 14, he
reported to Molotov that, “if we want to talk to the Germans about anything without particularly
committing ourselves, in these cases it would be more expedient to do it here [in Germany].” 51
Molotov was in no hurry and thus the merry-go-round with Britain and France continued.
Molotov would not give up. He addressed the Supreme Soviet (another domestic
audience) on May 31, 1939. He roundly criticized the foreign policies of England, France, Italy,
and Germany while reiterating the Soviet desire for peace. According to Molotov, the so-called
democratic countries were victims of their own systems. The western powers ignored the
aggressive nations because “they are still chiefly concerned with 'pacifying' public opinion,
pretending that nothing of importance has happened recently.” Molotov argued that the democratic
nations created a false sense of security in an attempt to satisfy public demands. “For us,” stated
Molotov “it is clear that the attempt to hide from public opinion the real changes that have taken
place in international affairs must be countered by facts.” He noticed an ominous tone to western
practices. In the west, “it becomes obvious that soothing speeches and articles are necessary only to
those who do not wish to hinder the further progress of aggression, in the hope of diverting it, so to
speak, in a more or less 'acceptable' direction.” Here Molotov repeated to the Supreme Soviet a long
standing Soviet fear: that western policy sought to force Hitler eastward and into war with the
USSR. For Molotov, western policy was not benign and he urged his colleagues to remain
“vigilant.” The People’s Commissar repeated that the USSR stood for peace and resistance to
aggression. He reviewed the on- going negotiations with Britain and France and he concluded that
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Anglo-French proposals placed “the USSR in an unequal position.” For all of the political conflicts,

Germany and Italy could remain viable economic partners:
…While conducting negotiations with England and France, we do not by any means think it
necessary to renounce business dealings with countries like Germany and Italy. As long ago as
the beginning of last year negotiations were begun on the German initiative for a trade agreement
and new credits. Germany at that time proposed granting a new credit of 200 million marks. 52
Molotov certainly did not want to close the door to cooperation with Germany and Italy. These states
may in fact be a last resort for Soviet policy. Clearly, the USSR needed the economic interaction.

Following the lead of the People’s Commissar and tirelessly seeking compromise, the
USSR submitted yet another draft on June 2, 1939 in response to the Anglo-French proposal.
The Soviets suggested that the three states protect each other as well as “Belgium, Greece,
Turkey, Rumania, Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Finland whom England, France and USSR have
agreed to defend against aggression.” In addition, “the three States will come to an agreement within
the shortest possible time as to methods, forms and extent of assistance which is to be rendered by
them” as well as to consult and to act independently of the procedures of the League of Nations.
Finally, the signatories are to conclude an armistice or peace only by joint agreement. 53

As logical and practical as the Soviet draft was, still the western powers sought a
modification. This time the French Prime minister, Edouard Daladier, sought to expand Soviet
commitments. While admitting the “logic” of the Soviet initiative, Daladier informed Surtis on
June 3, that:
He would be inclined to work out approximately the following somewhat broader
formula on this question: all sides pledge to come immediately to each other’s aid in the
event of a direct attack in Europe on any of the parties to the agreement, as well as in the
event of the parties’ being drawn into war as a result of aid rendered to any European
state subjected to direct or indirect aggression. 54
Daladier did not want to list the nation states subject to protection, but wanted Soviet aid and
support for the existing Anglo-French commitments in Europe. He also extended the
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requirements for action to include both direct and indirect aggression, which is the threat of
aggression or capitulation. He realized that Germany may choose indirect aggression against
nations, especially those with already existing pro-fascist regimes.
After rejecting earlier Soviet overtures for a conference, Britain now supported the
convocation of a roundtable meeting in Moscow. Halifax made this request to Maisky on June 8.
Halifax added that he would like to attend personally, but the “complexity of the international
situation chained him to London.” Halifax informed the Soviet ambassador that Seeds would
lead the British delegation aided by Sir. William Strang. 55 While Hitler would send Ribbentrop
personally, Halifax was simply too busy.
Halifax also questioned the required guarantees to the Baltic States referred to in the
Soviet draft of June 2. He said that the British government could not accept the Soviet
requirement that the states receiving guarantees be named. He proposed a compromise to the
“justified” Soviet draft, namely that, “the document make no mention of the states to be
guaranteed, but that it simply state that the pact commitments take effect in the event of a direct
or indirect threat to the security of one of the parties to the agreement.” 56 Halifax conveniently
ignored the Soviet request that the pact and military agreement be signed simultaneously.
On June 10, the People’s Commissariat instructed Maiskii to respond to the British
concerns. The Foreign Office told the Ambassador to make it clear that if the USSR could not
guarantee “the security of the USSR’s north-western borders by providing for decisive
counteraction by the three consenting parties against direct or indirect attack on Estonia, Latvia
or Finland, it will be impossible to satisfy public opinion in the Soviet Union.” Maiskii was to
“explain to Halifax that this is not a question of technical wording, but a question of agreeing on
the essence of the question, after which it will it will not be difficult to find a suitable
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wording.” 57 Maiskii further informed Halifax that “his coming would be welcomed in Moscow.”
Halifax again retorted that the critical international situation made it impossible for him to leave
London. England would not commit to concrete action.
Pravda entered the fray with an extensive article on June 13, entitled “The Question of
Defending the Three Baltic States Against Aggression.” The article asserted that the foreign
press had finally recognized that, “the question of maintaining the neutrality of the three Baltic
states is, from the point of view of the Soviet Union’s security, of vital interest and there can be
no question that the peoples of the Baltic states are vitally interested in guarantees of their
integrity from the great powers.” The party organ also underscored the powerful influence of
other forces opposed to a united front of non-belligerent states:
It is quite possible that we are dealing here with certain influences from outside, if not
with direct inspiration from those who wish to impede the formation of a broad defense
front against aggression. At present, it is difficult to say just who the actual inspirers are:
the aggressive states, interested in sabotaging the anti-aggression front, or certain
reactionaries within the democratic states who want to limit aggression in certain areas,
and not hamper its expansion in other areas. 58
Sadly, subsequent research has proven Pravda’s position correct. Britain, in particular had no
intention of concluding a pact with the Soviet Union. For example, the Latvian envoy in Moscow
informed his government on June 16 that the British military attaché in Moscow had told him
that he personally was “against concluding a pact among Britain, France and the Soviet Union”
and he further did “not believe that the pact will be concluded.” 59 The USSR faced a formidable
task. Still, it continued in pursuit of the elusive agreement.
On June 15, Seeds handed Maiskii yet another British draft supposedly in response to the
Soviet initiative of June 2. The requirement of an invitation on the part of the threatened state
became just one option for intervention. Now, if the aggression constitutes “a menace,” joint
action arises. 60 “Menace” was not defined. Despite the effort, the British draft continued to
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ignore, avoid, or simply disregard the Soviet desire for specificity of obligations. The British
Foreign Office simply sang a worn out tune. England’s intentions were becoming increasing
clear: let the USSR protect the west while the parties discuss the possibility of aiding the USSR.
Perhaps during the consultations, Hitler will finish the job the allies started after the Bolshevik
revolution; the destruction of the Soviet Union.
Molotov and the Foreign Commissariat were relentless. On June 16(notice the rapid
response), the Soviets replied to the latest draft in specific terms. Molotov considered the latest
proposal a “humiliation” for the Soviet Union because it placed the bulk of military obligations
on the USSR without corresponding responsibilities on England and France. 61 On the same day,
the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs cabled the Soviet Ambassadors in England and France
concerning the present state of the negotiations:
In particular, we are being asked to render immediate assistance to the said five
countries, but there is a refusal to give immediate assistance to the three Baltic states
ostensibly in view of their refusal to accept such aid. This means that the French and
the British put the USSR in a humiliatingly unequal position, something we cannot
accept in any case.
We feel that the British and the French want to conclude a pact with us which would
be advantageous to them and disadvantageous to us, that is, they do not want a serious
treaty in line with the principle of reciprocity and equality of obligations.62
Molotov and the foreign policy leadership realized that England and France, particularly England,
were not “serious” about a binding and substantive alliance with the Soviet Union. At this point in the
critical summer of 1939, the USSR could have looked to the other major power for assistance: Nazi
Germany. The possibilities existed to broach the subject of improved political relations. The Germans
certainly wanted a more stable relationship. The Soviets held on for dear life and continued the
exchange of drafts with England and France.
On June 21, the British and French ambassadors handed Molotov a new draft of Article 1
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regarding the Soviet draft of June 2:
The United Kingdom, France and the USSR undertake to give to each other immediately
all the support and assistance in their power should one of these countries become
involved in hostilities with a European Power as a result either of
1) Aggression by that power against any one of these three countries, or aggression by it,
which being directed against another European state, thereby constitutes a menace to the
security of these three counties, or
2) aggression by that Power against another European State which the contracting party
had, with the approval of that State, undertaken to assist against such aggression.
Such support and assistance will be given in conformity with the principles of the League
of Nations but without its being necessary to await action by the League. 63
British and French diplomats were not done. The British and French ambassadors made the
following statement to Molotov:
Taking into consideration the view of the Soviet Government and the facts of a
geographical nature, the Baltic States, Poland and Rumania are, if the two Governments
are right, those neighboring European states the inviolability of which is one of the
elements of security of the USSR. As regards France and Great Britain, Belgium, Holland
and Switzerland are with respect to those neighboring European States which have to the
security of France and Great Britain the same importance as the five above-mentioned
States for Russia. 64
As in the June 15 British draft , what constituted a “menace” requiring intervention
remained unclear, while Britain and France shifted Soviet obligations westward. Menace
remained vague because it was undefined. What constituted a menace? Under what
circumstances? Could the menace be diplomatic, psychological or intellectual? Did the target
nation have to realize that it was subject to this menace? Like the word aggression, the Soviet
Union wanted to know clearly what triggered the obligations under the proposed treaty. Soviet
diplomats feared an uneven arrangement whereby the USSR would carry the brunt or all of the
duties of conflict, while the west bore none. As they requested on numerous occasions, the
Soviets wanted clarity of language and mutuality of obligations.
Again, the western proposals made no provisions for equal responsibilities. The Foreign
Commissariat replied on June 22:
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the Soviet government has attentively examined the proposals of England and France
handed to M. Molotov on June 21. In view of the fact that these proposals constitute a
repetition of previous proposals made by England and France, which, as already stated,
have met with serious objections on the part of the Soviet Government, the latter have
come to the conclusion that these proposals must be rejected as unacceptable. 65
Molotov underscored his position in a cable to Maiskii and Surtis on June 25. Attempts on the
part of britain and France to “create the impression that the latest Anglo-French proposals meet
the USSR’s demand on the Baltic states are clearly not serious.” 66 What could the Soviets do to
illustrate their integrity and impress on Britain and France the prospect of a catastrophe? While
the negotiations continued, frustrations were building in the Soviet foreign office.
Andrei Zhdanov, Bolshevik intellectual, close associate of Joseph Stalin, and Party boss
of Leningrad after Sergi Kirov’s murder, contributed a long, detailed and critical article to
Pravda on June 29. The title illustrated his contention: “The British and the French Governments
Do Not Want an Equal Treaty with the USSR.” He began with an illustration of the danger of
the western position. According to Zhdanov, “despite the utmost clarity in the position of the
Soviet Government, despite all efforts of the Soviet Government aimed at the earliest conclusion of a
pact of mutual assistance,” no substantial progress in the talks was discernable. He asserted that this fact
“encourages the hopes of the aggressors and of all enemies to peace in the possibility of the breakdown
of the agreement among the democratic States against aggression, and it impels aggressors to the
further unleashing of aggression.” Zhdanov probed Anglo-French intentions: “What is the reason for
the delay in the negotiations whose favorable termination is impatiently and hopefully awaited by all
pacific nations and all friends of peace?” He concluded, based on Anglo-French behavior, that “the
English and French Governments have no wish for a treaty on terms of equality with the USSR, that
is, for the only kind of treaty to which a self-respecting State can agree.” Zhdanov provided concrete
examples of western delay and contradictions:
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What are these facts?
Anglo-Soviet negotiations in the direct sense of this word, that is, since we were
presented on 15 April with the first British proposals, have been going on for seventy-five
days. Of these, the Soviet Government took sixteen days in preparing answers to the
various English projects and proposals, while the remaining fifty-nine have been consumed
by delays and procrastination on the part of the English and French. The question is: Who,
in such a case, if not the English and French, bears responsibility for such slow progress in
the negotiations?
He then cited another illustration of the contradictory western policy. When England wanted to
conclude mutual assistance pacts with Turkey and Poland, it acted in haste. Therefore, “the
intolerable delays and endless procrastination in negotiations with the USSR”
permit doubts of the sincerity of the real intentions of England and France, and compel us to
put the question as to what exactly forms the basis of such policy: Is it a serious endeavor to
ensure a peace front or a desire to utilize the negotiations as well as the delay in the
negotiations for some different purposes having nothing in common with the creation of a
front of pacific Powers?
Zhadanov gave further evidence of western bad faith when he asserted that, “The English and French
Governments pile up artificial difficulties, make it appear that serious differences exist between
England and France…and the USSR, which given goodwill and sincere intention by England and
France, could be solved without delay or hinderance.” Based on the facts, Zhadanov concluded that:

It seems to me that the English and French desire not a real treaty acceptable to the
USSR, but only talks about a treaty in order to speculate before public opinion in
their countries on the allegedly unyielding attitude of the USSR, and thus make easier
for themselves the road to a deal with the aggressors.
The next few days must show whether this is so or not. 67
Zhadanov correctly assessed the motives of the western powers and now publicly challenged
them to illustrate their good faith. He left the ball in their court and awaited a response. Stalin
wanted to move the talks along toward an agreement.
On July 1, England and France delivered still another draft of Article 1 of the proposed
pact and a supplementary draft agreement, this time requiring secrecy. England and France
always wanted more from each Soviet submission, as Zhdanov described. The draft of Article 1
stated:
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The United Kingdom, France and the USSR undertake to give to each other immediately
all effective assistance should one of these countries become involved in hostilities with a
European Power as a result of aggression by that Power against any one of these three
countries or aggression by that Power against another European State whose
independence or neutrality the contracting country concerned felt obligated to defend
against such aggression.
Such assistance will be given in conformity with the principles of the League of Nations
but without its being necessary to follow the procedure of, or to await action by the
League.
England and France added a supplementary draft:
It is understood between the three contracting Governments that Article 1 of the treaty
signed today will apply to the following European States:
Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Poland, Rumania, Turkey, Greece, Belgium, Luxemburg,
Netherlands and Switzerland
The foregoing list of countries is subject to revision by agreement between the three
contracting Governments.
The present understanding between the three Governments will not be made public. 68
On the same evening, July 1, Naggiar handed Potemkin, the Deputy People’s commissar the
Anglo-French draft of Article 3 concerning consultations. The proposal stated:
Without prejudice to the immediate rendering of assistance upon commencement of
hostilities in accordance with Article 1, in the event of circumstances arising which
threaten to call into operation the undertakings of mutual assistance contained in Article
1, the three contracting Governments will, at the request of any one of them, immediately
consult together to examine the situation and to decide by common agreement the
moment at which the mechanism of mutual assistance shall be put into immediate
operation and the manner of its application, independently of any procedure of the
League of Nations. 69
Naggiar further admitted that the revisions covered only indirect, not direct aggression. He gave
the example of Switzerland. It was possible, the Ambassador continued, that power might be
seized “by fascist parties, which would enter into close contact with Nazi Germany and, under
her direction, begin preparations for carrying out Germany’s offensive plans against France.
There would be no direct aggression, yet France could call on the USSR and Great Britain to join
her in consultation with the aim of averting a German attack.” 70 The Soviets wanted protection
(guarantees) against any form of aggression, direct or indirect. Again, Britain and France were
playing dangerous word games. The Soviets argued that the Anglo-French proposals, as Naggiar
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illustrated, were one-sided and did not address Soviet concerns. This latest Anglo-French
proposal did spell out the eastern European states which were possible targets of aggression;
however, the USSR was in no position to accept what it considered a fractured agreement
concerning the specifics of the trigger mechanism of intervention.
On July 3, the Soviet government handed the British and French representatives its
counter-proposals, which sought to clarify the dichotomy between direct and indirect aggression
and removed the language concerning “invitation” or “wishes” of the threatened nation. Further,
the Soviets defined “indirect aggression” and called for the exchange of information and mutual
diplomatic support:
The United Kingdom, France and the USSR undertake to give to each other immediately
all effective assistance should one of these countries become involved in hostilities with a
European Power as a result either of aggression by that Power against any one of these
three countries, or of aggression, direct or indirect, by that Power against another
European State whose independence or neutrality the contracting countries concerned felt
obligated to defend against such aggression.
The assistance provided for in the present article will be given in conformity with the
principles of the League of Nations, but without its being necessary to follow the
procedure of, or to await action by, the League. 71
Soviet diplomats re-worded the Anglo-French supplementary agreement as well:
The three contracting Governments have agreed that Article 1 of the Agreement signed
by them today will apply-either in the event of direct aggression or in the event of
indirect aggression, understood to mean an internal coup or a change in policy in favor of
the aggressor-to the following States:
Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Poland, Rumania, Turkey, Greece, Belgium.
The foregoing list of countries is subject to revision by agreement between the three
contracting Governments. 72
Soviet revisions to Article 3 stated:
Without prejudice to the immediate rendering of assistance in accordance with Article 1,
and with a view to securing its more effective organization, the three contracting
Governments will exchange information periodically about the international situation
and will lay down the lines of mutual diplomatic support in the interests of peace, and in
the event of circumstances arising which threaten to call into operation the undertakings
of mutual assistance contained in Article 1, they will, at the request of any one of them,
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immediately consult together to examine the situation and to decide by common
agreement the moment at which the mechanism of mutual assistance shall be put into
immediate operation and the manner of its application, independently of any procedure of
the League of Nations. 73
On July 3, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs advised Maiskii and Surtis that:
We have rejected the Anglo-French proposal to the guarantees to three additional
countries—Switzerland, Netherlands and Luxemburg—since only eight and not eleven
countries were discussed during the negotiations and endorsed by the Supreme Soviet.
We could agree to include two more countries (Switzerland and Netherlands) but not
three and these two only on condition that Poland and Turkey conclude mutual-assistance
treaties with the USSR similar to those they have with Britain and France. 74
Interestingly, both Halifax and Georges Mandel, the French Minister of Colonies, agreed that the
USSR should be protected in cases of both indirect and direct aggression citing the Czech
example of March 15. 75 The give and take slogged on. Britain and France could not understand
that a collective front with the USSR against Hitler was in their interests.
On July 8, Seeds and Naggiar submitted their draft of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet treaty.
While the draft included new articles 2-7, the supplementary protocol presented more problems.
Anglo-French diplomats also altered the first paragraph of the supplementary protocol:
It is understood between the three contracting Governments that Article 1 of the
agreement between them signed today will apply to the following European States, and
that the word ‘aggression’ is to be understood as covering action accepted by the State in
question under threat of force by another Power and involving the abandonment by it of
its independence or neutrality. 76
While this July 8 proposal contained lofty goals and broad language, it failed to address
important Soviet concerns. For example, Britain and France agreed only to conclude an armistice
or peace by common agreement among the three contracting parties, but made no provision for
simultaneously concluding a military and political agreement as the Soviets had demanded from
the outset of negotiations in April. The supplementary protocol provided protection in cases of
direct or indirect aggression, but included the term “threat of force”. This language ignored the
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problem of the Czech crisis of March, 1939, when Czech President Emil Hacha “voluntarily”
allowed the German invasion. If the Baltic States extended Germany the same privileges, the
consequences for the Soviet Union were obvious.
On July 9, the Soviets delivered a new draft to Seeds and Masikii with a more detailed
definition of “indirect aggression” while removing the requirement of “threat of force”:

The three contracting Governments have agreed that
1) Article 1 of the treaty signed today will apply to the following European States:
Turkey, Greece, Rumania, Poland, Belgium, Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Switzerland and
Holland:
2) with respect to the last two of the above named countries (Switzerland, Holland), the
agreement shall take effect only if and when Poland and Turkey conclude a mutual
assistance pact with the USSR:
3) the term ‘indirect aggression’ applies to any act which any of the above listed States
agrees to under threat of force by another Power, or without such threat, which act
involves the use of the given State’s territory and forces for aggression against it or
against one of the contracting parties, consequently involving the abandonment by that
State of its independence or neutrality.
The foregoing list is subject to revision by agreement between the contracting
Governments.
The present supplementary agreement will not be made public. 77
This draft clarified Soviet requests for definite language regarding reciprocal obligations. The
Czech crisis made clear the danger of “indirect aggression” and the consequent abandonment by
a State of its independence or neutrality.
It is curious to note the absence of Lithuania in any of the proposed guarantees in the
Soviet drafts. Hitler had occupied Memel in March 1939 and perhaps Stalin already had turned
his interests to the eventual partition of this bothersome Baltic state. In the original secret
protocol of August 23, 1939, Latvia and Estonia were in the Soviet sphere of interest and
subsequently occupied in June, 1940. Germany received Lithuania, including the Vilnius region.
Soviet troops entered Vilnius on September 19, 1940. According to the German-Soviet Boundary

180

and Friendship Treaty of September 28, 1940 and its secret protocol, the USSR acquired
Lithuania with the exception of a strip of territory in the southwest. 78
Britain remained obstinate. On July 12, Halifax cabled Seeds and informed him that the
British could not accept the Soviet definition of indirect aggression. Britain was attempting to
avoid any possibility of defending the USSR against subversive Nazi actions directed against
East European States as had occurred in Czechoslovakia. Britain still wanted Soviet support in
case of a direct German attack against it, which English political leaders considered remote.
Halifax warned Seeds that if the Soviet Union persisted in its demands concerning indirect
aggression, “His Majesty’s Government may have to reconsider their whole position.” Seeds
understood from this language that the negotiations were likely to be broken off. 79
British policy was fragmenting. On July 14, Maiskii met with David Lloyd George, the
fiery Welshman and former Prime Minister, who made sport out of criticizing the present
English government. Maiskii reported to Moscow that Lloyd George “expressed grave concern
over the course and future prospects of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations. He said that the
Chamberlain clique, still unable to resign themselves to the idea of a pact with the USSR against
Germany, was now attempting a maneuver roughly along these lines.” Lloyd George explained
that,
On the one hand the British government was pressuring Poland through political, military
and economic channels, recommending moderation over Danzig. On the other hand, by
mobilizing the navy, putting on a show of air-power in France(and probably in Poland),
emphasizing the strength of the Anglo-French alliance, publicizing the ‘firm’ speeches
made by British ministers, etc., the British government hoped to ‘frighten’ Germany and
thus to restrain her from expanding the conflict over Danzig into all-out war. 80
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On July 17, Seeds, Naggiar and Strang handed Molotov new drafts of Article 1 and the
supplementary protocol. The definition of aggression in the July 8 draft, requiring “threat of
force”, unacceptable to the USSR, was now placed verbatim in Article 1:
…It is agreed between the three contracting Governments that the words ‘aggression’ in
paragraph 2 above is to be understood as covering action accepted by the State in
question under threat of force by another Power and involving the abandonment by it of
its independence or neutrality. 81
Britain and France continued to ignore Soviet demands for clarification of obligations. The
western powers did not want to get involved over in new Czech crisis involving the Soviet
definition of “indirect aggression” and “threat of force” although Nazi agitation in Eastern
Europe was clear. Britain and France wanted Soviet protection but tried to avoid involvement on
behalf of the USSR.
Molotov contacted his ambassadors in London and Paris and provided his view of the
latest “new” revisions:
There is still disagreement on how the definition of ‘indirect aggression’ should be
worded; our partners resort to all kinds of skullduggery on this question. Also, we have
insisted all along that the military part is an inseparable component of a military-political
agreement, and categorically reject the Anglo-French proposal that we should first agree
on the ‘political’ part of the treaty and only then turn to the question of a military
agreement.
Molotov called the latest proposal “unscrupulous” and argued that it “splits up what should be a
single treaty into two separate treaties and contradicts our fundamental proposal to conclude the
whole treaty all at once…” He reminded his ambassadors that “if an absolutely concrete military
agreement is not included as an integral part of the overall agreement,” then the treaty “will
amount to nothing but an empty declaration, and this is something we cannot accept.” 82
Surtis responded on July 19. The ambassador asserted that “while the negotiators are
double-dealing with you, they are at the same time deceiving the public in their own countries,
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where the vast majority (at least here in France) are waiting impatiently for an early conclusion
of an effective agreement with us.” According to Surtis, “The deception is primarily one of
distorting our position—which they describe as one of constantly coming up with new
demands—and of deliberately misinforming the public about the substance of our demands and
the real points over which there is disagreement.” He reported that the Soviet proposal regarding
a military agreement was presented to the public and the press “as a demand for prior conclusion
of a military pact, ‘entailing the disclosure of military secrets’ and without sufficient guarantee
or certainty that a political agreement will, in fact, be reached.” He further informed Molotov
that “as much effort has been made to distort our formulation of indirect aggression.” He then
explained the reasons for the Anglo-French delay:
Their three months’ temporizing has made it perfectly clear that our partners do not want
to reach a real agreement with us, but, being wary of their own public opinion, will
conceal this fact and continue to hide behind the ‘secrecy of negotiations.’ 83
Surtis and Molotov correctly gauged western motives.
Meanwhile, Britain continued its dangerous game of double dealing. On July 18 and 21,
Chamberlain’s confidential agent, Horatio Wilson, chief economic advisor to the British
government, met with Helmuth Wohltat, Nazi emissary and special assignments officer in
Göring’s department to discuss the conclusion of a pact between the two nations. Wilson
explained to Wohltat that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact “would allow problems like
Danzig and Poland to recede into the background and lose their significance and that a nonaggression pact would enable Britain to disengage herself from her obligations to Poland.” 84 On
July 20, Wilson set up a meeting between Wohltat and Sir. Robert Hudson, the British minister
of Overseas Trade. Dirksen, now German ambassador in London, summarized the content of the
meeting:
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Hudson outlined some far- reaching plans for Anglo-German cooperation in opening up
new, and exploiting existing, world markets. He expressed the opinion, incidentally, that
there were still three large areas in which Germany and Britain could find abundant
opportunity for profitably applying their efforts: namely, the British Empire, China and
Russia. 85
It certainly seemed that Britain, at least, wanted to have the diplomatic advantage in all
directions.
On July 24, Maiskii replied to the British press reports of the Hudson-Wohltat
conversations. England was not keeping its intentions secret. He cabled Molotov that:
The Prime Minister is now making a desperate effort to back out of the commitments
made in the spring regarding guarantees to Poland and at the same time to revise his
former policy of appeasement. To this end, the British government continues to put
strong pressure on the Polish government advising ‘moderation’ over Danzig. 86
Maiskii argued that Britain’s policy was two-faced: mobilization of the British navy and RAF
flights to France and the Hudson-Wohltat talks in London concerning the possibility “of granting
Germany huge international loans of up to one million pounds, if Hitler really abandoned his
‘aggressive intentions’ (read: leave the West alone and face Eastwards).” Maiskii had no doubt
that Hudson was “expressing the feelings of the Prime Minister.” 87 The Soviet Union now saw
what it was up against in the negotiations with Britain and France. If Soviet policy was really
pro-German from the start as Tucker, Weinberg and Haslam, among others assert, why not use
the intransience and hypocrisy of the west as an excuse for concluding a pact with Germany at
this point? By continuing the talks with England and France, Molotov would not abandon
collective security. He understood that the German option was a minefield as well.
England, not the USSR pursued Germany. On July 29, discussions took place between
British Labor Party official Roden Buckston and Counsellor of the German Embassy in London
Theodor Kordt. Buckston introduced a proposal designed for Anglo-German “agreement on
establishing spheres of influence”:
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1.
2.

3.

Germany agrees not to interfere in the affairs of the British Empire.
Great Britain agrees to fully respect the German spheres of influence in Eastern and
Southwestern Europe. As a consequence, Great Britain would revoke the guarantees
extended by her to certain States in the German sphere of influence. Further, Great
Britain agrees to take action to induce France to dissolve her alliance with the Soviet
Union and sever all her ties in Southeastern Europe.
Great Britain agrees to discontinue the present negotiations with the Soviet Union. 88

It seemed that Germany and Britain were the imperialist threats, not Russia. Notice the classic
colonial language “spheres of influence.” England had to protect the empire at all costs. Britain
still had its public image as a defender of peace to uphold even as it deceived the Soviet Union
by continuing the discussions for a mutual assistance pact. Strang revealed the British position in
a report to the Foreign Office on July 20:
We may find ourselves for months in negotiation with Moscow without any concrete
agreement being reached. ..Whether the continuance of this indeterminate situation would
be better for us than a final breakdown of negotiations remains a matter of high policy,
but I think myself that it would. A break would create bad feeling. It would encourage the
Germans to act. It might drive the Soviet Union into isolation or into composition with
Germany. On the other hand, the fact that military conversations were in progress,
although producing no immediate concrete results, would still probably worry Hitler.
Russia would also be less likely to remain neutral. 89
Because a break in the talks would “create bad feeling,” the negotiations continued and England
maintained the ruse of good faith.
NAZI SHIFTS
German representatives played a dual game as well. While discussing common interests
with England, the Nazi state moved closer to a possible understanding with the USSR. Who
initiated what depends on the source of the documentation, but high level contacts persisted in
late July. Hitler was anxious to unleash the Wehrmacht against Poland, and he needed the
assurance of Soviet compliance, or, at least neutrality. He was convinced, that based on Munich,
England and France would not fight.
Trade representative Schnurre reported to the Foreign Office on conversations with
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Soviet representatives in a memorandum dated July 27. He was quite detailed. He reported that
the “Russians started the talk about the political and economic problems which interest us in a
very lively and interested manner…” Schnurre declared that improved relations were desirable
and could begin with the re-establishment of collaboration in economic affairs through the credit
and commercial treaty. Economic interaction could then form the basis of improvement in
political relations. Schnurre reminded his guests that despite “all the differences in
Weltanschauung, there was one thing in common in the ideology of Germany, Italy, and the
Soviet Union: opposition to the capitalist democracies.” Schnurre asserted that “on our part there
could be no question of menacing the Soviet Union; our aims were in an entirely different
direction.” According to Schnurre, Nazi actions were directed solely against the KPD. After the
meeting, Schnurre reported that he had the impression that “there is the excessive distrust[in
Moscow], not only toward us but toward Britain as well.” However he concluded that “from our
point of view it may be considered a noteworthy success that Moscow, after months of
negotiation with Britain, still remains uncertain as to what she ought to do eventually.” 90
Schnurre felt that relations with Russia could improve, especially since the Russians broached
the subject of political arrangements and had not concluded pacts with Britain and France.
Astakhov painted a somewhat different picture in his telegram to Molotov of July 27. He
reported that Germany was “prepared to discuss and come to an understanding with us on all the
questions that both sides are interested in, and to give all the security guarantees which we would
require from them.” When Astakhov inquired as to the source of his authority, “Schnurre said
that he spoke on the direct instructions of Ribbentrop ... Germany was prepared to give us a
choice of everything from friendship to enmity. Naturally, we didn't give Schnurre any hopes,
limiting ourselves to general noises and promising to bring the talks to your attention.” 91
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Astakhov, seeking direction in his relations with Germany, sent a letter to Potemkin,
Deputy People’s Commissar for foreign Affairs, on July 27. Astakhov had “no doubt that if we
wanted to we could involve the Germans in far-reaching negotiations and get from them
assurances about the questions that interest us. Of course, what the value of these assurances
would be is another question.” He then recommended that the USSR “ought to give them some
encouragement, in order to retain in our hands a trump card which we could use in the event of
necessity.” 92 Molotov cabled on July 28 that, “In restricting yourself to hearing out Schnurre’s
statements and promising to pass them on to Moscow you did the right thing.” 93 Molotov was in
no hurry to accommodate the Nazis. On July 29, Molotov telegraphed a more detailed statement
of Soviet intentions to Astakhov wherein the Foreign Commissar urged caution. “Political
relations between the USSR and Germany may improve of course…” began Molotov, “But only
the Germans can say concretely how political relations should improve.”Molotov continued that
German intentions must take on “concrete terms.” He concluded in reminding Astakhov that the
USSR would “welcome any improvement in political relations between the two countries.” 94
BRITAIN AND FRANCE ACT
On July 25, Britain accepted the Soviet proposal on a three-power military agreement and
Halifax informed Maiskii that an British delegation would leave for Moscow in about 7 to 10
days. Bonnet informed Surtis in Paris on July 26 that the French representatives would leave
for Moscow “in the next few days.” The delegations did not arrive until August 11 because
they took a circuitous route by train and boat. 95 Direct air travel and speed were not important
to England and France. Clearly, England and France did not support word with actions because
they had no intention of concluding an agreement. They had to seem interested in order to push
Hitler eastward and away from them.
187

Still pursuing the policy of delay, English and French diplomats presented the Foreign
commissariat with a new definition of “indirect aggression” on August 2:
It is agreed between the three contracting Governments that the words ‘indirect
aggression’ in paragraph 2 above are to be understood as not excluding(or as including)
action accepted by the State in question under threat of force by another power and
involving the abandonment by it of its independence or neutrality.
In the event of circumstances arising which are not covered in the above definition, but
which, in the judgment of one of the contracting Governments, threaten the independence
or neutrality of a State in question, the contracting governments will, on the request of
any one of them, immediately consult together for the purposes of taking any action on
which a decision is taken by common consent. 96
This “new” definition differed little, if any, from previous proposals and the intent of purposeful
vagueness in language and policy seems clear. “Consultations” became the fallback position in
order to delay action and responsibility.
On the same day, Izvestia published a report entitled “On One of the Reasons for the
Delay in the negotiations with Britain.” British hypocrisy was at the heart of the article:
In a speech before the House of Commons on July 26 of this year, Parliamentary Vice
Secretary of foreign Affairs Mr. Butler said, according to the press, that the British
government was doing everything possible to speed the resolution of disagreements
between the USSR and Britain, the chief disagreement having to do with the question of
whether or not we should encroach upon the independence of the Baltic States. I contend,
said Mr. Butler, that we should not, and in this disagreement lie the main reasons for the
delay in the negotiations.
Izvestia then set the record straight:
TASS has been authorized to announce that if Mr. Butler did indeed say the above, he has
allowed himself a distortion of the Soviet Government’s position. In actual fact, the
disagreements do not consist in whether or not to encroach upon the independence of the
Baltic countries, for both sides want this independence guaranteed; they have rather to do
with not leaving for the aggressor encroaching upon the independence of the Baltic States
any kind of loophole in the definition of ‘indirect aggression.’ One of the reasons for the
delay in the negotiations is that the British formula leaves such a loophole for the
aggressor. 97
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French ambassador Naggiar could only comment to Potemkin on August 5 that, “a precise
definition of [indirect aggression] is exceedingly difficult.” 98 The definition was indeed difficult
because England and France made it difficult.
On August 3 the Foreign Commissariat informed the British and French embassies that
the Soviet Government has formed a delegation headed by People’s Commissar for Defense
Kliment Voroshilov to conduct military negotiations. Although French General Valin
commented that, “such an authoritative delegation, headed by Voroshilov himself made a big
impression in France” 99 , Maiskii in London and Surtis in Paris were not so impressed with the
Anglo-French group. Maiskii commented to Molotov on August 1 that:
one of the positions was honorary and not active, I think that judging from the posts they
hold officially, the delegates will not be able to make any decisions on the spot and will
have to refer everything to London. It is also suspicious that, again because of the kinds
of posts they hold, the members of the delegation will be able to stay in Moscow
indefinitely. This does not promise any particular speed in the conduct of the military
negotiations; particularly after the Prime minister’s reference yesterday in Parliament to
precedent (negotiations for the Anglo-Japanese alliance lasted 6 months, for the AngloFrench entente-9 months, for the Anglo-Russian entente-15 months, and so forth). 100
Surtis wrote to Molotov that the selection of the French delegation of “predominately narrow
specialists is also witness to the inspection aims of the delegation—to their intention to find out,
above all else, the condition of our army.” 101 The Anglo-French delegates wanted to do anything
and everything short of reaching an agreement.
British documents, unknown to the Soviet negotiators, reveal the true intentions of the
Moscow mission. A British directive to the delegation stated:
The British government is unwilling to enter into any detailed commitments which are
likely to tie our hands in all circumstances. Endeavors should therefore be made to
confine the military agreement to the broadest possible terms. Something along the lines
of an agreed statement of policy may meet the case…If the Russians propose that the
British and French governments should communicate to the Polish, Rumanian or Baltic
States proposals involving cooperation with the Soviet government or General Staff, the
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Delegation should not commit themselves but refer home. The Delegation should not
discuss the defense of the Baltic states, since neither Great Britain nor France have
guaranteed these states. 102
Soviet concerns were indeed well founded. The mission to Moscow was a cruel façade.
On August 2, Surtis cabled Molotov more upsetting news. In a meeting with Georges
Mandel, French minister of Colonies, Surtis reported that:
Mandel has received information that the mission is leaving for Moscow without a
worked out plan. This is disturbing and casts doubt on the seriousness of their approach
to the negotiations. The reason for all this, according to Mandel, is that here and in
London hopes of reaching an accommodation with Berlin are far from having been
dismissed. 103
Britain and France were engaged in a dual diplomacy, with the USSR as a secondary participant.
As Surtis reported, their very “seriousness” was questionable.
On August 12, the talks began. The Soviet Union introduced concrete proposals for
action and the circumstances requiring the providing of defense against aggression. Not
surprisingly, Britain and France remained vague and delayed any hope for a conclusion.
According to Voroshilov, “the cardinal question” was the USSR’s assistance to Poland and
Rumania. He commented at the session on August 14 that, “the military missions of Great
Britain and France had not raised this question themselves and had not brought a precise answer
to it.” 104 He continued with a clear outline of Soviet objectives in the negotiations:
The admission of Soviet troops to Polish territory through the Vilna corridor and Galicia
and through Rumanian territory comprises the prerequisite condition for our negotiations
and a joint agreement between the three states. If this is not resolved positively, then I
have my doubts about the usefulness of our negotiations in general. I do not think it quite
right to say as General Doumenec and other representatives of the French and British
military missions have said, that Poland and Rumania will ask for assistance
themselves. 105
At the August 15 meeting, Admiral Drax informed the delegates that the Anglo-French missions
had transmitted the Soviet statement to their respective governments and were awaiting a
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response. The Anglo-French delegates were closely following their instructions and creating
more delay. While playing Russia for the patsy, England continued detailed discussions with
Germany regarding an accommodation, which would move Hitler toward his goal of eastward
expansion. We must ask at this crucial moment, which nation(s) really sought peace?
By August 21, the Anglo-French representatives in Moscow still had received no word
concerning the “cardinal Question” regarding Soviet troop passage through Poland and Rumania.
Voroshilov then concluded that further negotiations would be fruitless. 106 Despite Hitler’s
actions, Britain and France wanted to avoid war and could not understand the value of an
alliance with the USSR. The war London and Paris wanted to avoid was a war in the west, not in
the east.
NAZI DIPLOMATS UNDER PRESSURE TO CONCLUDE A PACT WITH THE USSR
Meanwhile, Ribbentrop and the Nazi foreign office sought to take advantage of the
conflicting Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks. On August 14, Ribbentrop telegraphed Schulenburg in
Moscow with instructions to “call upon Herr Molotov personally” and relate to him that “there
exist no real conflicts of interest between Germany and the U.S.S.R. The living spaces of
Germany and the U.S.S.R. touch each other, but in their natural requirements they do not
conflict.” The German Ambassador should inform Molotov “that the capitalistic Western
democracies are the unforgiving enemies of both National Socialist Germany and of the
U.S.S.R.” In order to clarify German intentions Schulenburg informed his host that “Reich
Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop is prepared to make a short visit to Moscow in order, in the
name of the Führer, to set forth the Führer's views to Herr Stalin.” Finally in an attached annex,
Ribbentrop requested that Schulenburg “do not give Herr Molotov these instructions in writing,
but that you read them to him.” 107 Germany approached the USSR, not vice versa. Ribbentrop
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was in a hurry to conclude a pact before the planned attack on Poland. As he informed
Schulenburg, he was willing to go to Moscow personally to meet Molotov and Stalin. The
Germans were quite serious. Even with this direct overture, Molotov held fast. He requested
certain “adequate preparations” in order “that the exchange of opinions might lead to results” as
Schulenburg reported to Ribbentrop on August 15. Molotov was not interested in protracted
discussions, but sought specific outcomes. 108
On August 16 the pace of German negotiations continued to intensify. Schulenburg
reported to Weizsacker, the State Secretary that:
Herr Molotov was quite unusually compliant and candid. I received the impression that
the proposal of the visit of the Reich Minister was very flattering personally to Herr
Molotov and that he considers it an actual proof of our good intentions.
In Herr Molotov's statements yesterday, the surprising moderation in his demands on us
also seems to be worthy of note. He did not once use the words "Anti-Comintern Pact…"
More significant is his quite clearly expressed wish to conclude a non-aggression pact
with us.
Despite all efforts, we did not succeed in ascertaining entirely clearly what Herr Molotov
desired in the matter of the Baltic States.
It actually looks at the moment as if we would achieve the desired results in the
negotiations here. 109
At this crucial juncture, with the Anglo-Franco-Soviet discussions deadlocked over
language, Molotov had to entertain other options.
With a break in the Soviet wall, Ribbentrop did not want the moment to pass. On August
16, He instructed Schulenburg to increase the pace of the talks and to arrange a quick trip for the
Foreign Minister to Moscow. The Foreign Minister informed the Ambassador that:
1) the points brought up by Herr Molotov are in accordance with German desires. That is,
Germany is ready to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and, if the
Soviet Government so desires, one which would be irrevocable for a term of twenty-five
years.
2) The Führer is of the opinion that, in view of the present situation, and of the possibility
of the occurrence any day of serious incidents (please at this point explain to Herr
Molotov that Germany is determined not to endure Polish provocation indefinitely), a
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basic and rapid clarification of German-Russian relations and the mutual adjustment of
the pressing questions are desirable.
Additionally, Ribbentrop wanted to arrive in Moscow at the end of the present week or early the
next in order to conclude the particulars. Finally, he requested that Schulenburg read the
instructions to Molotov and ask for the reaction of the Soviet government. 110
Schulenburg quickly reported Molotov’s reply on August 18. Molotov remained
cautious, hoping for a break in the Anglo-Franco-Soviet discussions. He suggested that Germany
and the USSR fortify their trade relations before the conclusion of a diplomatic pact. Thereafter,
Molotov suggested that the two nations could “conclude a non-aggression pact or the
reaffirmation of the neutrality pact of 1926, with the simultaneous conclusion of a special
protocol which would define the interests of the signatory parties in this or that question of
foreign policy and which would form an integral part of the pact.” He concluded that the Soviet
Government “was very gratified” by Germany’s proposed visit of the Reich Foreign Minister
“since the dispatch of such a distinguished public figure and statesman emphasized the
earnestness of the intentions of the German Government. This stood in noteworthy contrast to
England, who, in the person of Strang, had sent only an official of the second class to Moscow.”
Molotov added that, “A journey by the Reich Foreign Minister, however, required thorough
preparation...” 111
Molotov, still trying to buy time, eventually agreed that Ribbentrop could visit on August
26 or 27, after the signing of a commercial agreement. The Soviets were in no hurry to conclude
a pact while talks with England and France continued. Ribbentrop continued to press for an
earlier date and instructed Schulenburg to press Molotov. Schulenburg reported to the Reich
Foreign Minister on August 19 that Molotov remained suspicious. While the Soviet Government
understood the importance of Ribbentrop’s visit, Molotov explained “that for the present it was
193

not possible even approximately to fix the time of the journey since it required thorough
preparation.” Schulenburg, fulfilling the instructions of Ribbentrop, “repeatedly and very
emphatically advanced for the need for haste…”Molotov quickly responded that the economic
agreements had not been finalized, much less the text of a non-aggression pact. Molotov
concluded the meeting explaining that “Herr won Ribbentrop might arrive in Moscow on August
26 or 27” if the economic agreement was signed. On August 19, Molotov delivered to
Schulenburg the Soviet draft of a non-aggression pact. 112
Hitler, frustrated with the delays and anxious to attack Poland, sent a letter to Joseph
Stalin requesting an expedited visit by Ribbentrop. The Führer was ready for war. He related to
Stalin that “the tension between Germany and Poland has become intolerable. Polish demeanor
toward a great power is such that a crisis may arise any day.” He informed Stalin that He
accepted the draft non-aggression pact but that some clarification was needed. Therefore, Hitler
requested that “you receive my Foreign Minister on Tuesday, August 22, but at the latest on
Wednesday, August 23. The Reich Foreign Minister has full powers to draw up and sign the nonaggression pact as well as the protocol.” 113 Stalin agreed to the visit and informed Molotov. The
Foreign Commissar in turn informed the German Foreign Office. Stalin told Hitler that “the
people of our countries need peaceful relations with each other. The assent of the German
Government to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact provides the foundation for eliminating
the political tension and for the establishment of peace and collaboration between our
countries.” 114
TOO LATE FOR BRITAIN AND FRANCE
On August 22, France responded positively to the Soviet proposal of troop passage.
Voroshilov, quite pessimistic of this sudden turnabout asked, “What position in this whole matter
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do the Polish and Rumanian governments take? Are they abreast of the situation or was the
French government’s answer given without the knowledge of Poland and Rumania? General
Doumenc replied, “je ne sais pas.” 115 Voroshilov, naturally upset, replied that, “it is impossible
for me to agree to take part in further meetings until such time as all official answers are
received.” 116 Molotov then commented that, “when the matter is fully clarified and all the replies
have been received, then we will go to work.” 117 After at least 5 years of intense effort to create
an anti-fascist front, collective security finally died. Ribbentrop’s plane arrived in Moscow on
August 23.
Hitler was ecstatic, not only with the diplomatic aspects of the pact, but also with the
continued connection to Soviet exchange. The German economy needed to avoid the devastating
effects of an allied blockade. The Germans and Soviets quickly opened talks for a huge trade
deal, finalized in February, 1940. Trade volume was set at between 600-700 million
Reichsmarks. The Soviet Union became Germany’s leading supplier of animal feed while
supplying the Third Reich with 74 per cent of its phosphate needs, 67 per cent of its asbestos
imports, 65 per cent of chrome ore, 55 per cent of manganese, 40 per cent of nickel imports and
34 percent of imported oil. Colonel Eduard Wagner, Quartermaster General of the German Army
asserted that “the conclusion of this treaty saved us.” 118 Hitler now had a free hand to fulfill his
dreams of conquest.
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CONCLUSION
From the foundation of the Bolshevik state in November, 1917, Lenin understood that
domestic stability required international peace, at least in the short run. The weak and
unorganized worker’s paradise suffered massive internal and external problems that demanded
immediate attention lest the grand socialist experiment would simply disappear. On the day after
the storming of the Winter Palace, Lenin issued the decree on peace and established the People’s
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Peace became the first priority of Lenin’s policy; a peace
policy that threatened to split the Bolshevik movement itself. Lenin was the founder of
“collective security.” To be clear, the peace described in this dissertation was a peace of
convenience; a peace of preparation for the coming conflict, hence perhaps “peace for the wrong
reasons” but peace nevertheless. With peace, resolution of differences remains possible while
war creates a different dynamic. I am not arguing that the Soviets were saints nor did they
deserve medals. They did recognize the danger of Hitler and sought to do something about him.
Britain and France were not so supportive of Soviet overtures.
After the harsh Treaty of Brest Litovsk and the replacement of Trotsky, Lenin further
reformed domestic politics when he introduced the New Economic Policy in 1921. Economic
success and international peace would secure the gains of the revolution, especially as it became
clear that Marx’s worldwide upheaval would not occur in the foreseeable future. War and
conflict held no fascination for Lenin. For socialism to spread, it must first establish itself in
Russia; no small task.
As World War I dragged on into 1917, the Bolshevik revolution forever altered the
world’s landscape. Western diplomats and politicians feared the hoards of workers and peasants
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streaming into Paris, London, and Washington. Few understood or appreciated the uniquely
Russian roots of the conflict. True, Marx had predicted a worker’s revolt across Europe (he
thought that Germany would lead the way; he never imagined Russia, with its economic
backwardness and peasant base), but the end of the Great War brought no such unified reaction.
The Comintern, the international voice of Communism, did spread the Marxian rhetoric of
violent revolution, but the reality did not match the verbiage. Under Stalin, the Soviet leadership
did not object to the Nazi anti-communist policies in Germany and regarded the SPD and other
European socialist parties as “social fascists.” As Litvinov commented, the pronouncements of
the Comintern were a hindrance to his “collective security” policy.
However, the fear of Bolshevism dominated western diplomacy throughout the inter-war
period. The USSR appeared menacing, particularly the revolutionary rhetoric of the Comintern.
Stalin’s actions, both within the Soviet Union and abroad, served to deepen the concern. Britain
and France did not seriously consider the possibility of substantive relations with the Soviet
state. Hitler seemed the least offensive of the two choices; at least he was moving eastward. This
anti-Bolshevik outlook even shaped the foreign policy of the Holy See in its relations with Hitler.
Pope Pius XI and the future Pope Pius XII, then Vatican Secretary of State, believed that the
Communist threat was the greater evil in Europe in the 1930s. Hence, Vatican relations with
Nazi Germany took on a more conciliatory tone. A Catholic Cardinal, in a report to the future
Pope regarding the position of Nazis in the Church, recommended:
If the new [Nazi] government demonstrates in fact that the fears of the bishops were
unfounded—if in addition the new government continues to remain strong in the battle
against advancing Bolshevism and public immorality, the bishops will gladly give up
their distrust of the party and, for example, permit churchgoing in closed ranks, which up
to now was viewed as a demonstration and therefore forbidden, and permit the swastika
flag at Church burials. 1
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As the USSR faced these widely-held misperceptions, it continued to promote substantive peace
initiatives. The challenge it faced was the incongruence between rhetoric and action.
Unfortunately for the Soviet Union, “perception” was reality in western foreign offices.
Justice Louis Brandeis summed up the paralyzing power of fear in his concurring
opinion in the case of Whitney v. California in 1927 “… it is hazardous to discourage thought,
hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces
stable government…men feared witches and burnt women.” 2 When fear dominates, a distorted
perception becomes reality, no matter the facts. Truth becomes a victim. As during the cold war
after World War II, Communism became the bogey man for everything. Nothing valuable or
worthwhile could come from Russia and the Communists were always lying. These attitudes
made for limited diplomatic or political options, especially when the record seemed to make no
difference. Importantly, during the 1920s and 1930s, anti-Soviet policy and rhetoric had
substantive political benefits for those aspiring to higher offices in the western democracies. A
good candidate could not seem “soft on communism.”
Despite these obstacles to international stability, the newly formed USSR persisted. In the
1920s, the Soviet Union concluded trade agreements with England and received diplomatic
recognition from France and Germany. The USSR had products of interest to the west but it still
remained a political and cultural enemy. As the documents illustrate, no-one could trust the
Soviet Union. The important issue for the west was to keep the USSR in check militarily and
prevent its expansion. Somehow, the western politicians overlooked Russia’s value as a
substantive player in world affairs. In many capitals in the 1920s, hope remained that this new
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political and social experiment shortly would simply fade away. In no case should the west aid
the viability of the USSR.
With the west mired in the depths of the Depression, new Soviet Foreign Minister
Litvinov sought substantive diplomatic relations with all interested nations in the form of nonaggression pacts. He was especially interested in settling the disputed eastern borders of
Germany in an attempt to prevent future conflict and German movement eastward. His “Eastern
Locarno” proposal failed mainly because of western disinterest. Britain and France wanted to tie
up the Soviet Union in endless talks without the possibility of success. Paris and London clearly
feared Russia more than Hitler and began a long and dangerous diplomatic game of playing
Russia against Germany. As we analyze the existing documentary record, admittedly incomplete
from the Soviet side, we clearly see a fearful Britain and a France playing Russia for a
diplomatic fool. Anglo-French diplomats received direct instructions to delay and elongate the
talks to the points of futility. A.J.P. Taylor describes the British position:
If dates mean anything, the British were spinning things out, the Russians were anxious
to conclude. There is other evidence that the British treated the negotiations in a casual
way, more to placate public opinion than to achieve anything. Anthony Eden offered to
go to Moscow on a special mission; Chamberlain turned down his offer. A member of the
foreign office who was sent to Moscow for some obscure purpose (certainly not to
conclude an alliance) wrote home light-heartedly on 21 June: ‘I daresay we shall arrive at
something in the end. When I say “in the end” I recall a remark of Naggiar’s [the French
ambassador] this afternoon that he will probably have reached the age limit and gone into
retirement before I get away from Moscow.’ 3
Taylor concluded in his own biting manner that, “If British diplomacy seriously aspired to
alliance with Soviet Russia in 1939, then the negotiations toward this end were the most
incompetent transactions since Lord North lost the American colonies.” 4 Anglo-French
diplomats hoped that if Hitler believed that an Anglo-Franco-Soviet agreement was immanent,
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perhaps he would re-consider his bellic position or at least move eastward as he promised in
Mein Kampf. In other words, Britain and France wanted an eastern war in the hopes of
destroying both the Soviet Union and Germany and wanted to be left alone; not a realistic
position. They did not dream that Hitler and Stalin would align at the last minute, thereby
guaranteeing a Nazi victory in the east and that the Nazi Führer would turn westward and attack
Britain and France. Anglo-French diplomats and politicians, with few exceptions, missed the
forest for the trees.
If, as Nekrich, Tucker, Haslam and others of the “German School” argue, that it was the
avowed aim of Soviet foreign policy to align with Hitler from the early 1930s, why all the Soviet
time, resources, and effort to conclude alliances with the exact opposite as the goal? As the
released Soviet documents illustrate, Litvinov and Molotov directed proposal after proposal in an
attempt to conclude an anti-Nazi pact with Britain and France. The Soviet diplomats responded
to the most inane requests for clarification of clear principles. Finally, after Britain and France
sent second-rate delegations to Moscow to buy even more time, Hitler sent an aggressive
Ribbentrop to Moscow by plane to conclude the pact. Alliance with the Nazis was hardly the
central tenant of Soviet foreign policy, but the last alternative in what the Soviets feared was an
emerging western alliance against the Soviet Union.
With the long shadow of the cold war dominating the diplomatic history of this crucial
period, the Nazi-Soviet pact remains, in the eyes of many, as the central cause of the European
war. E.H. Carr explained the difficulties of writing impersonal, detached history centered only on
facts and interpretations. He argued for the historian’s need for “imaginative understanding” of
the minds of the people with whom he is dealing. He clarified his position:
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I say ‘imaginative understanding,’ not ‘sympathy,’ lest sympathy should be supposed to
imply agreement. The nineteenth century was weak in mediaeval history, because it was
too much repelled by the superstitious beliefs of the middle Ages and by the barbarities
which they inspired, to have any imaginative understanding of mediaeval people. Or take
Burkhart’s censorious remark about the Thirty Years’ War: ‘It is scandalous for a creed,
no matter whether it is Catholic or Protestant, to place its salvation above the integrity of
the nation.’…Much of what has been written in English-speaking countries in the last ten
years about the Soviet Union, and in the Soviet Union about English-speaking countries,
has been vitiated by this inability to achieve even the most elementary measure of
imaginative understanding of what goes on in the mind of the other party, so that the
words and actions of the other are always made to appear malign, senseless, or
hypocritical. History cannot be written unless the historian can achieve some kind of
contact with the mind of those about whom he is writing. 5
When Professor Carr wrote these profound words, access to even the most basic Soviet
documents did not exist. Now, with the release of some, not all, and important material still
hidden, we can carefully begin our “imaginative understanding” of this crucial period in
diplomatic history freed from the shadow of the Cold War. While the leaders of the Soviet Union
perpetrated some of the most heinous crimes in the history of the world, during the interwar
period the USSR sought peace and a united front against Hitler. After years of effort, and when
the alliance became impossible because of western intransigence, the Soviet Union turned to
other options.
A sober assessment of the record, such that it is, indicates that this alliance was a
distasteful last resort of Soviet policy in the face of a less than honest Britain and France. The
Soviets sought to avoid war at all costs, not to cause one.
Based on the existing evidence, the Soviet Union genuinely sought collective security
from its founding to the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. As we re-assess the origins of World
War II, England and France must come in as principal actors in the outbreak of this terrible
conflict. Their diplomatic stance proved tragic.
206

END NOTES
1

Hubert Wulf, Pope and Devil: The Vatican’s Archives and The Third Reich. Kenneth Kronenberg (tran),
(Cambridge: Belnap Press, 2010), 164. Pius XI felt that Hitler was the only anti-Communist statesman. See Ibid.,
161.

2

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 47 S. CT. 641, 71 L.ED. 1095(1927).

3

A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961), 231.

4

Ibid., 229.

5

E. H. Carr, What is History (New York: Vintage, 1961), 27.

207

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I.

Document Collections.

Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik, 1919-1945 Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt, 1950.
Dokumente der Deutschen Politik und Geschichte. Berlin: Dokumenten-Verlag, 1939.
Documents and Materials on the Eve of the Second World War. 2 vols. (Moscow:
Institute for Political Literature, 1948).
Documents on German Foreign Policy. Series C, Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1957-1983.
Documents on German Foreign Policy. Series D, Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1949-1964.
Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. London: H.M. Stationery Office,
1946- .
Dokumenty Vneshnei Politili 1939 god. 2 vols (Moscow: Institute for Political Literature,
1992).
Dokumenty Vnshnei Politiki SSSR. Moscow: Institute for Political Literature, 1957-1977.
Foreign Relations of the United States. Washington: United States Government Printing
Office, 1956.
International Affairs Affairs (Moscow) -1963 and 1969.
God krizisa, 1938-1939: Dokumenty i Materialy, 2 vols (Moscow: Institute for Political
Literature, 1990).
Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941. Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1948.
Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1951-1953.
Soviet Peace Efforts on the Eve of World War Two (Moscow: Institute for Political
Literature, 1973), 2 vols., eds., V.M. Falin, A.A. Gromyko, A.N. Grylev, M.A.
Kharlamov, V.M. Khvostov, S.P. Kozyrev, V. Ya. Siplos, I.N. Zemskov.
208

Ursachen und Folgen: Vom deutschen Zusammenbruch 1918 und 1945 bis zur
staatlichen Neuordnung Deutschlands in der Gegenwart. Berlin: Dokumenten
Verlag, 1958.

II.

Newspapers

Izvestia
Kommunisticheskii Internatsional
Pravda

III.

Secondary Sources

N. A. Abramov, “Osobaya Missiya Davida Kandelaki.” Voprosy Istorii, (1989), nos. 4-5,
144-156.
Albrecht-Carrie, Rene. A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of
Vienna.New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958.
Baynes, Norman H. The Speeches of Adolf Hitler.Vol I.London: OxfordUniversity
Press, 1942.
Beloff, Max. The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia.Volume I: 1929-1936.London:
OxfordUniversity Press, 1947.
Birt, Raymond. “Personality and Foreign Policy.”Political Psychology, vol. 14, no. 4.
(Dec. 1993): 607-625.
Bracher, Karl Dietrich. “Das Anfangsstadium der
HitlerschenAussenpolitik.”Vieteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 5, No. 1 (January,
1957): 63-76.
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin, Parallel Lives (New York: Vintage, 1991).
Cameron, J. David. “To Transform the Revolution into an Evolution: Underlying
Assumptions of German Foreign Policy toward Soviet Russia, 1919-1927. Journal of
Contemporary History, vol. 40, No. 1 (January, 2005): 7-24.

209

Carley, Michael Jabara. “A Fearful Consternation of Circumstances: the Anglo-Soviet
Rapprochement, 1934-6.” Contemporary European History, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Mar.,
1996): 29-69.
Carley, Michael Jabara, “End of the ‘Low, Dishonest Decade’: Failure of the AngloSoviet Alliance in 1939.” Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 45, No. 2 (1993): 303-341.
Carley, Michael Jabara, and Richard Kent Debo. “Always in Need of Credit: The USSR
and Franco-German Economic Cooperation, 1926-1929.” French Historical Studies,
Vol. 20, No. 3, (Summer, 1997): 315-356.
Carr, Edward Hallett. The Bolshevik Revolution.1917-1923.vol. III. Baltimore: Penguin
Books, 1966.
_________________.German-Soviet Relations Between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951.
_________________.What is History? New York: Vintage, 1961.
Craig, Gordon A. and Felix Gilbert (eds.), The Diplomats, 1919-1939. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1953.
Davies, R.W., Soviet economic development from Lenin to Khrushchev. Cambridge
University Press, 1998.
Debo, Richard K., “G.V. Chicherin: A Historical Perspective” in Gabriel Gorodetsky
Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1991, A Retrospective.London: Frank Cass, 1994.
Deutscher, Issac. The Prophet Armed: Trotsky 1879-1921.New York: Vintage, 1965.
Dirksen, Herbert von.Moscow, Tokyo, London: Twenty Years of German Foreign
Policy.Norman:University of Oklahoma Press, 1952.
Dyck, Harvey Leonard. Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 1926-1933, A Study in
Diplomatic Instability. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966.
Eudin, Xenia Joukoff and Robert M. Slusser.Soviet Foreign Policy, 1928-1934:
Documents and Materials,Vol II.University Park: The PennsylvaniaStateUniversity
Press, 1967.
Gatzke, Hans W. “Russo-German Military Cooperation During the Weimar
Republic.”American Historical Review, Vol. LXIII, No. 1 (March, 1962): 565-597.

210

Girnis, Kestutis. “The Historiography of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.” Lituanus, vol.
34, no. 2 (Summer, 1989), 1-9.
Henry, Bernhard (ed.), Gustav Stresemann, Vermachtniss, 3 vols.Berlin: Ulstein, 1932.
Hilger, Gustav and Alfred G. Meyer.The Incompatable Allies.New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1953.
Hilger, Gustav. Soviet Russia (N.Y.), 14 August 1920.
Haslam, Jonathan. The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe,
1933-39.New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984.
Hein, Paul N. “The Collapse of the Weimar Republic and the National Socialist
Revolution, 1923-1933: The View from Warsaw and Moscow.” The Polish Review,
vol. 25, (1980), Issue 3/4, 28-48.
Hill, Leonidas E. “The Wilhelmstrasse in the Nazi Era.”Political Science Quarterly, Vol.
LXXXII, No.4 (December, 1967): 546-570.
Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf, Translated by Ralph Manheim. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1971.
Hochman, Juri. The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 19341938.Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984.
Kellogg, Michael. The Russian Roots of Nazism: White Émigrés and the making of
National Socialism, 1917-1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Kennan, George. Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin. Boston: Little Brown and
Company, 1960.
Kershaw, Ian. The Nazi Dictatorship, Problems & Perspectives of Interpretation, 4th ed.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Krasnin, L.B. VoprosyVneshneiTorgovli. Moscow: State Publishing House for Political
Literature, 1928.
Langsam, Walter C., Documents and Readings in the History of Europe Since
1918.Chicago: Lippincott, 1951.

211

Laqueur, Walter. Russia and Germany: A Century of Conflict.Boston: Little Brown and
Company, 1965.
Lee, Marshall M., and Wolfgang Michalka German Foreign Policy, 1917-1933:
Continuity or Break New York: Berg Publishers, 1987.
Lenin, V.I. Sochinenie. Moscow: State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1935.
_________. Sochinenie. Moscow: State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1947.
_________. Sochinenie. Moscow: State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1950.
Lindenfeld, David F. “The Prevalence of Irrational Thinking in the Third Reich: Notes
Toward the Reconstruction of Modern Value Rationality.” Central European
History,Vol. 30, No. 3, (September,1997): 365-385.
Lyubimov N. N., and A. N. Erlikh. “The 1922 Genoa Conference.”International Affairs
(Moscow), No. 8, (August, 1963): 97-103.
__________. “The 1922 Genoa Conference.”International Affairs (Moscow), No. 9,
(September, 1963): 78-83.
Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engles.The Communist Manifesto with Related Documents,
John E. Toews (ed.), Boston: Bedford St. Martin’s, 1999.
Neilson, Keith. Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 19191939 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Nekrich, Aleksandr M. Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 19221941.New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.
Phillips, Hugh. Between Revolution and the West: A Political Biography of Maxim M.
Litvinov. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.
Pipes, Richard E., “Domestic Politics and Foreign Affiars,” Russian Foreign Policy:
Essays in Historical Perspective, Ivo J. Lederer (ed.), (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1962).
Post, Gaines Jr., The Civil-Military Fabric of Weimar Foreign Policy.Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1973.
Radek, Karl. ZurTaktik des Kommunismus: EinSchreiben an den Oktober-Parteitag der
KPD (Hamburg, 1919).
212

Roberts, Geoffrey. “Stalin, the Pact with Nazi Germany, and the Origins of Postwar
Soviet Historiography.”Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 4, No. 4, (Fall 2002): 93103.
______________. The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War: RussoGerman Realtions and the Road to War, 1933-1941. New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1995.
______________. The Unholy Alliance: Stalin’s Pact with Hitler. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1989.
Schlusser, Robert M. “The Role of the Foreign Ministry.” Russian Foreign Policy:
Essays in Historical Perspective. Ivo J. Lederer(ed.), New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1962.
Semyonov, V., “The Leninist Principles of Soviet Diplomacy”, International Affairs
(Moscow), vol 4, (April, 1969): 3-8.
Service, Robert. Stalin: A Biography. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2004.
_____________. A History of Soviet Russia from Nicholas II toVladimir Putin.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003.
Shore, Zachary, What Hitler Knew: The Battle for Information in Nazi Foreign
Policy.New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Snyder, Timothy. Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin. New York: Basic
Books, 2010.
Sontag, Raymond. A Broken World: 1919-1939. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.
Spalcke, Karl. “BegegnungenZwischenReichswehr und RoterArmee.”Aussenpolitik, Vol.
8 (August, 1958): 506-513.
Speidel, Helm. “Reichwehr und Rote Armee.”Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, Vol. I
No. 1 (January, 1953): 9-45.
Sperber, The Kaiser’s Voters: Electors and Elections in Imperial Germany,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
Stalin, Joseph. Problems of Leninism. New York: International Publishers, 1934.
_____________. Works.vol. 7, 1925. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House,
1954.
213

_____________. Works, vol. 14, Marxist Internet Archive.
Stein, George. “Russo-German Military Collaboration: The Last Phase, 1933.” Political
Science Quarterly Vol. LXXVII, No. 1 (March 1962): 54-71.
Steiner, Zara.“The Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the Czechoslovakian
Crisis in 1938: New Material from the Soviet Archives.” The Historical Journal, Vol.
42, No. 3 (Sept. 1999): 751-779.
Taylor, A.J.P. The Origins of the Second World War. New York: Simon and Schuster,
1961.
Tooze, Adam. The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi
Economy. New York: Penguin, 2007.
Treadgold, Donald W. Twentieth Century Russia, 7thed, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.
Trotsky, Leon. Mirnyne Peregovory.
__________. Moia Zhizn, vol. II. (Berlin: 1930).
Tucker, Robert. Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941. New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, 1990.
___________. “The Emergence of Stalin’s Foreign Policy.”Slavic Review, vol. 36, No. 4
(Dec., 1977): 563-589.
__________. The Lenin Anthology. New York: W.W. Norton, 1975.
__________. Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879-1929, A Study in History and Personality.
New York: W.W. Norton, 1973.
___________. “Stalin, Bukharin and History as Conspiracy.” Introduction to The Great
Purge Trial, R.C. Tucker and Stephen F. Cohen, eds. (New York, 1963).
Ulam, Adam B. A History of Soviet Russia.New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976.
__________. Expansion and Co-Existence: A History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 19171967. New York: Praeger, 1968.
.Uldricks, Teddy J., “A.J.P. Taylor and the Russians.” in G. Martel, ed., The Origins of
the SecondWorld War Reconsidered (Boston: Allen &Unwin, 1986).
______________. Diplomacy and Ideology: The Origins of Soviet Foreign Relations,
1917-1930. London: Sage Publishers, 1979.
214

Weinberg, Gerhard. The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany: 2 Vols. Diplomatic
Revolution in Europe, 1933-1936. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.
____________. Germany and the Soviet Union 1939-194.Leiden, 1954.
Wollstein, Gunter. “Rudolf Nadolny-AussenministerohneVerwendung.”Vierteljahrshefte
fur Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 28, and No. 1 (January, 1980): 47-93.
Wright, Jonathan. Gustav Stresemann, Weimar’s Greatest Statesman. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002.
Wulf, Hubert. Pope and Devil: The Vatican’s Archives and the Third Reich, trans
Kenneth Kronenberg (Cambridge: Belnap Press, 2010).

215

VITA
Mark Davis Kuss was born in 1956 in New Orleans, Louisiana. He graduated from John
Curtis Christian High School in 1974. In the fall of that year, he entered the University of New
Orleans, from which he received a bachelor of arts degree, Magna Cum Laude, in the spring of
1978, in communications. In the fall of 1978 he entered the Graduate School of the University of
New Orleans in the Department of History and received his master of arts in history in the spring
of 1987.
In the spring of 1982 he received a Juris Doctorate degree, Cum Laude, from the Tulane
University School of Law.
In the fall of 1982 he received a bachelor of arts degree, Magna Cum Laude, from the
University of New Orleans in German.
In the fall of 2005, he entered the doctoral program in history at Louisiana State University in
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in May, 2012.

216

